



 B & M Development Consultants PLC
Founding member of the Ethiopian Consultants Association

Support from DFID's Climate High Level Investment Programme to the CRGE Facility

2016 Review

Submitted to DFID and the CRGE Facility by LTS International Limited and B&M Consultants PLC.

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Acronyms

AEFWPDA	Amhara Environment, Forest and Wildlife Protection Development Authority
AF	Adaptation Fund
BoFED	Bureau of Finance and Economic Development
BPR	Business Process Re-engineering
CCF-E	Climate Change Forum Ethiopia
CDKN	Climate and Development Knowledge Network
CHIP	Climate High Level Investment Programme
CR	Climate Resilience
CRGE	Climate Resilient Green Economy
CRS	Climate Resilience Strategy
CSI	Climate Smart Initiative
DA	Development Agents
DCT	Donor Coordination Team
DFID	Department for International Development
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EPLAUA	Environmental Protection, Land Administration & Use Agency
ESSF	Environmental and Social Safeguards Framework
ETB	Ethiopian Birr
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FGD	Focus group discussions
FTI	Fast Track Investment
GCAP	Global Climate Adaptation Partnership
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GE	Green Economy
GGGI	Global Green Growth Institute
GHG	Greenhouse Gas

GoE	Government of Ethiopia
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan
HABP	Household Asset Building Programme
HH	Household
ICF	International Climate Fund
INDC	Intended Nationally Determined Contribution
IPCC	International Panel on Climate Change
IPDC	Industrial Parks Development Corporation
LEPB	Land and Environmental Protection Bureau
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MCAM	Mainstreaming Capacity Assessments Matrix
MEF	Ministry of Environment and Forest
MEFCC	Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change
MFI	Micro-finance institute
MoANR	Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources
MOFEC	Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation
MoFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoI	Ministry of Industry
MoT	Ministry of Transport
MoWIE	Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Electricity
MRV	Measurement, Verification and Reporting
MUDH	Ministry of Urban Development and Housing
NDRMC	National Disaster Risk Management Commission
NPC	National Planning Commission
NRM	Natural resource management
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Criteria
OM	Operations Manual
PDIA	Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation
PIF	Policy and Investment Framework
PPP	Public-private partnerships
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme
PV	Photovoltaic

RAG	Red Amber Green
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation
SCIP	Strategic Climate Institutions Programme
SLMP	Sustainable Land Management Programme
SNNPR	Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region
SRAP	Sector Reduction Action Plan
TA	Technical Assistance
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United nations develop programme
UNFCCC	United Nationals Framework convention on climate change
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VfM	Value for Money
VFM	Value for Money
WB	World Bank
WOFED	Woreda Office of finance and economic development

The names and acronyms of many GoE ministries have changed during the lifetime of CHIP. Unless explained in the text, we have used the most recent names and acronyms even when referring to events in the past where the institution may have had a different name.

The review was conducted by LTS International and B&M Development Consultants who together act as the CHIP M&E agent. The primary authors of the main report are Kirsty Wilson and Rebecca Adler. Gadissa Bultosa, John van Mossel, Gulden Bayaz, and Sheena Matthews produced interim deliverables and Raya Abagodu, Tesfa Berhanu and Tarekegn Kassa also made valuable contributions to both data collection and analysis. Quality assurance was provided by Dr Paddy Abbot, Jenny Chapman and Matthew Savage.

This report focuses in detail on only one component of CHIP's work – the investment of £13m to the Government of Ethiopia's CRGE Facility and DFID's wider policy engagement in the GoE-led CRGE process, including provision of technical assistance.

Concepts and terms used in the review

CRGE Vision: The goal to achieve middle income status by 2025 in a climate resilient green economy (no net growth in emissions).

Climate High Level Investment Programme (CHIP): This is a DFID programme providing up to £25.6 million of UK International Climate Fund (ICF) resources to several components over four years from September 2012 to December 2016. CHIP adopted a twin-track approach supporting sectoral interventions in relation to food security and forestry alongside support channelled through the Government of Ethiopia's CRGE Facility.

Climate Resilience: Climate resilience can be generally defined as the capacity for a socio-ecological system to: (1) absorb stresses and maintain function in the face of external stresses imposed upon it by climate change and (2) adapt, reorganize, and evolve into more desirable configurations that improve the sustainability of the system, leaving it better prepared for future climate change impacts.

Climate Change Mainstreaming: The integration of climate change response into the development process. Climate considerations become 'core' to all activities and are no longer a set of isolated standalone activities.

Climate Change Adaptation: Adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities.¹

Climate Change Mitigation: An anthropogenic intervention to reduce the anthropogenic forcing of the climate system; it includes strategies to reduce greenhouse gas sources and emissions and enhancing greenhouse gas sinks.

Measurement, Verification and Reporting (MRV): A term used to describe all measures which states take to collect data on emissions, mitigation actions and support, to compile this information in reports and inventories, and to subject these to some form of international review or analysis. This report distinguishes between MRV as a formal mechanism for mobilising climate finance and 'measurement of emissions' which does not need external verification and can be used for domestic policy purposes.

¹ IPCC (2007)

Programmatic Approaches: An approach in which a programme is developed as an overarching framework under which a series of projects can deliver to a common goal. Programmes are typically long-term (5 years) and where possible should take a sector-wide or cross-sectoral approach – i.e. A CRGE Programmatic Approach might capture all relevant CRGE priorities in one sector or in a cluster of related sectors.

Gender mainstreaming: This is defined as the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the experiences of both women and men an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.²

Results for women and girls³: This is not limited to the participation of women or girls in a particular activity, but should touch upon one of the following areas:

- Changes in access to, or control over, productive assets
- Decision-making about their own labour investments
- Control over income from their labour
- Changes in labour-sharing for household domestic tasks
- Changes to contribution to community leadership
- Changes to sense of well-being
- Changes to sense of personal safety
- Changes to self-esteem or confidence in own ability for a particular task or activity

² Draws on the UN ECOSOC resolution 2001/41 on gender mainstreaming (July 2001) which is also widely cited in Ethiopian Government manuals on gender mainstreaming such as the Ministry of Water and Ministry of Health Gender Mainstreaming Guidelines.

³ The DFID (2011) Strategic Vision for Women and Girls sets out four pillars under which results for women and girls are to be achieved these include 1) Delay first pregnancy and support safe childbirth 2) Get economic assets directly to girls and women 3) Get girls through secondary school and 4) Prevent violence against girls and women. This definition highlights results under pillars 2 and 4 which were particularly relevant to Ethiopia's CRGE and DFID's support to it.

Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
1 INTRODUCTION.....	8
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO CHIP	8
1.2 INTRODUCTION TO THIS REVIEW	8
2 APPROACH AND METHODS.....	10
2.1 REVIEW QUESTIONS	10
2.2 REVIEW METHODS.....	10
2.2.1 <i>Portfolio analysis</i>	10
2.2.2 <i>Case study approach</i>	11
2.2.3 <i>Contribution analysis</i>	13
2.2.4 <i>Mainstreaming capacity assessment</i>	13
2.2.5 <i>Value for Money Analysis</i>	14
2.2.6 <i>Approach to key informant interviews</i>	15
2.2.7 <i>Beneficiary feedback approaches</i>	15
2.2.8 <i>Data analysis and interim deliverables</i>	16
2.3 LIMITATIONS.....	16
3 CHIP'S SUPPORT TO THE CRGE	18
3.1 THE GOVERNMENT OF ETHIOPIA'S CRGE PROCESS	18
3.2 OVERVIEW OF DFID SUPPORT.....	19
3.3 OVERVIEW OF FTI PROJECTS.....	21
4 FINDINGS.....	24
4.1 TO WHAT EXTENT DID DFID SUPPORT TO THE CRGE FACILITY MAKE A RELEVANT AND ADEQUATE CONTRIBUTION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ETHIOPIA'S ABILITY TO DELIVER THE CRGE?	24
4.1.1 <i>Systems and capacity for mainstreaming</i>	24
4.1.2 <i>Fast Track Investment Results</i>	39
4.1.3 <i>Results for women and girls</i>	50
4.1.4 <i>Is there alignment or trade-off between programmatic planning and mainstreaming objectives?</i>	53
4.2 WERE THE OUTCOMES THAT THIS INVESTMENT ACHIEVED, WORTH ACHIEVING GIVEN THE INVESTMENT? DID THE PROGRAMME REPRESENT VALUE FOR MONEY?	57
4.2.1 <i>What were the outcomes of DFID's support?</i>	57
4.2.2 <i>How do costs compare to benefits?</i>	60
4.2.3 <i>To what extent were VfM principles upheld in the selection and implementation of FTI projects?</i>	66
4.2.4 <i>What impact would scaling projects have on overall costs?</i>	67
4.3 WHAT ARE THE FACTORS THAT ENABLE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO SUCCESSFULLY CONTRIBUTE TO IMPROVEMENTS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF ETHIOPIA'S SYSTEMS FOR CLIMATE RESPONSE?	67

5	CONCLUSIONS	74
5.1	HOW ADEQUATE AND RELEVANT WERE DIFD INVESTMENTS IN THE CRGE FACILITY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ETHIOPIA'S ABILITY TO DELIVER ITS CRGE VISION AND STRATEGIES?.....	74
5.2	WERE THE OUTCOMES THAT THIS INVESTMENT ACHIEVED, WORTH ACHIEVING GIVEN THE INVESTMENT? DID THE PROGRAMME REPRESENT VALUE FOR MONEY?	77
5.3	WHAT ARE THE FACTORS THAT ENABLE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY CHIP (AND OTHER PARTNERS) TO SUCCESSFULLY CONTRIBUTE TO IMPROVEMENTS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF ETHIOPIA'S SYSTEMS FOR CLIMATE RESPONSE?	80
6	RECOMMENDATIONS	81
	ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE CHIP FINAL REVIEW	85
	ANNEX 2: LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED	88
	ANNEX 3: LIST OF STAKEHOLDERS INTERVIEWED	94
	ANNEX 4: REVIEW MATRIX	100
	ANNEX 5: SAMPLE DATA COLLECTION TOOLS	108
	INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR NON-FTI BUREAU STAFF AT REGIONAL / WOREDA LEVEL.....	108
	FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE- FORESTRY PROJECTS.....	109

Executive Summary

Introduction

The Government of Ethiopia's Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) vision sets out the national objective to achieve a climate resilient middle income economy with no net growth in greenhouse gas emissions by 2025. It is recognised that this is a goal of unprecedented ambition, which rests on uncertain assumptions (no one yet knows *how* a carbon neutral middle income economy can be delivered) and touches all parts of Ethiopian economic development planning and action. It requires widespread awareness and commitment, new institutional arrangements, new targets and measurement methodologies, new funding, improved policy and programmes and a commitment to make hard decisions about priorities and to analyse and learn from experience. Early efforts on CRGE mainstreaming targeted six priority sectors, represented by Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (MoANR), Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change (MEFCC), Ministry of Industry (MoI), Ministry of Transport (MoT), Ministry of Urban Development and Housing (MUDH) and Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Electricity (MoWIE). More recently, there has been a 'whole government' commitment to reach all sectors as part of the second *Growth and Transformation Plan*.

The UK's Climate High-Level Investment Programme (CHIP) aimed to support Ethiopia to plan and implement the CRGE vision. The CHIP programme provided direct support to GoE through a strategic mainstreaming component and direct support to three sectoral programmes, the World Bank Bio Carbon Plus Fund for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) activities, the Climate Smart Initiative of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) and FAO's Integrated Agricultural Solutions programme (£2.7m).

Through the strategic mainstreaming component, DFID provided direct funding to the national climate finance institute, the CRGE Facility combined with wider policy engagement and technical advice to GoE. Funding this national climate financing facility was seen as the most promising approach to:

- Empower GoE to prioritise its own climate resources;
- Build national climate institutions;
- Promote CRGE mainstreaming into existing sectoral development initiatives;
- Avoid existing or potential political bottlenecks.

This component was implemented according to the DFID business case but experienced some delays. The 26 DFID-funded Fast Track Investment (FTI) projects implemented in the

six sectors didn't start until late 2014 or in 2015. Some were subsequently extended from an initial completion date of March 2016 to December 2016.

Scope of the review

This review focuses in detail on only the strategic mainstreaming component of CHIP's work. This represents both DFID's investment of £13m to the Government of Ethiopia's CRGE Facility and policy engagement in the GoE-led CRGE process, including provision of technical assistance.

The review is delivered by CHIP's M&E agents, LTS International and B&M Development Consultants and builds on a series of monitoring and lesson learning exercises that began in 2013. This review reflects progress up to the end of June 2016 and fulfils both accountability and learning purposes.

Review Questions

The review sought to answer three high-level questions:

1. How adequate and relevant were DIFD investments in the CRGE Facility to the Government of Ethiopia's ability to deliver its CRGE Vision and Strategies?
2. Were the outcomes that this investment achieved, worth achieving given the investment? Did the programme represent value for money?
3. What are the factors that enable technical assistance provided by CHIP (and other partners) to successfully contribute to improvements in the Government of Ethiopia's systems for climate response?

A number of supporting questions were outlined in the Review Matrix available in Annex 4.

Methods

The review methods were agreed between DFID and the CRGE Facility and are documented in a standalone approach paper. Review approaches and data collection methods included:

- Portfolio analysis: To review performance and results reported across the portfolio of Fast Track Investment (FTI) projects;
- Sectoral and regional case studies based on site visits to projects from three sectors in three regions that relied on document review, key informant interviews and focus group discussions with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries;
- Mainstreaming capacity assessments covering five sectors and regional bureaus with a mandate to coordinate mainstreaming in two regions;


- Contribution analysis to explore the plausibility of association between CHIP’s intervention and the development of CRGE;
- A value for money assessment focused on economy, efficiency and cost-effectiveness; and,
- Technical assistance case studies that drew on academic literature and key informant interviews from participating stakeholders.

Review conclusions

The review documented forty-eight findings which can be found in the full report; from these the team developed 15 conclusions which are summarised here.

1. How adequate and relevant were DIFD investments in the CRGE Facility to the Government of Ethiopia’s ability to deliver its CRGE Vision and Strategies?

These conclusions are presented in relation to components of the review team’s interpretation of the CRGE process. (See the figure below). This simple diagram was developed to depict the various elements in which action is required to achieve CRGE. The mapping of conclusions onto the diagram demonstrates how CHIP contributed to GoE’s overall achievement of the CRGE vision.



CRGE Foundations

Conclusion 1 – Political commitment: CHIP supported existing GoE political commitment, helped raise awareness of CRGE and advanced learning on how the CRGE Vision can be achieved.

Conclusion 3 – CRGE capacity: While capacity has increased, there are still gaps in relation to institutional arrangements and capacity at regional and woreda levels. In particular, there are gaps on cross-sectoral and CRGE coordination, project management, the quality of reporting and M&E as well as systems for emissions measurement.

CRGE Delivery

Conclusion 2 – Systems development: CHIP made an important contribution to the establishment of systems for fund mobilisation, prioritisation, cross-sectoral coordination and project management. Systems for safeguards and leverage of private sector investment still require further development.

Conclusion 6 – Mainstreaming: There is no inherent trade-off between mainstreaming and programmatic planning but dedicated CRGE staff have only limited time. If the level of effort is more focused on resource mobilisation and management, then this will affect the speed at which mainstreaming happens and transaction costs associated with CRGE.

Conclusion 7 – FTI implementation and results: FTIs were delivered with impressive speed and commitment, generating learning and supporting practical institutional capacity building for CRGE. However, wider impact and sustainability of the related CRGE results could have been strengthened by longer timeframes, improved planning and implementation capacity in some sectors.

Conclusion 9 – Gender: Women participated in FTIs and commitment to GoE's gender policy was widespread. However, no specialist gender expertise was used in project design and there were few activities specifically designed to tackle the drivers of gender inequality.

CRGE Reporting

Conclusion 4 – GTP integration: CHIP supported the inclusion of CRGE in Growth and Transformation Plan 2 (GTP2). CRGE targets are included, to some extent, in all sectors' GTP2 text. However, the level of ambition, detail and coherence with standalone CRGE strategies varies and the ability of sectors to report progress against new targets is limited.

Conclusion 8 – Reporting: The lack of emphasis on reporting against agreed results frameworks made analysis of project performance challenging. Some reports under or over-reported results, did not explain deviations from plans in the proposals and lacked disaggregated data or supporting evidence.

CRGE learning

Conclusion 5 – Space for learning: Ethiopia is attempting something unprecedented, which presents significant opportunities for learning. Data and time for reviewing progress and refining strategy are both important. Currently there are limited resources and incentives for sectors to do this.

2. Were the outcomes that this investment achieved, worth achieving given the investment? Did the programme represent value for money?

Conclusion 10 – FTI results: FTI development outcomes resulted in positive changes to productivity, incomes and jobs. Achievement and reporting of climate results were limited but longer timeframes and more focused design could have improved this.

Conclusion 11 – FTI cost management: FTI projects mostly had low management costs and followed procurement and financial control systems appropriately. However, VfM was not a criteria for project design and was not monitored to inform implementation. Costs per output did not always compare favourably with benchmarks.

Conclusion 12 – Value for Money: The review has found that given its systems level contribution, CHIP has offered VfM, despite not having convincing evidence of the value for money associated with individual FTI results.

Conclusion 13 – Private Sector Engagement: CRGE Strategies note the important role of private investment but some FTI designs relied extensively on GoE implementation, which could crowd out private sector in the future. There is also scope to use non-state executing entities to improve the quality of GoE delivery and results management.

Conclusion 14 – Scaling: Scaling through sector programmes should reduce transaction costs. Scaling through changes to mainstream programmes will only be meaningful if there is political demand.

3. What are the factors that enable technical assistance provided by CHIP (and other partners) to successfully contribute to improvements in the Government of Ethiopia's systems for climate response?

Conclusion – Technical Assistance 15: Successful technical assistance (TA) is a product of a realistic ambition, a demand-driven, problem-focused and iterative approach, and application of tools and methods appropriate to the problem. Capacity to design and manage TA is as important as the TA itself in driving success.

Recommendations

Based on the conclusions, the review prioritised eight recommendations.

Recommendation 1: MEFCC, MOFEC and sector Line Ministries should continue to invest in improved capacity for CRGE strategy and design and identify joint priorities for immediate action.

Recommendation 2: Sector Line Ministries should establish systems that create stronger incentives for the use of lessons learned for CRGE implementation and climate and weather information in decision-making. Whilst capacity to use evidence for adaptive management should be the long-term goal, in the short-term sectors and regions should focus on developing and updating detailed implementation guidance for key CRGE actions.

Recommendation 3: MOFEC and sectors need to improve project management capacity, including capability for realistic planning and budgeting as well as accurate and comprehensive reporting. The Results Management System for CRGE needs to distinguish the process for ongoing aggregation of GTP2 results from that for standalone climate finance project results.

Recommendation 4: Establishing a stronger evidence base for climate outcomes and a clearer process for assessing the cost-effectiveness of selected delivery approaches are essential to delivering value for money in future CRGE investments. MoFEC should investigate how changes to financial reporting systems can enable ongoing monitoring against all aspects of value for money.

Recommendation 5: Sectors should invest more time and resources into gender and safeguarding issues.

Recommendation 6: MoFEC, MEFCC and relevant sectors should ensure pipeline development is long-term and reduces transaction costs. This means achieving an appropriate balance between investment in climate mainstreaming via other sector programmes and the development of standalone climate projects. Decision-making about this should reflect dialogue with potential donors and will vary between sectors. Sectors should ensure pipelines include support to innovation, learning, regulatory change and institutional developments as well as just scaling up CRGE results.

Recommendation 7: Donors, including DFID, should consider making longer term investments, improving coordination and investing in pooled funds if possible to reduce transaction costs.

Recommendation 8: The CRGE Facility should manage supply and demand for TA through pooled TA that is guided by joint donor- GoE decision-making.

1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction to CHIP

The UK's Climate High-Level Investment Programme (CHIP) aimed to support Ethiopia to plan and implement its Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) vision. The 2011 CRGE Vision set out plans for Ethiopia to become a middle income country by 2025 with zero net increase in carbon emissions. It contributes to the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) intention to use climate finance to complement and strengthen its development investment, achieving both climate resilience and green growth objectives across sectors.

CHIP has provided up to £25.6 million over nearly four years from September 2012 to December 2016, supported by DFID policy engagement and technical advice. It is complemented by DFID's Strategic Climate Investment Programme (SCIP) which aimed to build the capacity for investments to succeed. UK global and regional programmes provide complementary investment in Ethiopia in climate resilience and green energy.

CHIP's outcome is that the Ethiopian Government's capacity to tackle climate change will be improved. This contributes to the impact statement that Ethiopia's economy is more resilient to climate change, and is moving along a low-carbon trajectory, with direct benefits for low-income households. The programme has four components, which include support to the World Bank Bio Carbon Plus Fund for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) activities (£2.3m), support to the Climate Smart Initiative of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) (£6.2m) and support to Disaster Risk Management activities through analytical work on PSNP and DRM and FAO's Integrated Agricultural Solutions programme (£2.7m). This review is concerned with support to the fourth component and largest investment that aimed to deliver *strategic CRGE mainstreaming* through the provision of just over £13m to the Government of Ethiopia's CRGE Facility. This was intended to strengthen the GoE's financial mechanism and to channel resources for the delivery of CRGE results in key sectors, namely agriculture, forestry, industry, transport, urban development, water and energy. The CHIP monitoring and evaluation (M&E) agents have provided programme level monitoring and evaluation services since 2013.

1.2 Introduction to this review

This review builds on evidence collected throughout the lifetime of the CHIP monitoring and evaluation contract, collected by the CHIP M&E agents. This included the baseline, annual reviews and GoE-led lesson learning exercises. It is however different to those activities in one major respect in that its scope and methods were decided jointly between DFID and

GoE, rather than previous exercises which were either DFID-led (annual reviews) or GoE-led (lesson learning exercises).

Whilst the original M&E Strategy prepared in 2014 set out an evaluation at the end of the programme covering all four of CHIP's components, it was agreed with DFID to narrow the scope to focus solely on support to the CRGE Facility and technical assistance. This was because other components had already been subject to standalone evaluation work or were considered less important to lesson learning for future delivery.

It was also agreed that this exercise would not be considered a 'final evaluation' but rather the '2016 review' reflecting progress made to the end of June 2016⁴. This was partly because the CRGE Facility's contract to deliver the FTI projects was extended until December 2016, whereas the contract for the M&E Provider finishes in September 2016, so this assessment does not reflect the final results or achievements of the CHIP support. It is also because the concept of 'evaluation' implies that it may be feasible to determine with certainty the extent to which joint UK-GoE objectives have been achieved or that the model of support is effective. The use of the term 'review' indicates that this is another moment in an *ongoing process* of collaborative work to assess progress, examine results and learn lessons.

The review thus:

- Has dual accountability and learning objectives;
- Focuses primarily on investments in the CRGE Facility;
- Investigates CHIP's impacts on wider Government policy and delivery approaches as well as the achievements of the projects funded with DFID investments.

⁴ Fieldwork was completed in early June, but results reported in final reports provided in mid-July are included.

2 Approach and methods

2.1 Review questions

Three high-level review questions developed by DFID, in discussion with GoE guided this review and the structure of this report. The review questions were:

1. How adequate and relevant were DIFD investments in the CRGE Facility to the Government of Ethiopia's ability to deliver its CRGE Vision and Strategies?
2. Were the outcomes that this investment achieved, worth achieving given the investment? Did the programme represent value for money?
3. What are the factors that enable technical assistance provided by CHIP (and other partners) to successfully contribute to improvements in the Government of Ethiopia's systems for climate response?

The sub-questions can be found in the review matrix (included in Annex 4).

2.2 Review methods

A detailed description of the approach and justification for the selection of data collection methods is available in the Review Approach paper which includes the review matrix, justification of methods and data sources used in this review. Findings were triangulated across different data sources to minimise common method bias. The approaches, whilst appropriate given the time, resource and informational constraints faced by the review, have some limitations. These are explained further in Section 2.3.

2.2.1 Portfolio analysis

Documents from projects within the Fast Track Investment portfolio were examined to identify differences in performance against the following key metrics:

- Completeness of reports
- Results reported vs. targets in proposal logframe
- Quality of reporting
- Strength of evidence (i.e. are results substantiated with additional evidence)
- Description of M&E methods used to report on results
- Gender disaggregation / reporting

Where final reports were not available, the most recent quarterly or annual report was used for the analysis. The portfolio allowed for aggregation and synthesis of information across FTI projects to understand the performance of the portfolio as whole. Where results were

unclear, follow-up discussion was made and some results included are based on these discussions rather than those included in the reports. All the reports used in the portfolio analysis are listed in Annex 2.

2.2.2 Case study approach

Case studies are useful to explore changes and progress in particular instances of unique interest and offer the opportunity to explore any unexpected or unintentional impacts (both positive and negative). However, they are not always representative of the wider situation. The CHIP review relied on three different kinds of case studies: regional (2 case studies undertaken), sectoral (3 case studies) and technical assistance (5 case studies). Each kind of case study used purposive sampling to ensure selected cases covered a range of activities and had sufficient evidence to generate learning. Sampling approaches are described in the subsequent sections. These case studies were internal working documents that informed the drafting of the main report.

2.2.2.1 Sector and regional case studies

Sectoral and regional case study sampling was undertaken in parallel as both were dependent on the interventions being implemented through the DFID supported *Fast Track Investment* (FTI) process. A list of all FTI projects is provided in Section 3.3. Using criteria that covered sectoral diversity, project size, resilience focus, geographic diversity⁵ and logistical feasibility, DFID and GoE selected three sectors of interest – Agriculture, Forestry and Urban Development, with a particular focus on the solid waste FTI projects. Findings from these case studies are presented throughout this report.

Amhara and Somali Regions were then selected as they offered coverage of all three sectors' work. Somali was the only feasible emerging region⁶. Somali agricultural activities were funded by Austria, but the project approach was the same as in DFID-funded activities, so it was agreed to be relevant. This was supplemented with Harari Region which offered potential for learning about DFID-funded agriculture work in a dryland area.

Woredas and kebeles were then sampled by the M&E Agent using a random starting point and then other woredas logistically feasible from that point. The selection was approved by

⁵ As per the ToR, the review covered two regions, of which one is an emerging region. Ethiopia is a Federal nation with nine regions and 2 chartered cities. Under regions, sit 68 zones, and under this are Woredas (districts). The smallest administrative unit is the Kebele. 'Emerging Region' is a GoE terminology used to describe four of its Regions: Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, and Somali. These are based on the extreme east and west of the country, were the last to implement decentralisation of planning and decision-making to Woredas (District).

⁶ Security issues excluded Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella. Afar was excluded since its forestry intervention was an outlier in the wider portfolio and of less interest to the review.

the Facility. One woreda (Wegidi) was replaced, due to inaccessibility of the FTI site during rainy season. Woredas in which no FTI projects had been implemented were included to provide more information on the level of CRGE mainstreaming outside of the FTIs. Sites visited are listed in Table 1.

Table 1: Locations visited during regional and sector case study data collection

Amhara	Somali	Haraar
Dessie Municipality (Urban)	Jigjiga Municipality (Urban)	Sofi (Agriculture)
Enebsie Sar Midar (Agriculture)	Jigjiga (Forestry)	
Wadla (Agriculture)	Kebrebegeh (Forestry)	
Lay Gaint (Forestry)	Awbere (Agriculture)	
Guba Lafto (Non FTI)	Gursum (Non FTI)	

Case studies relied on: reviews of project documentation including FTI proposals, reports, project outputs and financial information; field visits to project sites; key informant interviews; and, 25 focus group discussions with beneficiaries. Guides for semi-structured interviews were developed based on the common review questions. Two focus group discussions were held in each kebele visited, separated by gender. Effort was made to ensure that FGDs considered community composition and involved approximately 10-12 individuals involved in the FTI in some way. Table 2 below shows the stakeholders consulted in the review FGD. Separate tools for each sector were used to guide FGDs but these followed a standard format. An example is available in Annex 5.

Table 2: Stakeholders consulted in focus group discussions

Location	Male	Female	Total	Of which FHH	Of which youth	Of which older	Of which landless
Urban: Dessie, Amhara Region	11	9	20		5	5	n/a
Urban: Jigjiga, Somali Region	10	24	34		7	0	n/a
Forestry: Amhara	14	11	25	4	12	8	0
Forestry: Somali	4	10	14				
Agriculture: Amhara	32	29	61	5	13	10	11
Agriculture: Harari	27	15	42	9	0	0	0
Agriculture: Somali	11	12	23	1	4	5	2
Non-FTI: Amhara	12	12	24	4	7	5	11
Totals	121	122	243	23	48	33	24

2.2.2.2 Technical Assistance case studies

In response to the third review question, five technical assistance case studies were identified using sampling criteria that prioritised DFID-supported TA, and ensured selected cases cover

a range of different purposes, types and focal institutions. The final sample is presented in Table 3 below.

Table 3: Technical assistance sampling criteria

Case Study	Provider
Funding a DFID climate expert seconded to the CRGE Facility	DFID
Consultancy and technical support to Climate Resilience Strategy (CRS) development in the Agriculture and Water sectors	GGGI financed by DFID
Technical support to the CRGE Facility and selected sectors in investment planning and drafting the first two cross sector, more programmatic Green Climate Fund (GCF) proposals	CDKN, DFID and UNDP
Facilitating GoE accreditation for GCF and Adaptation Fund (AF)	CDKN
Funding international training to the CRGE Facility and sectors	World Bank

These examples were reviewed and assessed against a set of criteria identified from the literature. Data collection relied on reviews of available secondary information, such as CRGE Strategies and GCF proposals and key informant interviews which followed a common structure guided by the review matrix.

2.2.3 Contribution analysis

Contribution analysis explored the plausibility of the association between CHIP and the development of the CRGE. The analysis explored the extent to which DFID's investments had been necessary and sufficient to create change in systems, capacity and results whilst acknowledging the complexity of the context and the role of other partners.

2.2.4 Mainstreaming capacity assessment

As part of the ongoing monitoring of CHIP, the M&E Strategy designed a *Mainstreaming Capacity Assessment* tool. The tool collects data on CRGE mainstreaming through a series of questions covering planning systems, staff awareness and skills, and safeguards and equity. It uses a none (0), partial (1), yes (2) rating scale designed to provide an ordinal score that is agreed together during the interview and supported by evidence that is shared during a carefully facilitated semi-structured interview. The sample of government organisations for this assessment was determined during the CHIP baseline in 2013 and is presented in Table 4 below.

Table 4: Mainstreaming Capacity Assessment Sample

Ministries / Sectors	Regional Bureaus
Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (MoANR)	Oromia Rural Land and Environment Protection Bureau
Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change (MEFCC)	Oromia Bureau of Finance and Economic Development

National Disaster Risk Management Commission	Tigray Bureau of Planning and Finance
Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Electricity	Tigray Environmental Protection, Land Administration & Use Agency (EPLAUA),
Ministry of Health	

2.2.5 Value for Money Analysis

The approach of the Value for Money (VfM) analysis drew on the four “E”s as outlined in DFID literature on VfM. It included:

- **Economy Analysis:** This asked whether the right inputs were procured at the right price and if funds were used appropriately. A light touch assessment of procurement, financial controls and unit costs was undertaken. All sectors were interviewed at Federal level but more detailed assessments were undertaken at regional and woreda level in the case study sectors.
- **Efficiency Analysis:** This asked whether project expenditure is in line with the delivery of outputs. Analysis of budgets and financial reports was done, to the extent, that data was available across all sectors. This allowed reporting on the pace of fund utilisation and estimates of costs per output. In relation to the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, more detailed work was done to assemble costs per output from unit cost information provided by Woreda staff. Costs were benchmarked across woredas and with other projects operating in Ethiopia, where data was available.
- **Cost-effectiveness Analysis:** This relied upon a study of the programme outcomes in relation to the costs. Where outcomes could be monetised, very rough estimates of possible break-even periods were made but this was only done for MoANR. Otherwise this assessment was qualitative and based on the judgement of the review team. Detailed cost-benefit analysis was outside of the scope of the review.
- **Equity Analysis:** This asked to what extent the benefits of the intervention (both outputs and outcomes) reached the most vulnerable, including women and girls. This drew on the findings of the case study analysis and study of project documents.

More details on the VfM methods and definitions can be found in the separate VfM report.

2.2.6 Approach to key informant interviews

Given the qualitative nature of much of the review and its focus on learning, key informant interviews were a very important data source. Key informants were identified purposively⁷ and the majority (118) were Government of Ethiopia staff. Staff from other development partners were interviewed as part of the TA review and to triangulate findings. Beneficiaries were interviewed as part of our overall approach to the collection of beneficiary feedback and inform case study analysis (See Section 2.2.7). They are included in Table 5 below.

Table 5 below summarises the interviews conducted. The full list is available in Annex 3.

Table 5: Summary of interviews conducted

	Male	Female	Total
Federal (GoE)	23	9	32
Regional or City (GoE)	81	5	86
Other organisation	27	8	35
Community member	5	5	10
Totals	136	27	163

2.2.7 Beneficiary feedback approaches

Approaches to collect beneficiary feedback were integrated into the review design. This included beginning FGDs with goal-free discussion for beneficiaries to set their own agenda and priorities and ending all discussions with opportunities for reviewers to present findings and for beneficiaries to challenge assumptions/interpretations.

As well as interactive FGDs, one to one interviews were held with one male and one female beneficiary from each project in each region and were used to develop testimonials. These are available in Annex 5. While these were largely positive 'good news' cases, the interviews provided an opportunity to highlight beneficiary perspectives about the nature of the FTI projects and the implications for their lives. An Amharic summary will also be used to disseminate findings back to DAs and beneficiaries.

Principles to ensure ethical and meaningful beneficiary feedback were provided to all consultants and GoE staff involved in the site visits. These were based on UK Government guidance for social research.

⁷ Purposive sampling is a non-probability sampling techniques. Purposive sampling relies on the judgement of the researcher when it comes to selecting the units (e.g., people, cases/organisations, events, pieces of data) that are to be studied and usually is used when the sample being investigated is small.

2.2.8 Data analysis and interim deliverables

Qualitative evidence and notes were logically coded to facilitate analysis and triangulation of findings. This coding was supported by a team analytical workshop which helped the reviewers synthesise evidence produced by the various data collection teams into review findings. Interim deliverables were provided which included three sectoral case study assessments, two regional summaries, a VfM assessment and case studies of technical assistance. The three sectoral working drafts, which included portfolio analysis findings, were shared with sectors before developing this draft to allow fact-checking to the extent possible. These documents are not evaluation outputs, but rather working documents used as part of the evidence base for this review.

2.3 Limitations

There are a number of methodological limitations to the review. These include:

Data Availability: The review team worked closely with component implementers to access relevant data, however there were limitations in the availability and quality of data. Where reports were available, information required for this review was not consistently included. This is particularly relevant for the VfM analysis, as information presented was based on trial ledger bank balances or periodic GoE expenditure based on government cost categories. Some financial data was only presented in hard copy or Amharic, so not all evidence provided could be used by the review team.

Data Quality: LTS could not assure all data to source as part of this review. Measures were taken to promote quality, with guidance provided to all sectors on data standards, particularly with regard to beneficiary counting and reporting. Field visits were made to assess the accuracy of GoE results reporting and the understanding of calculation approaches by key users of the M&E System. However, the review found that quality of reporting and reporting formats was not consistent between sectors. Results data both over and under-estimated results and financial data was not well-suited to comprehensive economy and efficiency analysis.

Tendency for positive bias: Despite the clear protocols established for selecting key informants and conducting and recording their responses to standard checklists, most informants were selected by project implementers. There remains the risk of sampling bias despite efforts made by the review to ensure impartiality in the selection of sites and individuals.

Representativeness of sampled case studies and evidence provided: The review relies heavily on case studies. A purposive sampling approach has been designed and documented. Case study findings are not necessarily generalizable to the rest of the

portfolio. This has been mitigated by the use of the portfolio analysis to provide a general overview of the performance of the FTI portfolio.

Implementation time-period: Some of CHIP's investments did not begin until early 2015, others started in late 2014. The review did not provide a full analysis of the likely impacts of investments, as evidence of impact and sustainability is typically visible after longer periods of implementation.

Despite these limitations the review team considers that findings included are based on a robust evidence base and can be used as a basis for lesson learning and to inform future action.

3 CHIP's support to the CRGE

The review terms of reference ask for an assessment of DFID's contribution to the Government of Ethiopia's CRGE process. To do so, it is first important to understand both (1) the nature of the Government of Ethiopia CRGE process and (2) CHIP's envisioned contribution outlined in its business case. This section covers both of these areas. It also gives an overview of the FTI projects financed with DFID's £13.6m commitment to the Facility.

3.1 The Government of Ethiopia's CRGE Process


The Government of Ethiopia's CRGE Vision sets out the national objective to achieve a climate resilient middle income economy with no net growth in greenhouse gas emissions by 2025. Commitment to this vision is reinforced in the *Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC)* submission to the UNFCCC process in 2015 – this document sets out that *'the implementation of CRGE would ensure a resilient economic development pathway while decreasing per capita emissions by 64% or more'*. This draws upon a national Green Economy Strategy (released in 2011) and various Sectoral Strategies that provide more detail on how this vision can be achieved.

This review recognises that the CRGE vision commits Ethiopia to achieve something unprecedented. It rests on uncertain assumptions (no one yet knows *how* a carbon neutral middle income economy can be delivered) and touches all parts of Ethiopian economic development planning and action. It requires widespread awareness and commitment, new institutional arrangements, new targets and measurement methodologies, new money, improved policy and programmes and a commitment to make hard decisions about priorities and to analyse and learn from experience.

Figure 1 shows our simplified understanding of how this might happen. It builds on the *plan-implement-review-assess* process documented in the CRGE Vision to capture other essential elements in the CRGE process. The two main pillars (Reporting and Delivery) reflect the fact that in order for CRGE to be achieved, it must deliver results and also have the capability to measure and report on these results. The foundations for CRGE are shown across the bottom; these include political commitment, cross-Government coordination, systems with CRGE mandates and awareness of CRGE. The central double headed arrow indicates that there are both technical and political decisions which underpin CRGE and that learning from monitoring, measurement and reporting processes must be used to inform those decisions

and to improve ongoing delivery. The delivery pillar recognises the role of both publicly funded actions and the creation of new policies and regulations in delivering CRGE. It encapsulates both standalone climate programmes and actions mainstreamed into other sectoral activities. The process of mobilising and allocating funds for CRGE is also captured under the delivery pillar.

Figure 1: Review team impressions of CRGE elements



3.2 Overview of DFID Support

The Climate High Level Investment Programme was approved in 2012 shortly after the launch of the CRGE Vision, national Green Economy Strategy and the announcement of the Strategic Partnership between the Ethiopia, UK and Norway in December at the 17th UNFCCC conference of parties in Durban.

The CHIP appraisal case drew on both quantitative and qualitative analysis to justify the selection of its components. Quantitative analysis focused on the programme’s costs and potential results as well as documentation of value for money drivers such as low overhead costs associated with MOFEC management, reduced transaction costs associated with pooling Government resources and the increased likelihood of Government resource

commitment. In the qualitative assessment, CHIP’s approach was found to offer the best option to:

- Empower the Government to prioritise its own climate resources;
- Build national climate institutions;
- Promote CRGE mainstreaming into existing sectoral development initiatives;
- Avoid existing or potential political bottlenecks.

The strategic case set out a range of benefits both to the UK and to Ethiopia which are summarised in Table 6.

Table 6: Strategic case for CHIP from UK and Ethiopian perspectives

Envisioned benefits for the UK	Envisioned benefits for Ethiopia
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leverages development finance towards climate objectives – delivers value by avoiding projects not owned by GoE • Delivers poverty reduction, carbon emission and security objectives across a range of sectors • Pilots a new model for CRGE mainstreaming in a low income African country context • Reduces humanitarian need • Increases visibility of UK’s commitment to help other countries respond to climate change 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen GoE institutional arrangements for CRGE • Prepares Ethiopia for scaled-up climate finance • Develops national fund management and policy prioritisation capacity • Delivers CRGE Results and leverages wider domestic and donor investments to do the same • Positions Ethiopia as a leader in international climate policy

Whilst the context in which CHIP operates has changed significantly since the development of the business case, the broad objectives of the UK and Ethiopia in engaging in CHIP remain relevant. International enablers to CHIP’s objectives such as the Paris Agreement, the Adaptation Fund, Green Climate Fund and other multilateral climate financing mechanisms have developed more or less along expected timelines. In addition, the Ethiopian political commitment to CRGE, which was noted as a prerequisite for CHIP’s success in supporting CRGE mainstreaming, has not waned. But rather, institutional arrangements have been strengthened – for example through the establishment of the Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change.

Ultimately CHIP’s strategic mainstreaming component was implemented as per the business case. However, the time required to agree on CRGE facility operational procedures and design a set of strategic initiatives to utilise CHIP funds was underestimated. Whilst CHIP began in 2012, the MoU between DFID and the CRGE Facility was only signed in November 2013 and at this point there were no detailed plans for fund utilisation. *Fast Track Investment* design began in early 2014, with most projects beginning implementation later that year. Five Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change projects started in 2015. All FTIs

were initially expected to complete by March 2016, which was not feasible for some; this resulted in an extension to December 2016.

3.3 Overview of FTI Projects

Whilst the scope and results expected from the FTI projects was not the subject of an agreement between DFID and the Facility, DFID was active in the CRGE Facility Advisory Board at the time that the projects were funded. A total of 26 projects⁸ were funded, as described in Table 7.

Table 7: Summary of projects

Summary	
<p>Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (MoANR) Budget: \$6,035,000 Projects: 3 Regions: 8 Woredas: 23</p>	<p>MoANR implemented one large project introducing climate smart agricultural approaches in Amhara, Benishangul Gumuz, Dire Dawa, Gambella, Harari, Oromia, SNNPR and Tigray.</p> <p>MoANR also supported two smaller projects. The first, through a private contractor, Echnoserve built MoANR capacity in vulnerability analysis, investment planning, M&E and Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV). The second, with the NGO Climate Change Forum, was to implement watershed activities in the Rift Valley.</p> <p>These activities have assisted between 2,600 - 3,300 households. If their household members are included, that may reach up to 17,000 people. Overall, the investment has also helped to rehabilitate between 11,000-22,000 hectares of land with the planting of 3.9 million seedlings. MoANR also implemented a related Austrian-funded project in Afar and Somali visited in this review.</p>
<p>Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change (MEFCC) Budget: \$3,478,000 Projects: 12 Regions: 8</p>	<p>MEFCC implemented a portfolio of 12 projects designed by Regional Bureaus focused on improving forest cover and quality in Afar, Amhara, Benishangul Gumuz, Harari, Oromiya, Somali, SNNPR and Tigray. Activities included land enclosure, tree planting, development of joint forest management agreements, bamboo plantation and processing and support to alternative livelihood activities.</p> <p>One project in Afar focused on the production of cement bonded particle boards from the invasive <i>Prosopis Juliflora</i>. The projects report reaching 24,475 people directly, covering 8,378 hectares of land and planting 10.8 million seedlings.</p>
<p>Ministry of Industry (MoI) Project: 1 Budget: \$584,000 National</p>	<p>Due to a lack of existing data, human capacity and time, calculations of industrial emissions in the Green Economy strategy were mostly estimates. To address this, MoI's FTI project collected greenhouse gas emission baseline data for five industrial sub-sectors (brewing, cement, tanning, textiles, and steel) and recommended energy efficiency measures in sample factories. As a result,</p>

⁸ If MUDH projects are recorded as separate per town then the number of projects is 40.

	estimates of current and future industrial emissions have been improved and understanding of abatement through energy efficiency measures has been enhanced.
Industrial Parks Development Corporation (IPDC) Project: 1 Budget: \$508,000 Addis Ababa	IPDC took responsibility for the FTI project in 2015. It had been previously developed by MoI. Whilst the ambition is for eco-industrial parks, existing parks lack green spaces. IPDC used FTI funds to plant 57,000 seedlings, greening 33 hectares (10 percent) of the Bole Lemmi industrial zone, and making it a model of green industrial park development. The project also employed 740 people (almost two-thirds of them women and 450 from female headed households), 20 of whom received permanent employment as a result of the project. In addition, 8,000 employees and visitors to the industrial park will enjoy the benefits of the green spaces.
Ministry of Transport (MoT) Budget: \$1,495,000 Projects: 2 Addis Ababa	To help reduce emissions from transport, MoT implemented two projects in Addis Ababa, one focused on improving traffic flows to reduce emissions from congestion and another focused on promoting non-motorised transport. To improve traffic flow, MoT is implementing an off-street parking system (a contract has been awarded but implementation still needs to occur). To support non-motorised transport, MoT has developed cycle lanes and purchased 210 bicycles for a bicycle-taxi rental service. The Ministry has also installed 45 city benches and 141 bike racks and planted 9,000 seedlings. As a result, 311 people have directly benefited through short-term employment.
Ministry of Urban Development and Housing (MUDH) Budget: \$1,512,000 Projects: 2 Cities/towns: 13	MUDH implemented 5 urban greenery and 11 solid waste management initiatives across eight regions. MUDH has directly employed 1,934 people (14 percent of whom were unemployed youth and more than half women), created 12 hectares of urban greenery and planted over 69,000 seedlings, as well as improving composting and waste management in nine cities, through awareness raising and provision of improved waste management facilities.
MoWIE Budget: \$6,114,000 Projects: 5 ⁹ Regions: 9	Ethiopians rely on biomass for 88% of total energy consumption which has potentially negative environmental and health impacts, particularly for women. Two of MoWIE's FTIs aimed to reduce this by providing solar home systems and biogas plants. Reduced dependence on imported and greenhouse gas emitting diesel was the goal for the third energy project focused on solar energy for water supply and irrigation. In addition, MoWIE is implementing a national project to improve hydrological monitoring and systems for water management. A petroleum monitoring project was designed to reduce contamination and improve efficiency in the use of petroleum, but this project was transferred to the Ministry of Mines and Energy in 2016. So far, 17 biogas plants have been constructed. The solar lanterns, solar home systems, irrigation and petroleum and hydrological equipment were being shipped at the time of the review.

⁹ During the implementation of the petroleum monitoring project, it was transferred to the re-structured Ministry of Mines and Energy, whereas the Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Electricity (formerly Energy) remained responsible for the water monitoring, solar and biogas projects.

Source: Proposals and April 2016 Progress Reports. The budget is based on proposals provided in June 2015.

4 Findings

4.1 To what extent did DFID support to the CRGE Facility make a relevant and adequate contribution to the Government of Ethiopia's ability to deliver the CRGE?

This question is answered in two parts. The first (4.1.1) tackles the extent to which DFID has supported Government of Ethiopia to develop systems and capacity for mainstreaming CRGE in its analysis, planning, implementation, monitoring, measurement and reporting systems. The second (4.1.2) covers results and performance of Fast Track Investment projects.

4.1.1 Systems and capacity for mainstreaming

This section separates findings into those relating to the CRGE Facility, those relating to the Sectors and those focused on sub-national level. A final section investigates the review question in relation to potential trade-offs between programme planning and mainstreaming objectives.

4.1.1.1 National Level (CRGE Facility)

Finding 1 The national CRGE Vision has galvanised political commitment, with widespread awareness of its importance at national level and increasing clarity about priorities. DFID's support has been a necessary contribution but is not the most important factor.

The Government of Ethiopia commitment to the Climate Resilient Green Economy vision was a domestic political priority prior to DFID's engagement. However, key informants noted that DFID had been a long-term (from 2009) partner. DFID's interest in building a system for CRGE mainstreaming rather than focusing narrowly on their own results or projects was identified as important in ensuring that the high level vision maintained momentum.

Other partners such as UNDP, Norway, Denmark, GGGI, and CDKN have also provided support to the process, but DFID is widely acknowledged as a leader of the development partner community. Key informants in the CRGE Facility and in other development partners noted that DFID's leadership role and willingness to be a 'first mover' had built confidence.

Whilst a broad commitment to green growth and climate resilience is prominent in development partners' narratives, this is supported by GoE analysis and political engagement

on implementation decisions, both at national level and in the sectors (covered in the next section). This has resulted in commitments to CRGE in the GTP2¹⁰, as well as the creation of an overarching GHG emission target.¹¹ The submission of Ethiopia's Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) to the UNFCCC process in 2015 also reinforces continued ownership of the national Green Economy and Sector Climate Resilience strategies. It also reflects the desire to communicate and be held accountable to domestic commitments via an international agreement.

In order to catalyse political decision-making in relation to CRGE priorities, some of the domestic factors that are considered particularly important by stakeholders include:

- High profile support from two Prime Ministers;
- Creation of the Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change (MEFCC);
- Creation of a national CRGE Facility, which brings together MEFCC with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation (MOFEC) to manage climate finance;
- Upgrading of the profile of CRGE in MOFEC. In 2016, it became a formal structure¹²;
- Establishment of Ministerial Management Committee as a forum for ongoing high level decision-making in relation to CRGE.

Key aspects of DFID's support to the creation of awareness and commitment to a mainstreamed CRGE Vision include:

- Involvement in joint-donor activities at UNFCCC CoPs to publicise Ethiopia's ambition and donor collaboration and confidence;
- High-level intervention to push for GoE GCF accreditation to go beyond the 'small grant' level;
- Provision of strategic technical assistance – for example in relation to mainstreaming issues for GTP2.

Finding 2 DFID resources have been important in mobilising other resources from Government of Ethiopia and its partners.

Since DFID's investment in 2014, the CRGE Facility has mobilised \$20.3 million of additional resources from bilateral donors. It has also been successful in achieving accreditation to both

¹⁰ CRGE has now become a key strategic direction under *Cross Cutting issues* (Section 8.2) and is also mentioned as one of the key departures of GTP2 from GTP1 in Section 1.2. CRGE analysis also features in Sector level goals and this is reported in Section 4.1.1.2 of this report.

¹¹ Interviews noted that it may be challenging to report against this target given the lack of emissions measurement systems. However, its inclusion was an important political step to ensure CRGE received prominence and that all stakeholders would be required to develop appropriate measurement approaches to report on their contributions.

¹²The *Climate Change Facility and UN Agencies Directorate*.

the Green Climate Fund and Adaptation Fund. Whilst volumes of finance committed do not reach the original targets set in the CHIP logframe, these will be achieved if the GCF and AF proposals currently under development are successful.

A process tracing study conducted as part of DFID's 2014 annual review¹³ noted the importance of DFID's support in mobilising other donor commitments. In particular, this study noted the following factors as important in leveraging other donors' support:

- Investment of significant DFID advisory time;
- Support to GoE-Donor dialogue via the Climate Partners Group¹⁴, the SCIP oversight committee and the Facility Advisory Board;
- Investment in technical assistance to support the development of donor-ready systems. This included commissioning the Financial Flows study, engagement with the Operational Manual, and support to the Retrospective Safeguards Assessment.

Finding 3 Alongside GoE's own efforts and those of other partners, DFID has contributed to the development of institutional capacity for national CRGE mainstreaming and coordination.

Alongside maintaining political commitment for a high level vision, GoE and its partners have invested in institutional systems and capacity for CRGE mainstreaming and coordination at Federal Level.¹⁵ Whilst key to the institutional capacity at Federal level, the establishment of MEFCC and the CRGE Facility were not directly related to DFID support. However, it was noted by some stakeholders that DFID was a vocal advocate for the establishment of the CRGE Facility and particularly its 'unrestricted window' where donor support would be pooled and used to strengthen GoE's own coordination and prioritisation processes.

Operational guidance is also a vital part of the CRGE Facility's systems. Approval of the Facility's operational manual was a condition of DFID's financial commitment in 2013. Whilst the work on the manual was led by a UNDP-funded consultant, DFID and Norwegian staff made comments via the Advisory Board that helped the manual respond to donors' needs.¹⁶

¹³ LTS (2014) Catalysing coordinated investment of public climate finance in Ethiopia.

¹⁴ This was an informal discussion group that initiated cross donor and GoE coordination prior to the establishment of the CRGE Facility Advisory Board.

¹⁵ The performance of Federal Sector Line Ministry's institutional arrangements are covered in Section 4.1.1.2, this finding relates to the capacity available within MEFCC and the CRGE Facility for mainstreaming and coordination

¹⁶ See LTS International (2013) Inputs to the DFID Annual Review for analysis of the extent to which DFID and Norwegian comments were included in Facility Operational Manual.

Continued DFID policy engagement via the Advisory Board on safeguards has been an important feature of GoE-DFID dialogue. As a result, the issue has been given attention by the CRGE Facility, which worked with the World Bank to develop the Environmental and Social Safeguard Framework, with CDKN to deliver a retrospective safeguards assessment, and in 2016 recruited a dedicated Safeguards Advisor to oversee the implementation of the strategy (See Finding 5 for more on safeguards).

The secondment of a DFID advisor to the Facility was also seen by a number of stakeholders as a valuable contribution and is discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.

DFID's financial commitment to the CRGE Facility via the FTIs created incentives for the development of proposal templates, appraisal criteria and a nationally-led system for allocating funds between sectors and regions. Whilst room for improvement in the quality of proposal development and appraisal were noted¹⁷, the existence of this system is an important legacy of CHIP. The question of whether standalone climate project development contributes effectively to mainstreaming is addressed in more detail in Section 4.1.2.

A monitoring and evaluation framework has been developed with support from UNDP but this has not yet been used in its entirety by sectors. Whilst MoANR reported developing their own framework, no formal results framework was agreed between DFID and the Facility for the FTIs. DFID's contribution to the Facility's capacity for results management may therefore be limited but lessons have been learned. In particular, DFID support to process learning via two annual lesson learning exercises created space for Government and partners to reflect.

In both lesson-learning exercises and in the DFID/Norwegian financed financial flows study, the need for additional capacity in the CRGE Facility was noted. In response, the capacity available in both MEFC and MoFEC has grown during the lifetime of CHIP, with key posts focused on finance, M&E, safeguards, resource mobilisation and mainstreaming now in place. A July 2016 review of MoFEC staff positions within the Facility also resulted in greater clarity around roles. The use of technical assistance for GCF proposal development in 2015-6 also showed a response to issues raised in the 2014 learning review. Whilst many of the 34 staff positions¹⁸ in the Facility are supported by UNDP or GGGI, they are being managed by higher Government officials and are basically treated as Government of Ethiopia staff. In MEFC, a recent business process reengineering process will bring further capacity to support technical mainstreaming including at Director General Level.

The recognition by CRGE Facility staff that there is an ongoing need for technical assistance in relation to CRGE (see Section 4.3) indicates that capacity gaps in the Facility still remain

¹⁷ See LTS International (2014) Lessons Learned from the Fast Track Investment Process

¹⁸ 14 of these positions are in MoFEC, 20 are in MEFC. It is unclear if these positions are all filled, or identified in July 2016

(i.e. results management and technical communications) and that as the volume of funds managed through the Facility continues to grow, the number of staff working on project appraisal, safeguards, M&E/MRV and knowledge management will need to increase. However, there is also a need for this expertise to be sector-specific and housed within sectors (See Finding 7). Support to cross-sectoral coordination is important and being supported as part of the GCF proposal development process.

Finding 4 The Fast Track Investment process tested the Facility’s systems for project appraisal, prioritisation, financial management, reporting and quality assurance. Important lessons have been learned.

A common theme of key informant interviews was that the DFID-funded FTIs had been used to test systems, in order to identify and respond to capacity gaps. Sector key informants were appreciative of the support received from MOFEC via the FTIs in addressing contracting, procurement and financial management issues. There were fewer reports of useful technical or coordination support from MEFC. More detailed findings in relation to the FTIs are available in Section 4.1.4.

Key lessons emerging from the process included:

- Multiple small projects led to high transaction costs and lost opportunities for cross-sectoral coordination. This has been integrated into GCF proposal development;
- The value of using a delivery process to identify and resolve issues with institutional arrangements;
- Numerous financial management challenges were faced associated with the Channel 2 fund flow approach used in the FTIs. This transferred funds from the Facility to Sector Line Ministry to Regional Sector Bureau to Woreda Bureau of Finance. The Facility will adopt the better established Channel 1 approach in future which will channel resources from MoFEC to Regional Bureau of Finance to Woreda Bureau of Finance.

Finding 5 DFID supported the development of a safeguards system which meets international requirements. Whilst the review did not raise any major safeguarding risks, little evidence was available of consistent follow-up on safeguard recommendations.

When the FTIs were approved for funding in May 2014, the Facility’s Environmental Social Safeguard Framework (ESSF) was not yet ready. In 2015, MEFC, in collaboration with the World Bank, led the development of the CRGE Facility’s ESSF. This CRGE-specific manual builds on international safeguard systems, but has been customised using Ethiopian Laws. After finalisation of the ESSF, in October 2015 the CRGE Facility conducted a Retrospective Environmental and Social Safeguard assessment of all FTI projects. This makes a number of

recommendations in relation to the monitoring of projects categorised as Schedule II (moderate risk) including the completion of supplementary checklists and further investigation of risks associated with land use change. No evidence of these checklists having been completed for FTIs was found, though it was reported they were being used in GCF proposal development.

The manual and its requirements mostly meet international standards, but based on interviews, awareness of practical actions required to operationalise those requirements remains somewhat limited outside of the CRGE Facility. There are no reports in relation to safeguard follow-up except for from a joint DFID-Facility visit to the solid waste management project in Butajira which found that due process had been followed and that one household had been displaced, but was satisfied with the compensation provided.

No regional staff involved in FTI delivery reported having seen the ESSF or the Retrospective Assessment, but most had some awareness of some risks and actions in relation to safeguarding. The CRGE Facility Safeguards Specialist was recruited in early 2016 and had developed an action plan for training that aimed to address shortcomings in awareness.

The most important issues from FTI field visits with potential safeguard implications include:

- MoANR and the risk of high spend on a small number of beneficiaries creating conflict with non-beneficiaries (reported as low-level tension / uncooperative behaviour in Harari and Somali);
- Potential environmental and social impacts of new water infrastructure in Somali region related to use of ground water for irrigation without assessment of recharge rates or use of new technologies such as drip irrigation that minimise water use and salinization risks.

Finding 6 Design and planning capacity has mostly met current demands but has not resulted in a set of long-term sector programmes that have buy-in from multiple donors.

As recognised by many key informants at all levels, some gaps in sector capacity for accurate budgeting, realistic planning and results management were identified through the FTI experience. For example, in transport, forestry and urban development, plans were not matched with relevant budget amounts. The Facility recognised this gap and put substantial investment into technical assistance for the two Green Climate Fund proposals that are currently under development. These proposals reflect substantial improvements from the FTIs. These two programmes will be financed by the GCF and there is currently no plan to use them to mobilise or manage additional donor resources.

MEFCC informants noted that the Sector Reduction Action Plan (SRAP) process had been initiated. This process requires sectors to cost CRGE requirements for GTP2 implementation and is intended to result in a project pipeline that could attract donor funding. However most key informants in sectors did not comment on the SRAP process nor reflect on its use for fund mobilisation.

From the CHIP business case, the ultimate aim of the unrestricted window in the CRGE Facility is to attract donor resources which can be pooled, allocated to GoE priorities, and reported on through one set of reporting. As in other large pooled funds, this minimises transaction costs and allows learning and knowledge to be consolidated around a narrower set of programme objectives. However, the current support to the CRGE Facility for programmatic planning has been limited to specific opportunities and has not yet produced results related to this objective. This situation is unsurprising given the timeframe within which activities have been implemented. With current levels of human resource capacity it would be unrealistic to have expected greater progress within the timeframe. Furthermore, developing pooled funds requires huge political commitment from donors and GoE which may also not be realistic at this stage in the CRGE process.

Whilst donors still retain a preference for recording their 'own' results, there is an indication within at least the MoANR that learning is being used across different CRGE initiatives.

4.1.1.2 Sector Level

This section contains findings in relation to mainstreaming which are broader in scope and do not relate directly to the delivery of the fast track investment projects. Findings related to sectoral delivery and M&E / MRV capacity are available in Section 4.1.2 and focus more exclusively on the FTIs.

Finding 7 Analytical work has been conducted to identify CRGE priorities across sectors. Continued analytical work is needed to review sector priorities and ensure adaptive management towards the CRGE Vision. Neither DFID nor the Facility have sufficient resources to support all sectors.

Table 8 below provides information about the status of CRGE analysis in sectors consulted for the review and highlights the extent to which they are seen as sufficient in relation to the overarching CRGE vision. To date, MEFCC (with support from MOFEC and the NPC) has led on the provision of guidance for sectors to use in developing SRAPs and GTP2 targets, whereas sectoral CRGE strategies have been under sectoral leadership supported by development partners and external technical assistance. The CRGE Facility, through MEFCC, has the mandate to encourage and support analytical work across Government but may lack in-depth knowledge and necessary human resource to sufficiently support initial analytical work or to review and consolidate the results of sectors' work. DFID is keen to support GoE's

own capability to make fund and policy prioritisation decisions, but where GoE capacity to develop credible proposals is lacking, DFID advisors do not have capacity to engage in dialogue or provide direct support at sector level.

Given the unprecedented ambition of CRGE, information and incentives to review priorities in light of lessons learned are essential. Due to the close interaction between data-driven decisions about effectiveness and primarily political decisions about priorities, selecting an appropriate set of political actors to make these decisions is essential (as outlined in Figure 1). The CRGE Management Committee has proved an effective forum for high level decisions, but similar technical-political fora at sector level are also important. Revisiting the make-up and leadership of sectoral technical committees may be relevant.

Table 8: Status of CRGE Strategies by Sector

CRGE Strategies available	DFID Engagement	Sufficiency in light of national CRGE objectives
Agriculture		
GE and CR Strategies available and mostly aligned.	Via SCIP to CR Strategy. Via CHIP in CSI.	Comprehensive analysis with high ownership. Used for FTI and GCF strategy development. Commitment to analysis and learning about <i>how</i> selected strategies work in practice observed.
Forestry		
CR/GE strategies covered by Agriculture sector	Via World Bank & REDD+	Technical relevance but low ownership since developed with MoANR. More recent REDD+ work may have greater detail and ownership, but lacks any consideration of resilience.
Industry		
GE strategy focuses on cement. CR Strategy 'under development'.	Via FTIs.	FTIs expanded analysis to look at factory level improvements in cement, brewery, textiles, tanning, and steel, but no consideration of resilience issues which could cover eco-industrial parks, parks for major export crops and water availability for industry.
Transport		
GE Strategy focuses on electric rail, bus rapid transit, fuel efficiency, and electric vehicles. No CR Strategy.	No dialogue / analytical support.	GE strategy does not include non-motorised transport and parking issues prioritised in FTIs. There is no systematic consideration of infrastructure for resilience.
Urban Development		
GE Strategy focuses on lighting, solid and liquid waste gas flaring.	No dialogue/ analytical support	No copy of the new strategy was made available. The GE strategy does not appear to reflect current priorities. GHG benefits of the current solid waste activities are minimal but build an important

Climate Resilient Urban Development Strategy¹⁹ reported in GTP2.

foundation. Unclear if resilience benefits of 'greening' activities are maximised though there is scope for this to contribute to flood risk management / water storage. Institutional arrangements limit this.

Water Irrigation and Electricity

GE Strategy covers energy; CR focuses on both water and energy.

Via SCIP to CR Strategy

Comprehensive analysis used for FTI and GCF strategy development. Commitment to reviewing strategy/ learning about *how* strategies can best be delivered is less evident.

Finding 8 All sectors' GTP 2 plans indicate some integration of CRGE commitments and, in some cases, quantified targets. MEFCC, NPC and MOFEC worked together to develop and disseminate guidance on CRGE integration. DFID provided technical assistance to the development of guidelines.

MEFCC produced the GTP2 Mainstreaming guidance in both English and Amharic in late 2014.²⁰ According to key informants in MEFC, this guidance was the subject of extensive discussions between MEFC, MOFEC and the National Planning Commission (NPC) and sectors. The process yielded results as many sectors incorporated CRGE targets in their GTP2 submissions. However, in the final document, not all issues raised by the CRGE strategies were included and there is a stronger focus on quantified emissions targets than analysis of what can be done to build climate resilience. Table 9 includes a summary of CRGE focused GTP2 targets.

DFID's support and ongoing dialogue was cited by key informants in MOFEC and MEFC as having supported thinking on mainstreaming and a piece of DFID-funded analytical work was referenced as important in relation to this work. However, the bulk of the detailed work was done by sectors without technical or financial support from DFID. It is possible in some cases that additional technical support could have produced a stronger reference to CRGE or more realistic or measurable targets. But this may not have been appropriate given the need for strong ownership of the national development plan.

Table 9: Summary of CRGE-focused GTP2 targets by sector

Summary of CRGE-focused GTP2 targets

Agriculture

Emissions targets associated with watershed management, rangeland management, the use of low emission crop production technologies and improvements in livestock value chain efficiency. Other

¹⁹ Mentioned by stakeholders but no copy made available to the team.

²⁰ The review Team accessed an English Draft from November 2014

CRGE priorities are also included such as research and dissemination on climate resilient crop varieties, early warning, risk insurance, expansion of areas under irrigation and increased productivity of crops and livestock. There are no specific targets for some CRGE priorities such as mechanisation, R&D for climate resilient coffee, herd diversification, improved climate risk screening for irrigation or other large-scale developments, improved use of agro-meteorological information.

Forestry

Main targets relate to the increase in forest cover, the hectares of forest brought under the forest management plan and towns in which forest management actions are taken. There is no target set for fuel-efficient stoves under MEFCC or for forest adaptation measures outlined in the Climate Resilience Strategy such as the development of payment for ecosystem services schemes or implementation of research to support resilience measures for forests affected by increased temperatures, forest fires and other climate-related shocks.

Industry

Sustainable growth in the manufacturing industry is central to the GTP2, as its contribution to overall GDP is projected to increase from less than 5% in 2014/15 to 8% by 2019/2020. Emissions targets are included for some sectors, which include: leather, metal and engineering, meat, milk and honey, and chemicals and construction inputs. They are not included for agro-processing or textiles industries. Industrial parks are not referred to as 'eco-industrial' in GTP2 and no greening targets for the parks are mentioned. However, a cross-cutting action on *Building a Climate Resilient, Green Industry* is included, which commits to support on clean technologies and waste management.

Transport

A target of reducing emissions from logistics by 10% is set alongside a target of increasing the annual total distance covered by freight transport. This will be achieved through the increase in freight transported by railway. Both inter-city and urban light rail in Addis Ababa will receive investment in the GTP2 period and are included in the national GE plan. The development of the aviation industry was not assessed in Ethiopia's Green Economy sector and is planned to further grow in GTP 2. Fuel efficiency and the use of biofuel in transport sector are also prioritised in the GTP2. However, there is no mention of targets on non-motorised transport or electric vehicles.

Urban Development

GTP2 has a target to create a 'clean and green environment' in 150 towns with more than 2,000 people. The urban sector also has targets to ensure 30% of land in urban areas is available for green infrastructure and recreation and that waste collection and disposal in 75 urban centres reaches 90%. However there is no emissions target, no mention of energy efficiency in new housing, nor detailed elaboration of how resilience will be supported through improved urban planning.

Water, Irrigation and Electricity

Many quantifiable targets in relation to renewable energy, off-grid energy, biogas stoves and energy efficiency in transmission. Biofuel production and bioethanol and biodiesel also have targets. However, emission targets are not included. Irrigation and catchment management have targets and the use of agro-meteorological and hydrological information is prioritised. There are several WASH targets but these do not mention the resilience of self-supply or focus on improved water storage as recommended by the CR strategy.

Other sectors not supported by the CRGE Facility

Disaster Risk Management

GTP2 includes quantified targets related to the availability of the national food reserve, beneficiaries and graduates of the PSNP. Early warning, risk insurance and involved participation of the private sector are also mentioned in the narrative description of activities contributing to CRGE.


Health

GTP2 mentions 'strategies are designed to prevent the prevalence of diseases resulting from climate change'. No targets are set for the climate-sensitive dengue fever, yellow fever, malaria or water-borne diseases. However, nutrition and life-expectancy targets will require action on such diseases.

Finding 9 Sectors have also demonstrated improvements in the integration of CRGE into mainstream strategies and institutional arrangements at national level, though there are still gaps in many sectors. Progress is not confined to CRGE priority sectors.

The review's mainstreaming capacity assessment focused on a sample of five Federal institutions. This showed substantial improvements at the Federal level in terms of the extent to which CRGE was integrated into plans and the level of awareness of CRGE within government processes since the baseline. Scores increased by an average of four points (from a 2014 baseline of 6 points out of a possible total of 16) across all components.

Figure 2: Federal MCAM results



Qualitative information provided to support these scores demonstrated differences between sectors. Under the planning component, a range of evidence of different plans and guidelines being influenced was available. This included the MoANR’s programme investment framework (PIF2), Participatory Watershed Management Guidance, and Climate Smart Agriculture guidance, and MUDH’s *Climate Change Resilient Urban Green Development Strategy*. Less evidence of change was available from MoWIE about the use of the CR Strategy and the Ministries of Industry and Transport did not report new policies or strategies. Whilst Ministry of Health has not been a focus of the CRGE Facility or UK climate-finance actions, it does demonstrate that GoE commitment exists outside those supported sectors. Progress made on the National Health Adaptation Plan has already resulted in changes to the routine activities of the Health Extension and Primary Care Directorate.

In terms of institutional arrangements and staff awareness and skills, all sectors have made improvements, though further improvements can still be made. DFID has not provided financing for new units or staff, but there is evidence that the FTIs catalysed greater investment, for example in the creation of a new CRGE coordination role in MUDH and recruitment of support staff in MOT.

Level of budget, staffing and mandate of institutional arrangements to implement CRGE vary between sectors, though institutional structures have become more developed. The arrangements are summarised in Table 10 below. Most sectors note the need for a CRGE focal person to raise awareness of CRGE issues across the sector and promote mainstreaming. The position of this unit, its ToRs, the support it receives from high level officials and the capability of the staff within it have an impact on its success to support CRGE mainstreaming. For example, in MUDH, there is a risk under the current arrangements that CRGE will only be mainstreamed in relation to urban greening and solid waste and there will be no impetus to encourage this in the housing sector despite being identified as a priority in the CRGE strategy. In Transport, there has been a focus on non-motorised transport rather than identifying CRGE improvements that could be made in large-scale infrastructure projects. It is not clear if this is as a result of institutional arrangements or political priorities or a combination of both factors.

Table 10: Institutional arrangements by sector

Ministry	Summary of institutional arrangements for CRGE
MoANR	CRGE Unit with 7 technical positions and 1 finance; CRGE-relevant positions in Sustainable Land Management Programme (SLMP); Engaged Planning Directorate.
MEFCC	Dedicated Mainstreaming Directorate created to work on cross-sectoral mainstreaming. Increased capacity of senior staff on forestry, in which CRGE will be directly integrated. More qualified staff to work on this will be available.
MoI	An Environment and Climate Change Directorate works on integration issues supported by a technical committee which includes members from MoI and the institutes representing

different industrial sub-sectors. The Directorate works closely with the Policy Directorate and reports high leadership commitment in the sector.

MUDH After developing its own ministerial strategy for CRGE, MUDH set up the legal framework to implement programs with the municipalities across Ethiopia. MUDH designated the Urban Planning, Sanitation and Beautification Bureau to coordinate the Ministry's CRGE implementation through the work of two Directorates and assigned a capable lead. It is not clear how the coordination structure relates to all thematic elements allocated to MUDH in CRGE and GTP2, as several appear to be outside the two Directorate mandates, for example CRGE work related to housing.

MoT A new Green Development Unit was created in the Ministry of Transport in 2016. This Unit works closely with the Strategic Management Directorate to oversee CRGE issues in the sector.

MoWIE Planning Directorate works in parallel to CRGE focal staff in the Environment and Climate Change Directorate. But this unit has been recently upgraded and will go from 9 to 18 positions. Whilst in the case of the FTIs, the unit provided coordination and reporting services to other implementers, it reports that it will lead on 'planning CRGE projects' which poses the risk of it being a project cell rather than a group offering technical support to mainstreamed action.

NDRMC No dedicated staff working on CRGE yet but arrangements for linking DRM and CRGE should be clarified following Business Process Reengineering (BPR) later in 2016.

MoH No dedicated unit. Work on public health issues related to climate change is integrated into the work of Health Extension & Primary Health Care Directorate.

In addition to the data collected for this review, an extensive capacity assessment was conducted in 2015, led by the CRGE Facility.²¹ This found that awareness of CRGE and its key elements was strong at Federal level and that the majority of Federal staff positions were filled, but that the institutional arrangements for CRGE were still in the early stages and full staffing requirements had not yet been assessed. The review also noted gaps at Federal Level related to knowledge management, resource mobilization, analysis and strategic planning for CRGE mainstreaming and operational planning. In particular, staff did not have skills in relation to the use of scientific studies, environmental analysis, climate risk analysis in planning, investment prioritization process, risk assessment, cost-benefit analysis and participatory planning process and tools. The knowledge management system was also found to be a key gap. In particular, information sharing only occurs within units rather than across sectors and themes, teams had unclear or vague mandates for knowledge management, limited funds for knowledge management and there was no regular process

²¹ FDRE (2014) Climate Resilient Green Economy National Capacity Development Program Gap Assessments and Findings

for managing knowledge. The assessment noted also that knowledge management tasks are not part of staff members' regular job descriptions.

Whilst other partners (GGGI, UNDP, FAO) have provided seconded staff to bolster sectoral CRGE capacity, CHIP's contribution to CRGE institutional arrangements has not been direct. There is evidence from several key informants that implementation delays in the FTIs catalyzed the appointment of new staff and that CRGE Facility Management Committee communications were also a factor in developing institutional arrangements for CRGE.

4.1.1.3 Regional and Woreda Levels

Finding 10 There is increased capacity and awareness of CRGE at regional and woreda levels, though extent of progress on institutional arrangements varies.

In terms of the MCAM scores, these have increased since the baseline by five points, from a baseline score of 4 out of a total possible score of 16. Comments made by stakeholders note the integration of CRGE into GTP 2 has given regions clearer guidance on how to implement CRGE. There is also evidence of an increase in awareness of CRGE, EIA and safeguards at regional levels, mainly as a result of FTI implementation, though there is also recognition that regional capacity is not sufficient to fully achieve the CRGE targets in GTP 2.

Institutional arrangements vary between regions. For example, in Oromia there is a CRGE management committee, which includes the Bureau of Finance and Economic Development (BoFED) and the Land and Environmental Protection Bureau (LEPB) as well as sectoral focal points, but no staff are dedicated to CRGE nor is there a clear mandate in either BoFED and LEPB. In Tigray, arrangements are clearer, as there is a CRGE unit in the Bureau of Environmental Protection, Rural Land Administration and Use (EP & RLAU). This has five experts and a dedicated budget, but key informants feel this is still not sufficient to carry out CRGE activities fully.

In Amhara, a key informant mentioned the creation of two committees - a management committee, chaired by the Regional President's office and managed by BoFED and a technical committee, chaired by the Amhara Environment, Forest and Wildlife Protection Development Authority (AEFWPDA). However AEFWPDA is a new institution created in 2016 and the focal staff have only limited knowledge of what other bureaus are doing and coordination requirements. The management committee had not yet met. In Somali Region, there was no evidence of cross-bureau CRGE coordination structures. Evidence from the varied performance between forestry and agriculture FTIs suggest that coordination would have improved delivery quality. For instance, in Kebribeyeh woreda the Review observed two seedling nurseries which are separated by a fence and managed by the respective bureaus but there are no practices or staff shared. As mentioned above, arrangements are already in place to change this for future CRGE activities.

A common theme between regions is the limited engagement of Regional BoFEDs in the FTI projects. This was as a result of the Channel 2 financing arrangements used which by-passed these bureaus and missed opportunities for them to provide technical support and enhanced financial reporting.

The review team visited two non-FTI woredas in Amhara and Somali Regions. In Amhara Region, the Woreda staff had no information about CRGE and did not know about their responsibility to implement it. However, in Somali Region the non-FTI woreda selected had participated in the DFID-funded Climate Smart Initiative of the PSNP and so had quite good knowledge about CRGE. Regional and woreda staff had varying interpretations about what differentiated CRGE from previous Government of Ethiopia approaches. Of the FTI woredas and bureaus visited there was a strong sense that participation in the FTI had given them an opportunity to see how CRGE could materialise on the ground. In Amhara, the FTIs provided an opportunity to train regional, woreda and kebele staff, however more uniform awareness is needed to fully mainstream CRGE at lower levels.

Finding 11 There are notable capacity gaps at local level. Whilst FTIs showed CRGE capacity could be mobilised, there are gaps in relation to realistic project design, the use of climate information, technical knowledge on adaptation and mitigation, and MRV/M&E and reporting.

As will be seen from section 4.1.2, the FTIs have mobilised substantial capacity for project delivery at regional and woreda levels, and they have also been useful in identifying remaining capacity gaps.

Many sectors solicited regional or municipality engagement either in FTI design (MEFCC and MUDH) or in activity selection and work-planning (MoANR). However, the review found capacity at subnational levels for design and implementation was not consistently strong. Whilst there are some high points, such as quarterly reviews of seasonal forecasts in Somali Region that resulted in changes to procurement plans, most woredas did not have information about long-term climate trends nor systematic approaches to using seasonal or short-range forecasts in their climate resilience interventions.

Design and delivery challenges did not solely relate to the use of climate information; the Somali Regional Environmental Protection, Mines, Forest and Energy Development Agency was also found to have no experience in practical bottom-up planning of natural resource management activities, which impacted ownership and long term sustainability of activities.

The capacity for M&E and results reporting was less likely to be acknowledged as a gap by local staff, but inaccurate or hard to follow reports, blanket reporting of “100%” achievement and reports which did not follow the structure of plans were highlighted as issues in the

portfolio review and reviews of regional reports. Capacity for emissions measurement or MRV was absent at local level.

Despite these limitations, the FTIs provided an opportunity to learn by doing, with report quality generally improving throughout the programme. Ultimately, the success of CRGE implementation depends on the capability of local level staff, and their knowledge of the adaptation and mitigation approaches, their ability to interpret climate inform to identify appropriate actions, monitor outcomes and push for improvements.

4.1.2 Fast Track Investment Results

4.1.2.1 Summary of outputs

Finding 12 FTIs mostly delivered CRGE-relevant results. Not all projects have hit beneficiary targets and some seedlings planted have already died. As expected, projects in industry and transport focused on learning and piloting rather than large scale outreach.

The table and figures below reflect the achievements of the FTI projects summarised by the review team from FTI reports. In some cases, numbers were amended following discussion with Sector Line Ministries²². More results are expected by December 2016.

Table 11: Summary of FTI results in relation to key outputs

	MoANR	MEFCC	MoI	IPDC	MoT	MUDH	MoWIE
Direct beneficiaries¹ (#)	<i>Target:</i> 15,375 ² <i>Result:</i> 2,640-3,300 (17-21%)	<i>Target:</i> 16,122 <i>Result:</i> 24,475 (152%)	n/a ³	<i>Target:</i> 100 <i>Result:</i> 740 (740%)	<i>Target:</i> 91 <i>Result:</i> 311 (342%)	<i>Target:</i> 1,621 <i>Result:</i> 1,934 (119%)	<i>Target:</i> 12,240 <i>Result:</i> n/a
Area greened/ managed (ha)	<i>Target:</i> 48,031 <i>Result:</i> 11,000-22,000 (23-46%)	<i>Target:</i> 12,580 <i>Result:</i> 8,378 (67%)	n/a	<i>Target:</i> 34 <i>Result:</i> 33 (97%)	n/a	<i>Target:</i> 34 <i>Result:</i> 12 (35%)	<i>Target:</i> 184 <i>Result:</i> n/a
Seedlings/trees planted⁴ (#)	<i>Target:</i> 3.0m <i>Result:</i> 3.9m (130%)	<i>Target:</i> 7.3m <i>Result:</i> 10.8m (149%)	n/a	<i>Target:</i> 25,000 <i>Result:</i> 57,000 (228%)	<i>Target:</i> 10,000 <i>Result:</i> 9,000 (90%)	<i>Target:</i> 51,667 <i>Result:</i> 69,064 (134%)	n/a


Source: Proposals and April 2016 Progress Reports.

²² For example, the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources reported a number which appeared to have been based on the incorrect use of a household multiplier. The numbers are therefore reported as a range based on Sector staff knowledge about beneficiary targeting in each woreda of the project.

Notes: (1) In some cases individuals were reported, while in others households (which for ICF purposes could be subject to a multiplier) were reported, no multipliers were used in reporting these results. Also note that the MEFCC target excludes Tigray because its progress report was corrupted, while MoWIE excludes target beneficiaries from PV systems in 20 rural primary schools, 20 rural health posts, 5 farmer training centres, and 16 small scale irrigation schemes as the estimate is likely to include indirect beneficiaries; likewise, MoWIE's target of reaching 147,000 through solar water and irrigation is excluded. (2) Because household results were not multiplied, the MoANR target of 79,948 beneficiaries was divided by 5.2 to convert it to households and make the numbers comparable. (3) Not applicable (n/a) means that these results were not reported; (4) A number of projects reported low survival due to drought and low rainfall. Some projects responded by planting additional seedlings. For example, under MoANR's Mount JemoWechecha project, 30,765 seeds were planted but 14,328 were lost due to drought, an additional 68,140 seedlings have therefore been cultivated for planting in the next season.

The graph below shows the scale of ambition in terms of beneficiary outreach across the sectors. Variation is to be expected given the different scope of projects and budgets. There remains some confusion in relation to the MoANR results which appear well under-target. These could be a result of different methods used in beneficiary counting at proposal development and reporting stages. However the high cost per beneficiary may also be a factor as explored in Finding 40.


Figure 3. Direct beneficiaries (individual beneficiaries)



Note: MoI, IPDC and MoT did not provide target and/or results estimates. MoWIE results have been excluded because no results have been achieved as the solar systems have not been distributed.

The graph below shows the hectares reported by sectors working on greening or land management activities and indicates whether they under or over-performed against their targets. This does not account for the quality of measures implemented or for whether the targets were realistic given available budget.


Figure 4. Area greened / managed with conservation activities



Source: Proposals and April 2016 Progress Reports.

The final graph shows the number of seedlings planted in relation to targets set in FTI proposals. IPDC and MoT had relatively modest targets of 27,000 and 10,000 respectively and IPDC was able to exceed this by almost reaching the maximum number of tree seedlings which could be planted on each of the hectares 'greened'. As expected, MEFCO had the highest target of 7.3m seedlings which it exceeded. However, at least in some areas survival rates were reportedly very low, which is a likely reason for under-performance in terms of the area greened.

Figure 5. Seedlings and trees planted



Source: Proposals and April 2016 Progress Reports.

Notes: This records the number of seedlings planted. As mentioned above, a number of projects reported low survival due to drought and low rainfall.

4.1.2.2 Relevance of the FTI design

Finding 13 The timeframe of the FTI was too short. Pressure to deliver tangible results within 18 months limited the types of activities which could be supported.

The extension of the FTI timeline to December 2016 was justifiable but it would have been preferable to design programmes with a longer implementation period, as several interviews mentioned that the short timeframe and the perceived pressure to deliver tangible results had limited project design. There was also evidence from case studies that it had affected implementation.

The review found that, in the MEFC FTI project implemented in the Somali Region, the project was treated as a 'to do' list of outputs without only limited consideration of impact and sustainability. Likewise, the review of MOANR noticed that whilst delivery had been efficiently managed despite the short timeframes, it was hard to establish whether the activities would contribute to long-term resilience. There is less evidence that interventions were designed or prioritised in terms of climate outcomes of mitigation and adaptation. Federal stakeholders commented that pressure to deliver had meant activities that could be delivered quickly and would utilise budget resources were prioritised. This resulted in delivery of inputs as the main driver, at the expense of lower cost technologies with a behaviour change requirement such as conservation agriculture, improved access to input and output markets or the use of meteorological information to enhance decision-making.

In the MUDH, interventions appeared to have been feasible to deliver in the timeframe but some system elements were not yet completely finalised and sustainability was not ensured. Budget and time limitations were the main constraint on support to waste management infrastructure.

Finding 14 FTI designs in rural projects made use of prior learning to varying degrees.

In the MoANR project, the use of existing watershed management and public works guidelines from SLMP and PSNP were extremely important to the speed with which natural resource management activities could be delivered. One area where lessons were not used was in the development of revolving funds through which to provide inputs to farmers. In Somali and Harari, all inputs were provided freely with no expectation of repayment. In Amhara, inputs were provided to households with the expectation that they had taken a loan to be repaid via the Farmers' Cooperative. This did not expose households to new risks since households whose livestock died or crops failed were not required to repay, but neither had it considered learning from the "*Other Food Security Programmes*" (the precursor to the Household Asset Building Programme of the PSNP), where farmer cooperatives had lower

interest rates but also lower repayment rates²³ relative to microfinance institutions which were later used for managing rural finance.

Likewise, in the MEFCC projects, there was varied capacity in regions for the use of prior learning. Whereas in Amhara, the Bureau of Agriculture and Natural Resources was able to draw on learning from previous experiences with participatory forest management and livelihoods, it was clear that this was not available to the Regional Environmental Protection, Mines, Forest and Energy Development Agency in Somali Region and consequent differences in implementation performance were noted.

Finding 15 In the MoANR project, some activities promoted were not well-suited to poor and vulnerable households. This may be particularly problematic where there is increased risk of conflict between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.

Whilst Federal and regional staff frequently stressed that the ‘most vulnerable areas were targeted’, in practice this was not possible given the intervention design. All sites visited used ‘ability to manage the activities’ as one criteria in targeting individuals for participation in the project. In Enebsie SarMidar, the Kebele staff conducted a wealth ranking and selected individuals from different wealth groups. In this case, 53% were poor, 37% were considered middle and 10% were considered better off.

Considering the large-scale asset transfer involved in the project (can be items of up to £1,000 in value per household in some cases²⁴) there are risks that these projects may widen the gap between richer and poorer households. This is certainly not the intention of project developers who requested that all activities under each of the five outputs should reach ‘all social classes’ and noted that poultry and vegetable activities should be pro-poor in nature. MoANR applied interventions across a sample of all social classes to assess the feasibility and impact of implementing a range of CRGE activities for different types of households.

However, there are inherent risks of exclusion associated with this approach. However, where ‘capability to manage activities’ and ‘cover all social classes’ are used as targeting criteria, there is a likelihood that better off farmers will benefit from large-scale transfers of assets. It was agreed by beneficiaries and Government staff that heifer distribution and oxen fattening are not activities that are suitable for poor households. If these are to remain part of future

²³ A key informant reported rates of ~50% when managed through cooperatives and ~85% through MFIs and RuSACCos because of proper follow up and procedures. In addition, because of the interest rates in RuSACCOS and MFIs account for non-payment, they can continue to offer loans without re-capitalisation.

²⁴ See section 4.2 for more information.

interventions, it was suggested that these could be better managed as group activities, as is the case in the SLMP.

Finding 16 CRGE Strategies note the important role of private investment but some FTI designs rely extensively on GoE implementation and the private sector could be crowded out.

Public-private partnerships (PPP) are time-consuming to develop and may require skills not frequently available in local bureaus. Models for public-private partnership are under development in the transport sector for the management of parking services as there is already a track-record of PPP in this area. In addition, the MoI project aimed to influence the private sector. Table 12 below outlines potential opportunities to improve understanding of how GoE could best catalyse private sector engagement in CRGE.

Table 12 Opportunities for greater private sector involvement

Sector	FTI Model	Opportunities for greater private sector involvement
MoANR	GoE delivery of all inputs; management of loans through farmer cooperatives.	Consider involvement of microfinance in loan management and private sector in input supply (vouchers, input fairs). Establishment of local service providers – such as fodder supply, traction services. Support to co-ops on marketing.
MEFCC	GoE management of nurseries and reforestation through direct hire of casual labour.	Consider performance-based payments to private suppliers of nurseries and tree planting. Bonus payments for post 1-year survival rate can incentivise survival.
MuDH	Mixed public vs private approaches to solid waste management ²⁵	Learn from these examples and study level of GoE subsidy required, sustainability and quality of services under different models.
MoWIE	GoE delivers solar technologies for free or via a revolving loan system.	Development of smart subsidy package or results-based payment approach to incentivise companies to sell / distribute household solar technologies in remote areas. GoE plays quality assurance / measurement role.

4.1.2.3 FTI management, reporting and efficiency

Finding 17 Though projects could not complete within the initially agreed timeframe, overall the speed with which the FTI projects were designed and implemented is impressive.

²⁵ See Finding X under effectiveness or the MUDH Sector Assessment Report for more information about the current performance of the two models.

The FTIs had an ambitiously short timeframe for design and implementation, particularly as implementation meant using new and untested institutional structures, financial modalities and reporting requirements. While many projects did not complete within the initial timeframe (18 months), speed of progress has been impressive. While MoWIE has not been able to implement most of their investment due to procurement delays, this is offset by progress made by other sectors. For example, MoANR spending and reporting on ~£4.4m in 28 woredas in 21 months demonstrates capacity for procurement and community outreach.

Finding 18 Use of executing entities for support to planning, M&E and lesson learning was not widespread but did add significant value in MoANR

MoANR was the only sector to engage executing entities, engaging both an NGO (Climate Change Forum) and a private company (Echnoserve) to support delivery of the FTI.

Echnoserve had provided technical support prior to the development of the FTI and was involved in proposal development to fund its own role in the FTI. CCF-E was also a long-standing partner recruited to tackle a hotspot for land degradation in a critical watershed for Rift Valley lakes with particular economic and ecological significance. They were recruited as the area required higher support and focused more on capacity building. Implementation resulted in competently delivered watershed activities. Echnoserve provided support for M&E, MRV and technical advice to the MoANR implemented activities generating a significant focus on learning and results. With Echnoserve's support, MoARN is the only sector able to present outcome level results.

The partnership with Echnoserve was explicitly designed to provide technical assistance, transfer knowledge and support overall FTI implementation. CCF-E's work was appreciated by the Ministry but had not had an influence on staff capacity outside its one woreda of intervention. The two examples of use of executing entities provide lessons for how non-governmental executing entities can be used to develop GoE capacity in future.

Finding 19 The time required for international procurement is a major reason for severe delays in MoWIE and MoT projects but FTI reports also referenced a number of delivery challenges with setup delays, funding delays and capacity limitations being common themes.

FTI implementation faced a variety of challenges, sometimes resulting in delays to implementation. Table 13 below indicates some of the major challenges experienced by FTI projects reported in their progress reports. It is important to note that setup delays in some cases related to the absence of appropriate institutional arrangements and in others the absence of appropriate procurement arrangements. For example, MUDH reported some

initial delays in establishing work plans and providing reports to the CRGE Facility, though this was resolved through the assignment of a motivated CRGE coordinator. Similarly for IPDC, there were delays as the proposal was submitted by MoI before the creation of the organisation.

Table 13. Key challenges

	Inaccurate budgeting	Timing	Funding delays	Setup delays	Capacity	Erratic rainfall	Lack of vehicle
MoANR				✓	✓	✓	
MEFCC	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
MoI				✓	✓		
IPDC	✓	✓		✓	✓		
MoT			✓	✓	✓		✓
MUDH	✓		✓		✓		
MoWIE			✓	✓			

Source: April 2016 Progress Reports.

Notes: Inaccurate budgeting (planned budget was not sufficient to undertake all the planned activities); Timing (short amount of time available for implementation); Funding delays (delays in procurement or funding disbursement); Setup delays (delays in establishing appropriate management or procurement arrangements); Capacity (lack of institutional capacity or capacity in private sector to take on contracts).

Finding 20 Reports were of mixed quality. A lack of reporting against logframe targets, the absence of financial reports, no explanations for changes and weak aggregation of data across projects were the most common issues. Not all sectors disaggregated beneficiary data by gender.

Table 14 summarises the findings of the portfolio review of reporting quality. As can be seen MoANR, IPDC and MUDH provided the most comprehensive reports which enabled clearest understanding of the progress of the project in relation to the proposal and the most comprehensive information about results. The queries around reports from Ministry of Transport and Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Electricity are mostly a factor of delayed implementation and fewer results to report. MEFCC reports lacked full gender disaggregation and did not appear complete. The MoI report was generally comprehensive except it did not closely follow the format in the proposal and did not explain the shift in its activities from installing energy efficiency equipment in factories to the purchase of measurement equipment and studies on energy efficiency measures. This was a legitimate change based on budget availability but was not explained in the progress report. It is important to note that FTIs have not yet concluded and that there will be another opportunity for final reports to be submitted which may rectify some of these issues.

It was not within the review's scope to verify all results reported. However, an assessment of reporting quality at regional level in Somali demonstrated that in some cases reports of

“100% achievement” of targets were submitted without supporting evidence. This indicates an important role for sectors to quality assure regional reports prior to aggregating data.

Table 14: Summary of report quality by sector demonstrated by red-amber-green rating

	Quality of report	Description
MoANR	Completeness ✓✓✓ Information synthesis ✓ Logframe reporting ✓✓ Quantification ✓✓ Strength of evidence ✓✓✓ M&E ✓✓✓ Financial reporting ✓ Gender and poverty ✓✓	The MoANR projects did a good job of disaggregating data and providing photo evidence to support their results. The results were not compiled but were provided in separate Progress Reports. There were some issues with the aggregation of beneficiary numbers being unclear. The projects provided detailed reporting against their logframes, although these did not always perfectly align with the proposal logframes. MoANR had a strong focus on M&E, with one project specifically focused on building capacity in M&E and MRV. Total budget figures were reported in the individual progress reports but variation from proposal budgets were not explained.
MEFCC	Completeness ✓✓ Information synthesis ✓ Logframe reporting ✓ Quantification ✓ Strength of evidence ✓✓ M&E ✓ Financial reporting ✓ Gender and poverty ✓✓	MEFCC results were provided in a compiled Progress Report, although the report appears to be in a draft format and did not include an overview or synthesis of results or all the projects. More than half the projects included photo evidence. Approximately half of the projects reported against their logframes, while the remaining projects reported progress against outputs that were not directly related to their logframes. The majority of projects noted that MEFCC had undertaken external validation of their results, although the approach to M&E was not explained. Only total budget figures were reported, and only in the individual progress reports. The projects did not disaggregate data by gender, although a focus on women, youth and vulnerable people was frequently mentioned.
MoI	Completeness ✓✓ Information synthesis – n/a Logframe reporting ✓ Quantification ✓✓ Strength of evidence ✓✓✓ M&E Financial reporting ✓✓✓ Gender and poverty	MoI did not report against its logframe, although the activities completed are in line with its proposal. It included a count of greenhouse gas baseline and energy efficiency assessments undertaken but otherwise reported percentages against outputs. The report does not discuss M&E. It does however include a full financial report and MoI separately provided the close of project workshop agenda and presentation, a greenhouse gas quantification report, the TOR for energy efficiency systems installation, and energy efficiency study reports and presentations. Gender and poverty are not a strong focus as its stakeholders are government and industry.
IPDC	Completeness ✓✓✓ Information synthesis – n/a Logframe reporting ✓✓✓ Quantification ✓✓✓ Strength of evidence ✓ M&E Financial reporting ✓✓ Gender and poverty ✓✓✓	IPDC does a good job of reporting against its logframe and disaggregating results. The report covers all its activities and explains variations in its activities. The report lacks supporting evidence but provides confidence by noting that beneficiary numbers are obtained from the contractor’s payroll. The report does not discuss M&E. It does however include IPDC’s total budget, the amount disbursed to the executive entity and a VfM discussion.
MoT	Completeness ✓ Information synthesis ✓✓ Logframe reporting ✓✓ Quantification ✓ Strength of evidence ✓✓ M&E Financial reporting ✓ Gender and poverty	MoT only provided overview progress reports, which report percentages against logframes but these appear to have changed since the proposal stage without any explanation given. The Progress Reports include photo evidence of progress. M&E is not mentioned and only total budget for each project is included in the reports. Although in discussion, the project staff note the involvement of women in the bicycle taxi project, the reports do not contain gender disaggregated data.

MUDH	Completeness ✓✓✓ Information synthesis ✓✓✓ Logframe reporting ✓✓✓ Quantification ✓✓✓ Strength of evidence ✓ M&E ✓✓ Financial reporting ✓✓✓ Gender and poverty ✓✓	MUDH did a good job of combining the results across its projects in a standardised form and disaggregating data by gender and youth in some projects. The majority of projects reported against their logframe and explained variations in results. However, the only supporting evidence was one separate progress report, which includes photos of the activities undertaken for one project. There is not a lot of detail on M&E in the reports, but most projects reported that quarterly M&E visits were made. MUDH also included a financial report, with separate budget lines for each city and town.
MoWIE	Completeness ✓✓ Information synthesis ✓ Logframe reporting ✓✓ Quantification ✓✓ Strength of evidence Financial reporting ✓ Gender and poverty ✓	MoWIE provided a combined progress report, but did not include any overview or synthesis of results. The quality of reporting varied between projects, with one project strongly quantifying its impacts, two projects reporting percentages against logframes and one project not reporting against its logframe. A slight concern is that results implied that beneficiaries have been reached by the projects when most of the activities are incomplete. The report did not include any supporting evidence and only total budget for each project was included, with variations from the proposal budgets not explained. MoWIE did not disaggregate data by gender or report broader impacts on vulnerable groups, although the proposals focused on providing positive impacts for these groups, particularly women.

Source: Proposals and April 2016 Progress Reports. This analysis applies a Red Amber Green (RAG) rating where sectors with strong reporting are noted in green, sectors with weaker reporting in red. Definition of evaluation: A qualitative assessment (identified through number of checks) by the reviewer of the degree to which project reports achieved against the following criteria: Completeness (extent that all projects/regions are covered in the Progress Reports); Information synthesis (degree that results across projects are synthesised/summarised); Logframe reporting (degree to which projects report against their proposal logframes); Quantification (extent that results are quantified); Strength of evidence (amount of supporting evidence provided, such as photos or copies of reports); Financial reporting (level of financial information provided in the Progress Reports, for example whether a financial report or break down of expenditure was included); Gender and poverty (degree to which projects disaggregate results by poverty and gender and discuss implications for vulnerable groups).

4.1.2.4 FTI effectiveness

Finding 21 MoANR captured information on development outcomes, but assessment of effectiveness for other projects is hampered by a lack of outcome level data

MoANR is the only sector able to report on outcomes. Reporting in most sectors focused on activity and output level data. In MoANR, outcome level data collection was conducted at both baseline and endline and demonstrated changes in beneficiary income as a result of the programme. This information is critical to understanding the benefit derived from the FTIs, rather than just understanding the number of results achieved. This information is also needed to compare results from different activities and make evidence based decisions in future, though it relies on high quality monitoring data. There is still progress needed in other sectors to understand and capture this type of information. For example, in MEFC, the final report was a compendium of project reporting, indicating the lack of a system in MEFC to collect or even compile outcome level data from across the portfolio.

Finding 22 The FTI system enabled Austrian resources to be effectively programmed via MoANR which contributed to reduced transaction costs and greater aid effectiveness.

The DFID resources helped create an enabling environment which allowed effective use and programming of Austrian resources (£547,000)²⁶ that had been committed to the CRGE Facility in late 2012. These resources were used to implement an FTI in Somali and Afar which was also supported via the technical assistance provided by the DFID-funded Echnoserve project. Without the FTI process, instigated by DFID's commitment of resources in late 2013, the Austrian resources may not have been programmed and utilised so quickly.

Finding 23 Many FTIs leveraged substantial GoE and community resources but this is not captured systematically.

The most prominent example of leveraging is GoE commitment of its own resources to support FTI achievement. Across all sectors and levels, GoE staff, office resources and vehicles have been used for FTI management and monitoring. In Esebie Sar Midar, Government officials estimated the value of staff time invested at ETB 113,400 (£4,100). Vehicle and fuel use is estimated at around ETB 146,500 (£5,200), suggesting significant contributions if similar amounts were used in other woredas.

Of particular note, in Harari, the Regional Vice President used the FTI as an opportunity to leverage a substantial commitment of GoE resources to construct a large water harvesting pond. The region was able to liaise with the Road Authority to use their trucks and machinery (estimated commitment of ETB 2m (£68,500)). Gabion and fodder production materials worth ETB 200,000 (£6,900) were also contributed from the GoE budget. The officials interviewed noted the catalytic effect of the FTI project in creating the opportunity for cross-sectoral collaboration and leveraging this scale of resources.

Community resources have also been contributed. For example, for MoANR projects, a summary of community labour leveraged highlights contributions in Oromia, Amhara, Somali and SNNPR. An exercise conducted by Echnoserve estimated between 20 and 120 person days of community labour per woreda had been mobilised for soil and water conservation activities.

²⁶ This is based on current exchange rates of the €630,000 amount committed by Austria

4.1.3 Results for women and girls

Finding 24 Government of Ethiopia commitment to gender equality was understood by all stakeholders. However, specialist expertise available in line ministries was not used in project design or monitoring.

The Government of Ethiopia has made strong commitments to women’s equality in its constitution, through the Federal Family Code (2000), through its ongoing work on land registration and through its ratification of international legal instruments that seek to eliminate discrimination. The review found stakeholders at all level were aware of these commitments and had sought to ensure women could participate in FTIs.

However, officials mainly used their existing knowledge on gender in the design and implementation of FTIs. Interviews with Directorates responsible for gender mainstreaming in the three case study sectors noted that these staff had not been involved in FTI design, implementation or monitoring. They were not routinely invited to participate in FTI committees. In the MoANR, the Women’s Affairs Directorate had been invited to conduct a gender analysis for CRGE delivery in the Agriculture sector but this assessment was ongoing and had therefore not influenced the FTI implementation.

Finding 25 Where results were disaggregated by gender, it is evident that women have participated in FTIs.

Table 15 below indicates that the FTIs have successfully reached women and in many cases disaggregated reported results by gender. Those individuals who were available to participate in focus groups organised by the review commented on the benefits they had experienced and their satisfaction with participation in the projects. In particular transformational livelihood improvements were noted for two extremely poor women who participated in the MoANR project in Amhara. The level of participation in agricultural activities varied based on the activity, with women noting greater levels of participation in poultry and small ruminant activities. Women workers interviewed in MuDH solid waste sites were also satisfied with the opportunity to increase their income and ability to support their family.

Table 15: Results reported for women and other vulnerable groups in FTI projects

Sector	MoANR	IPDC	MUDH	MoWIE
Women	32% female. Of which, 16% of crop beneficiaries and 47% of livestock	61% of jobs created were for women	55% of all beneficiaries were women. 30-78% of the jobs created in	No results reported yet. At least 8,000 women should receive solar

	beneficiaries were female.		each town were for women.	lanterns by Dec 2016.
Youth	Not disaggregated	100% of jobs	Youth were 100% of jobs in Harari and Jigjiga. 16% of Dessie beneficiaries were youth.	Not targeted
Landless	Not disaggregated but identified as an important target.	N/A	N/A	Not targeted.

Finding 26 Targeting and beneficiary registration in rural projects was done at the household level in some cases. This limits the extent to which women in male-headed households ‘own’ activities designed for them.

As far as the review team could establish, there were different approaches taken in different woredas to registering beneficiaries in both MoANR and MEFCC projects. In Amhara and Somali, wives in male-headed households were not registered separately but shared the labour inputs and the benefits of the project with their husbands. However, high numbers of female-headed households were recorded as having been targeted in Somali Region, suggesting a deliberate targeting approach or the registration of women under the category of ‘female headed household.’ In Harari, the project recorded beneficiaries as individuals and had registered both husbands and wives, sometimes both within the same household. A similar approach was also used in the CCF-E project in Oromia.

Table 16: %s of female headed households and women registered as beneficiaries

Region	Amhara (DFID)		Harari (DFID)	Oromia (DFID)	Somali and Afar (Austria)
Woreda	Enebsie SarMidar	Wadla	Sofi Woreda	A/T/Jido Kombolcha	4 Woredas
% of FHH / women	13% (FHH)	5% (FHH)	25% (individual women)	40% (individual women)	42% (FHH)

Source: MoANR reporting

In general, involving women by registering male headed households has some limitations.²⁷ It is usually harder to ensure that women control the transferred assets and misses an

²⁷ Though it is common in projects tracking beneficiary numbers by household as those funded by the UK’s ICF are usually required to do

opportunity for the project to challenge existing attitudes in relation to gender roles. For example, a female MoANR beneficiary in Wadla woreda commented "*the additional gains from crop and sheep selling will be managed by men, but in all cases we use our additional incomes by consulting each other and with full agreement.*"

Finding 27 Activities "for women" were included, but those tackling the drivers of inequality were less evident.

There was no evidence from the review that project activities had created an unmanageable burden for women. Female headed households tend to be labour constrained and less able to take on a wide range of activities. In all cases, women appreciated the opportunity to generate additional income and to benefit their households. However, selecting activities which can be easily managed by women, generate solid returns and ensure that women are the registered beneficiary, is important.

MuDH's GTP2 contributions recognise that a strong driver for implementation of solid waste activities is job creation. The percentage of new jobs for women varied between towns, but there was equal pay for women and men waste management workers in both the Dessie and Jigjiga sites. There is a sense that this low paid and low status work is "well suited to women". Finding ways to challenge some of those attitudes, for example through the high profile participation of the Dessie mayor in the city's clean-up campaign, are valuable and could be given stronger emphasis and replicated. It was also noted that women had not been recruited into certain job categories such as tractor operators. It is known that there would be far fewer women candidates than men, but positive discrimination could be a way to develop female role models, where candidates are available and where permitted by GoE recruitment guidelines.

In Enebsie Sar Midar in Amhara Region, there was evidence that men were starting to get involved in some domestic tasks to reduce the burden for women and FGD participants cited extensive awareness raising by Government and NGO staff as the reason. However, this experience was not universal and there was no evidence of activities embedded within the FTIs which make active commitments to shift attitudes and beliefs around gender, distribution of labour burdens or other underlying drivers of gender inequality. There are likely lessons from other projects which have included a more extensive focus on gender equality into all project communications. Lessons from transformational household methodologies such as *Gender Action Learning Systems* may be relevant.

Finding 28 In rural areas, landless youth are the most frequently cited vulnerable group. Some activities were targeted specifically at these individuals but there is scope to widen the focus on off-farm activities to ensure such individuals benefit.

The main activities which were cited as being intended to benefit landless youth included the management of enclosed areas and sale of cut and carry fodder, livestock fattening, beekeeping and management of mechanised traction services. There was no disaggregation of youth-focused activities by gender in project documents or interviews. In our focus group discussions while not a focus of the review, the reviewers did not identify landless individuals who had benefitted from such activities. In Somali, those involved in oxen fattening were richer farming households with wives, whereas in Amhara the beekeeping beneficiary interviewed was also a landed farmer. Only in the MEFCC-led project were youth involved in beekeeping groups.²⁸ Federal MoANR staff note that on previous field trips to Tigray, SNNP, Gambella and Oromiya, they identified targeting guidelines being used appropriately. However, establishing targets for landless individuals and requiring disaggregation of beneficiary reports may provide greater transparency on these achievements in the future.

4.1.4 Is there alignment or trade-off between programmatic planning and mainstreaming objectives?

Finding 29 The balance between results delivery and wider-influence on mainstreaming was appropriate given the political buy-in and timeframe for the FTIs. This may not remain the case in future.

In sectors with very large budgets, questions were raised by some stakeholders about whether the FTIs were best focused on the delivery of standalone climate projects or whether a greater focus on influencing and improving the CRGE contribution of large-scale investments might have been more relevant. The review team does not feel that the time available for FTI design would have enabled such an approach to be impactful. Such efforts require a strong demand from mainstream programmes and high-level political buy-in to be effective. Without a joint project development process and buy-in from the object of influence, there is a risk that such projects would have very limited impact. Instead, Government-led prioritisation was a strong indication of the areas where political buy-in existed and influence was possible. For example, in the Ministry of Transport, the relatively small amount of money did result in increased buy-in and learning about a smaller aspect of the overall Ministry's plans – non-motorised transport. This was likely more meaningful than conducting research or small-scale piloting to influence *climate smart road or railway* construction without much more significant political buy-in to take those lessons forward.

²⁸ The vast majority of landless individuals interviewed were in the non-FTI woreda in Amhara.

An FTI which did aim to affect the larger context of its sector was the analytical project in the Ministry of Industry. Studying opportunities for energy efficiencies in major factories can influence the regulatory environment to catalyse behaviour change in the studied industries. However, whilst the potential for long-term impact is significant, the review did not find any evidence that progress on this will be visible in the near future. In fact, key informants noted that factory ownership of the findings was limited which may limit long-term results.

Finding 30 Mobilising new resources is an important component of the CRGE strategy and may result in standalone climate programmes. These can also generate useful learning to support mainstreaming and leverage other funds, but attention to the purpose in design is important.

The CRGE Facility plays an important role in mobilising and managing climate finance to support CRGE implementation, but staff throughout the GoE recognise that other sources will continue to be important. The CRGE Facility's Operational Manual notes that its "*Finance will be used to make catalytic investments and to leverage new and additional finance...it is accepted that not all of the funds necessary to implement the CRGE Strategy will be channelled through the CRGE Facility*" (p25)

Both the FTIs and the current CRGE programmes under development for the GCF demonstrate the tension between the interest in '*catalysing*' wider change and the need of both donors and Government to demonstrate that CRGE results are being delivered, at the widest scale possible, on the ground.

Of course, these two objectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive and there are signs that the FTIs and GCF are being used to deliver on both these goals (See Table 17). However, key informants involved in CRGE project design and implementation express most interest in '*scaling up CRGE interventions as defined in the CRGE strategy*' and we have noted elsewhere the need for a greater focus on experimentation and adaptive management given the unprecedented scale of CRGE (see Finding 7). Due to time pressures, there was also a sense that some of the more challenging issues such as attitudinal change, building soft-skills for adaptation, and encouraging private sector involvement had not been attempted due to the need for quick and visible results. With these tensions in mind, there could be value in formally defining different routes to achieving these different objectives and by asking sectors to consider an appropriate balance between these goals in their funding pipelines. For example, the 2014 CRGE Facility Lesson Learning Review, suggested that investment concepts could be categorised along the following themes: 1) Scaling up proven-CRGE activities 2) Making existing investments CRGE compliant 3) Building systems and capacity for CRGE 4) Developing innovative responses for CRGE. It is expected that the needs in each

sector would be different depending on existing capacity, the state of CRGE analysis, available mainstream mechanisms for delivering climate results, and their budget deficits.

Table 17: Indications of catalytic effects in FTI and GCF project design

Sector	Catalytic effects mentioned
MoANR	Building awareness and capacity on vulnerability analysis and investment planning for CRGE at local level to leverage new resources; catalysing cross-Bureau collaboration and resources in Harari Region, generating lessons on new technologies such as hand-held tractors.
MOI	Created new knowledge and analysis to help companies implement energy efficiency measures; can potentially feed into new regulation (though no progress on this to date).
MoT	Created momentum and generated practical lessons to feed into the non-motorised transport strategy which is also being supported by Korean finance. Galvanised larger GoE investment into 6 additional smart parking towers which were procured together with that funded by the FTI.
MUDH	Leveraged substantial GoE resources in Dessie so that the solid waste collection systems now cover all sub-cities. Generating lessons about the sustainability of public and private sector approaches to solid waste management.

Finding 31 There are no inherent trade-offs between mainstreaming and programme planning. However, the level of effort directed to mainstreaming vs. project management by dedicated CRGE staff will affect the speed at which mainstreaming happens and transaction costs associated with CRGE.

As outlined above, the review did not find inherent trade-offs between programmatic planning and mainstreaming. CRGE actions and programmes can be seen as one more mechanism by which mainstreamed strategies are developed and implemented. As acknowledged in the GCF proposals, Ethiopia routinely faces budget shortfalls and there is scope for increased public investment to achieve national development goals. However, it is also clear that with each new standalone climate project, GoE capacity is being used for the management of specific donor requirements and results, and that this may impact availability of resources for shared learning, knowledge management and aggregated results reporting in ways that could be counter to the overarching mainstreaming goal.

Currently, there is no systematic pipeline or overarching framework into which partner contributions can be pooled and reported on as one. So whilst each new project might bring much needed resources and opportunities to learn, their size and requirements also dictate the level of transaction costs involved in their management. Individual donors who do not pool their resources may create burdensome requirements that weaken the impact of all contributions. Projects which are too small and resource-intensive may not generate lessons which can be applied at scale and as initiatives proliferate, coordination and sharing learning

become more difficult. These issues are not unique to climate finance and form the foundation of Aid Effectiveness principles under the Paris Declaration.²⁹

GCF programmes are felt to be of a sufficient size to justify additional transaction costs by most stakeholders and it would not be possible to access GCF financing through a pooled fund. The CRGE Facility offers the opportunity for donors to pool resources around programmatic approaches. However, expertise in programme design, quality assurance and oversight within flagship Trust Funds exceeded those of the Facility in recent years³⁰ and this will continue to be the case until GoE and donors focus on further growing and developing national systems. As long as donors are confident in the quality of intervention design and that the CRGE Facility managed funds can deliver comparable cost-effectiveness and M&E, the added value of building national systems should encourage donors committed to aid effectiveness to prioritise this modality.

Finding 32 There is no evidence, to date, of efforts to aggregate reporting on CRGE results or to manage knowledge on mainstreaming from across multiple delivery channels. Capacity for this in woredas, regions and sectors will be important for the future.

In order to identify delivered results, overall progress on CRGE and key financing needs throughout the lifetime of GTP2, increased capacity for the aggregation of CRGE results will be required. This should primarily sit within the sectors and their respective bureaus. Analysis of FTI reporting demonstrated a number of gaps in basic results reporting (See Finding 23) and the absence of a consistent approach to measuring GHG emissions or resilience will both inhibit the GoE's efforts to document its achievements and to identify gaps. Gaps in reporting capacity are recognised by most stakeholders but mechanisms to fill them are unclear. The National Capacity Development Programme has a £40m budget but is a standalone project and so far no donor has expressed a willingness to invest in it.

²⁹ OECD (2005) Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action available at:

<http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm>

³⁰For example, the PSNP Donor Coordination Team (2015) plan outlined eight full-time staff and seven consultancy positions. (DCT 2015a p. 3). This team also has a substantial budget (£11m) for contracting consultants, capacity development initiatives and will work closely with numerous GoE counterparts employed through the PSNP.

4.2 Were the outcomes that this investment achieved, worth achieving given the investment? Did the programme represent value for money?

Section 4.2.1 gives an overview of outcomes achieved. Section 4.2.2 discusses the costs incurred in obtaining these outcomes, including an assessment of procurement systems and cost drivers. Section 4.2.3 covers the value for money implications of scaling up the programme. A full value for money assessment which covers the DFID VfM categories of economy, efficiency and cost effectiveness is available as a supplementary report.

4.2.1 What were the outcomes of DFID's support?

Finding 33 MoNAR reported positive changes in productivity and incomes for the majority of rural households covered by the pre- and post-project assessments reviewed.³¹ No data on outcomes for rural households was available from MEFC.

As part of its contract to provide technical assistance on M&E, Echnoserve collected data from a sample of around 40 households in each project site. Baseline data was collected in 2014 prior to implementation and endline data was collected between March and June 2016. The results are generally extremely impressive especially when viewed in the context of the severe drought which affected Ethiopia in 2015/6. Data was collected from the woreda offices which showed FTI households' productivity tended to be less affected by climate impacts than those outside of the FTI. It is clear that one-off transfer of improved seed and fertiliser is likely to have a substantial impact on yield. For example, FAO's Fertiliser Response Database shows yield responses from the application of 50kg N and 35kg P205 to maize to be between 20-200% depending on the site, so when combined with improved seed the yield improvements below are feasible. Some of the extremely high income increases in the Gambella households may be from measurement variation³² or due to the fact that there were food shortages as a result of the drought and in areas disconnected from wider markets, higher prices benefit those households able to harvest a surplus. In addition, as

³¹ Echnoserve was in the process of compiling these reports during the review. Reports for Amhara, Harari and Gambella were made available. Similar reports for all regions will be available by the end of 2016.

³² Measurement challenges in relation to African smallholders are well documented. See Beegle, K., Carletto, C., Davis, B., & Zezza, A. (2015). Households and Income in Africa. The Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics: Volume 1: Context and Concepts, 46.

noted in Finding 41 not all these gains will be sustained since the farmers may not access the same levels of improved seed and fertiliser without the project, and use of artificial fertilizer on poor soils can negatively impact long-term soil quality.

Table 18: Productivity, income and water availability benefits for one crop per woreda measured by Echnoserve (from 2014/5-2015/6 planting seasons)

Region	Woreda	Crop	Average productivity change	Average income change (from stated crop)	Average income per HH from livestock provided by the project (in year 2015/6)	Change in water availability
Amhara	Enebsie Sar Midar	Wheat	132% increase	154% increase	ETB 2,455 (£87)	Average increase of 20l per HH
Amhara	Wadla	Wheat	51% increase	184% increase	ETB 2,560 (£91)	No change
Amhara	Wegidi	Wheat	42% decrease	14% decrease	ETB 1,414 (£50)	Average increase of 4.6l per HH
Amhara	Andabet	Wheat	120% increase	63% increase	ETB 668 (£23)	Average increase of 17l per HH
Harari	Sofi	Maize	94% increase	38% decrease (but increases in income from sorghum)	ETB 600 (£21)	Average increase of 5l per HH
Gambella	Lare	Maize	340% increase	568% increase	ETB 2,403 (£85)	Average increase of 40l per HH
Gambella	Goge	Sorghum	6% increase	900% increase	ETB 268 (£9)	No change

Source: Echnoserve (2016) Post-project reports for Amhara, Harari and Gambella.

Finding 34 Both permanent and temporary jobs were created in urban areas by the FTIs. These are mostly low-wage jobs accessible to unskilled unemployed people.

Poverty reduction benefits in urban areas mainly results from jobs created. MUDH's solid waste and greening initiatives are likely to create the most permanent jobs, but it is noted that there is some under-reporting on job creation which makes estimating the value created challenging. In the two solid waste projects visited monthly wages for solid waste collectors

ranged from ETB800 – ETB1,200, which whilst still offering only a relatively marginal living was highly valued by the individuals with those jobs.

Table 19: Jobs created

Sector	No. of temporary/seasonal jobs reported	No. of permanent jobs reported
IPDC	720	20
MuDH	137	729 (likely higher as some towns did not report jobs).
MoT	310	

Source: FTI reports.

Finding 35 There is only mixed evidence that interventions have been designed or prioritised in terms of their climate outcomes.

The UK international climate fund expects projects to demonstrate value for money in terms of overall development benefits, and specifically in relation to mitigation and adaptation outcomes. The ICF sees value in both short-term cost-effective opportunities to reduce emissions and build resilience, and measures which develop long-term capacity for better decision-making, resource allocation and integration of climate considerations into sector policy and planning. As detailed in Section 4.1, investment in the CRGE Facility has supported the development of national systems for climate mainstreaming.

In terms of mitigation, only a proportion of FTIs actively seek to deliver direct GHG benefits, with the remainder focusing on capacity and institutional development. No projects managed to use GHG indicators and there is therefore no opportunity to assess the cost-effectiveness of mitigation gains. There is also no clear link between FTIs and sector or national level abatement targets. Some projects are rather optimistically promoted as having GHG reduction contributions which may not materialise in reality. For example, the solid waste management project in Somali was not engaged in composting and had no discernible GHG reduction opportunities. Literature on the mitigation benefits from composting is not extensive. However, under some conditions its emissions are lower than that from landfill,³³ but may not be sufficient to offset increased emissions from waste collection operations. The emissions reduction benefits associated with increased productivity of livestock rely on an assumption that fewer livestock are held which was not the case for FTI beneficiaries, many of whom were increasing their overall holdings. However, they do have other developmental or environmental benefits which are valuable.

³³ Lou, X. F., & Nair, J. (2009). The impact of landfilling and composting on greenhouse gas emissions—a review. *Bioresource technology*, 100(16), 3792-3798.

From an adaptation perspective, FTI activities are strongly aligned with DFID VfM in Adaptation guidelines, mostly representing 'no regrets' measures that offer both climate and development benefits. Where analysis has been undertaken, there is good evidence that interventions can result in productivity gains, yield improvements and better natural resource management. However, it is less clear that adaptive capacity is consistently being created among beneficiary groups to support beneficiaries to deal with current and future climate variability. With some exceptions, interventions have been built around existing 'input-based' models, with longer term systemic change deprioritised due to time constraints within the FTIs.

4.2.2 How do costs compare to benefits?

This section presents two types of findings. First it examines cost-efficiency within FTIs and the cost of achieving project outputs related to internal and external benchmarks. This analysis is done with caveats that comparison is challenging where financial and narrative reporting is not standardised. Second, it presents a narrative discussion of the value of all portfolio outcomes in comparison with the cost.

Finding 36 There was evidence of procurement procedures having been followed. There may be scope for lessons to be shared on optimal specifications and procurement approaches.

Evidence that procurement processes were followed was available, though the value for money assessment identified variances in unit costs and officials were not provided with standard specifications for all items procured. For example, MUDH did not provide standards for project infrastructure such as compost stores, solid waste management vehicles or equipment. This meant that in some instances equipment was purchased, when there may have been other less costly solutions. Similarly, it is not clear whether there was sufficient assessment of the technology choices in MoT or MoWIE from a cost-efficiency perspective. While it is likely there are reasons to justify cost differences, sharing lessons on cost-efficient procurement could be shared prior to any GCF implementation.

Finding 37 A reliance on current GoE staff with existing responsibilities and GoE vehicles was appropriate for the FTI given its relatively small scope. Management costs appear below or aligned to other modalities.

The FTI projects were largely implemented by assigning staff with existing jobs the task of coordinating, implementing and reporting on project results. While this added burden to government officials, it was considered realistic given the time frame and scope of the FTIs. A uniform percentage of M&E and supervision costs was not provided. Where it was possible, analysis was conducted on costs for management, supervision and technical

support, considering that no staff salaries were invested. Table 20 below presents Federal supervision costs, which vary considerably.

Table 20: Federal supervision and M&E funds in FTIs across sectors where data was available

Sector	Percentage (of total funding)
MOANR	8%
MUDH	9%
MEFCC	4%
IPDC	20%

Full examination of overall management costs is only possible in two sectors. Table 21 below identifies the key cost drivers of the MOANR FTI programme, and demonstrates that management costs represent an estimated 30% of the overall programme budget. This is comparable to Ethiopian NGO legislation that requires 70% of project costs to be allocated to direct delivery. Whilst there is no cause for concern, this does not indicate a particularly 'lean' operational cost structure despite the absence of staff or vehicle hire costs.

Table 21: Amounts allocated for different in MoANR costs

Cost Driver	Budgeted Amounts
Echnoserve – technical assistance and M&E	ETB 9,623,660, equivalent to ~ 10% of total MoANR budget (though funded additionally)
Federal Supervision and M&E	8% of MoANR allocation ~USD 418,000
Regional Supervision and M&E	11% of MoANR allocation ~USD 575,000
Woreda costs - Overheads	5% of 81% allocated to woredas ~ USD 211,700
Implementation Costs	~70%* - USD 4m
Split by:	
- 30% to be used for livestock;	* Calculated as a % of USD 5.77m (combined total of Echnoserve and MoANR expenditure)
- 30% for crops;	
- 20% for natural resource management activities;	
- 15% for livelihoods and resilience improvement.	

Analysis of MUDH operational costs indicates a much smaller management fee. Of the 9% of funds allocated for supervision, only 55% has been used. Several regions were allocated a small budget for supervision, constituting about 2% of the total budget. When combined the amount utilised overall by MDUH is around 7%. Project to project spend on management differs significantly. For example, in four projects (Assosa, Harari, Hawassa Solid Waste and Gambella), management costs such as staff, office rent, per diems/entertainment and transport exceeded 30% of the total. These and MoANR's supervision costs are on the high end of the range compared to the other sectors, and externally for instance Climate Change

Forum Ethiopia (CCF-E)³⁴ and other NGOs outside Ethiopia.³⁵ It is challenging to compare as there may be differences in accounting methods and there is no NGO which could have achieved the outreach at the speed that GoE has managed. Also in the case of MoANR, there are noticeable differences in the quality of, and availability of, outcome level reporting, which is included in these additional costs.

Finding 38 Key cost drivers, where this information was available, were not uniform across all sectors. However training, per diem and transport costs routinely featured among the key cost categories.

For MOWIE, MOI, IPDC and to some extent MOT, the expenditure breakdown was not presented in a way to identify different cost categories. For MoANR, after agricultural inputs and equipment, the biggest cost drivers were training, per diem payments and freight and/ or transport costs. Under MUDH, many of the projects featured construction as the major cost item. Examples of the constructed structures are compost sheds, storage or transfer stations. Construction costs as percentage of total costs among the FTIs were: Shire (96%), Bishoftu (68%), Hawassa (67%) and Harari (39%). Other cost drivers were purchase of equipment, forestry inputs or training. This included the purchase of vehicles in Dessie. For MEFCC, wage payments for manual labour in nurseries and tree planting activities, and agricultural inputs were the major cost drivers among the sector FTIs.

Finding 39 It is challenging to calculate the cost of FTI project outputs from GoE narrative and financial data, but preliminary calculations demonstrate costs frequently varied across sites and do not always compare favourably with external benchmarks

The analysis in Table 22 gives an indication of some costs associated with project outputs. These are drawn from project proposals, financial reports and supplementary information provided by FTI implementers interviewed by the VfM team³⁶.

Benchmarking costs per beneficiary is not usually relevant unless there is a programme which is delivering comparable activities. We have therefore only presented benchmarking

³⁴ Based on a proposed budget for cost-extension to MOANR in 2016, CCF-E's M&E and administrative expenses (excluding staff costs) categories amounted to 15% of the total amount requested. Including staff costs, it was almost 23%.

³⁵ Refers to the study referenced in 2011 Mozambique Citizen Engagement Programme Business Case. 'The study, that was carried out for DFID Uganda, found that the NGOs' administrative costs (which included management costs) averaged around 16%-18% regionally.'

³⁶ More detail on the information used in these calculations is documented in the annexes of the separate VfM Assessment report.

data for projects where there are examples of similar activities being delivered in the sector or in the literature. Where possible, we have used recent data from Ethiopia.

In the comparison between the MoANR projects and two other long-standing programmes in the sector (SLMP and HABP) it is important to note that the other programmes have been operating over a long time-period and at a much larger scale than the FTI. The FTI has used a very similar approach to SLMP and has lower costs but these would likely be comparable with the SLMP if inputs were not delivered to the same households on an annual basis. The costs per hectare for soil and water conservation also appear much higher than both SLMP and SCIP.

The inclusion of the *Household Asset Building Programme (HABP)* as a benchmark to the MoANR FTI is not strictly relevant since it has adopted a very different approach to livelihood support focused on group businesses and loans managed via local microfinance institutions. However, it does demonstrate the huge difference in costs per beneficiary from programmes which provide direct inputs and those linking households to private sources of credit. There may be lessons to draw from this in terms of the ability of future CRGE projects to achieve wider outreach.

Table 22: Summary of emerging output costs from FTI sectors

Item	Sector	FTI Cost	External benchmark
Cost per ha covered in afforestation	MEFCC	£65-£143	
Cost per ha under soil and water conservation measures	MoANR	£504 [#]	£120 (SCIP Fund project) £49 per Ha (SLMP)
Cost per beneficiary	MEFCC	£45-£224	
Cost per poultry beneficiary	MOANR	£50-£370	
Cost per beneficiary household	MOANR	£415-£1,000	HABP: £1.22 (over 3 yrs) ³⁷ SLMP: £635-1,589 (over 3 yrs)
Cost per overall beneficiary	MUDH	£130-£180	
Cost per job created	MUDH	£1,260	£580 (SCIP Fund Projects)
Cost per job created*	MOT	£1,736	
Cost per temporary job created	IPDC	£480	
Cost per biogas digester	MOWIE	£2,610	Costs from a study in Nepal, India, Costa Rica and Viet

³⁷ HABP benefitted from a large prior investment to capitalise a loan guarantee scheme that was then managed by Regional Microfinance Institutions. HABP relies on group businesses and on financial management from MFIs hence extremely low cost per beneficiary. SLMP operates on a similar model to the FTI.

			Nam showed costs £154-308 ³⁸ .
Cost per solar pump installed*	MOWIE	£2,223	Not available
Cost per solar lantern distributed*	MOWIE	£11	Costs for Ethiopia range between £11 and £100 ³⁹ .

Source: Compiled from a range of sources by the VfM team.

based on estimates using 40% of the allocation for one woreda in Amhara. *based on planned costs, not actual.

Finding 40 On a project level, there is some evidence that benefits may exceed costs, but further research is needed to understand full cost-benefit analysis.

The only sector which examined impacts on productivity and incomes consistently was the MoANR. MoANR delivered a costly package of multiple interventions to a single household.⁴⁰ This could include all of the following items: up to 100kg improved seeds, up to 200kg fertilisers, 2kg forage seeds, 24 poultry, 6 sheep, 1 improved heifer, and 3-8 modern beehives. This resulted in the overall cost of the package per household reaching up to £1,000 in some parts of Amhara visited by the review team.

The potential income from livestock and crops reported in Echnoserve’s assessments indicate that the investment would break even over 2 or more years per household, depending on the cost of the package they received and the consistency with which benefits could be sustained. The loss of assets through a climate shock could reduce these returns substantially and undermine the purpose of CRGE support. This needs to be explored in future in order to understand the contribution of such activities to climate resilience and their relevance to CRGE. A more thorough assessment could be made in the future, drawing on the basis of several years of survey results and the incorporation of assumptions about the percentage of beneficiaries which achieve different levels of results, the impacts of climate or other shocks and how successfully the FTI has supported households to better survive these shocks.

Scaling the package requires a substantial up-front investment, which depending on the availability of finance could ultimately reduce potential benefits in comparison with a cheaper approach that reaches more beneficiaries. The cost of potential conflict between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries is also not factored into these results but was reported as a risk in Harari and Somali Regions.

³⁸ Rajandran K. et al., Household Biogas Digesters: A Review, University of Boras Sweden, August 2012, mdpi.com/journal/energies.

³⁹ Prices based on 2014 figures, https://energypedia.info/wiki/Lists_of_Solar_Lanterns_Sold_in_Ethiopia

⁴⁰ Depending on targeting approaches, this can impact social relationships

In MEFCC, the benefits will likely vary substantially from region to region. In some cases (e.g. Kebrebegeh), lasting benefits were found to be minimal and it is unlikely that benefits would exceed costs. The beekeeping and poultry group visited in Enebsie Sar Midar had not yet found the enterprise profitable but there was still the possibility of recovery in more favourable rainfall years. The group businesses for stove production in Enebsie Sar Midar could perhaps have priced their stoves more profitably but had a broadly viable model. Profits from the joint forest management enterprise visited in Amhara cannot be assessed at this stage.

For MUDH, and to some extent IPDC and MOT, employment creation was one of the main intended outcomes. The in MUDH, high cost per jobs is likely caused by under-reporting of jobs. MUDH interventions also triggered establishment or supported the development of small enterprises, at least 170 of them according to project reports, and evidence collected suggests strong potential for sustainability. Therefore, despite the relatively high cost per job, it is likely that these projects offer value for money because the jobs were both likely to be sustained and in some towns to grow in number. In Jigjiga, the waste removal enterprise was considered viable and profitable and would likely expand and create new jobs without further investment. In Dessie, the Government of Ethiopia managed system had expanded to cover the entire town but was not currently breaking even. However, despite this, there was a strong commitment to retain the jobs even if subsidy was required.

Finding 41 Outside of the FTIs, the value of the whole portfolio, including its system-strengthening effects appears positive given the likely lasting benefits to Ethiopia of mainstreaming CRGE.

Whilst the benefits of the FTIs do not, as yet, appear to match those projected in the cost-benefit ratios included in DFID's business case, this does not mean that the review concludes the investment was not worthwhile. There is still time for benefits to accrue from several activities and as noted in the introduction, the FTIs are not yet complete.

It is likely that the most significant contribution coming from DFID's support to the CRGE Facility relate to the improvements in institutional capacity for CRGE mainstreaming and the ability to leverage other sources of finance for CRGE objectives. This did not feature in the business case economic appraisal because of the difficulty in monetising benefits. However, the review team concluded that building national systems was a significant contributor to the programme's value for money. If half of Ethiopia's ability to access GCF funding can be attributed to DFID's support and the two proposals are successful, then leveraged funds may outweigh the initial investment. Furthermore, assuming mitigation and adaptation results are delivered through mainstream programmes as a result of changes to the GTP2 and lessons from the FTI, then these could also exceed those initially projected in the CHIP business case.

4.2.3 To what extent were VfM principles upheld in the selection and implementation of FTI projects?

Finding 42 VfM was not a criteria for project selection and GoE financial reporting systems do not lend themselves to VfM assessment.

VfM frameworks for project appraisal, prioritisation and monitoring of CRGE interventions were found to be weak, which in turn has allowed some interventions to be implemented without clear assessment of the likely returns. The lack of a clear results framework agreed between projects and the CRGE Facility, weak budgeting skills and GoE financial reporting methods make assessment of costs per output and internal benchmarking challenging. If sectors were able to ensure standard methods were used for both financial reporting and results management, then comparison could be used to share VfM lessons and ensure continuous improvement on VfM metrics. To some extent this is already in place with the use of standardised unit costs for some items (e.g. in participatory watershed manuals) but this could be improved in some sectors with clearer specification and costing for standardised activities – for example tree nurseries, composting units, dumping sites.

A number of the findings in relation to the efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of the FTIs are also extremely relevant to VfM. Improving procurement, financial management, beneficiary targeting, safeguard implementation and private sector contributions would all contribute to better value for money.

Finding 43 There were a number of VfM good practices in use which should be sustained.

A selection of these good practices include:

- The level of detail provided in the operational manual and the widespread ownership and use of this manual by sectors.
- The recruitment by the CRGE Facility of two spot-checkers and two additional finance officers whose job is mainly to carry out field level verification, compliance and following up of financial information from FTIs. An internal auditor also reviewed FTI-related procedures in one private supplier.
- Cost conscious behaviour through the use of lower per diem rates than the one indicated in the OM (ETB 290) by the Bureau of Urban Development Somali and MOWIE, among others.
- Reporting on VfM in the IPDC FTI project report.
- Significant government and, at times, beneficiary contribution to FTIs. Government provided staff, office space, use of vehicles and other contributions to projects. Sometimes, FTIs were used to fund small allocations to bigger government projects

(such as in MoT, Dessie Solid Waste and Harari pond construction). Beneficiary contribution was also significant.

4.2.4 What impact would scaling projects have on overall costs?

Finding 44 **Scaling through multiple standalone climate projects will increase transaction costs. Scaling through changes to mainstream programmes has high VfM potential but will only be meaningful under certain circumstances.**

The GoE is committed to a programmatic approach with a large portion of CRGE results delivered through mainstream initiatives. However, the possibility to scale standalone climate finance based on the FTI lessons was considered by the review team.

Scaling the FTI approaches without modifications to the design would not be likely to substantially reduce costs per output, since many of the costs associated with asset transfers, afforestation or delivery of solid waste/greening in new towns, would not change. In fact, it is likely that overall costs would increase as most GoE staff noted the need for increased investment in staff time and vehicles for managing projects at a bigger scale. There may be some cost-savings associated with lessons learned or more stringent implementation of VfM measures but these are unlikely to make a particularly significant difference.

If CRGE results were scaled through strategic investments to influence mainstream programmes, then there is potential for substantially increased value for money. However, such investments are only likely to deliver results if leadership within those programmes express demand and are actively engaged in the design and implementation of the initiative. Since part of the purpose of these early CRGE investments is to build awareness and generate lessons to stimulate that demand it may not be immediately possible in most sectors, with the possible exception of the MoANR. However, in MoANR the main rationale for continued investment in GoE-led work on CRGE is to build confidence in the Government system and to investigate whether the World Bank managed trust funds continue to be needed. There are both benefits and risks associated with such an approach.

4.3 What are the factors that enable technical assistance to successfully contribute to

improvements in the Government of Ethiopia's systems for climate response?

This section includes findings on key factors contributing to successful technical assistance (TA) identified from evidence collected from the five TA case studies. This is supported by evidence from the broader TA literature to address limitations from the small sample of case studies.

Table 23: TA case study summaries

Case study summaries	
<p>Case Study 1: Funding a DFID climate expert seconded to the CRGE Facility (DFID)</p>	<p>Since April 2014, a climate expert with international experience has been seconded for 4 days/week to the CRGE Facility Secretariat. The role was designed to inject technical skills, foster collaborative relationships with government and improve communication between GoE and donors. The secondment has supported DFID's monetary support by promoting the development of capacity, knowledge sharing and systems building. Confidence in the Facility's and CRGE sectors' capability to attract and administer climate funds has been bolstered, as demonstrated by their achieving GCF and AF accreditation. Being present has allowed the secondee to alert DFID to changes in GoE priorities and address operational challenges. The impact of the role was endorsed by Facility members and other key interviewees as an exemplary model of effective TA.</p> <p>Lessons from this and other examples of embedding technical expertise illustrate that success is dependent on the secondee having: clear objectives and deliverables; the ability to build relationships; opportunity to demonstrate their added-value through contributions to something meaningful to the host partner; and sufficient time in post to make a difference.</p>
<p>Case Study 2: Consultancy and technical support to Climate Resilience Strategy (CRS) development in the Agriculture and Water sectors (GGGI, GCAP)</p>	<p>Technical support was provided to develop two Climate Resilient Strategies- one in Agriculture and Forests and one in Water and Energy.</p> <p><i>CRS Ag:</i> Supported by DFID to ensure that resilience was considered by MoANR, this strategy was developed based on high level analytical input from GCAP. It also benefited from support from an embedded advisor from GGGI who worked closely with MoA and GCAP. While the strategy design processes lacked GoE ownership, the resultant CRS has influenced the design of the sectoral FTI and GCF proposal.</p> <p><i>CRS MoWIE:</i> Initially the work was outsourced to an external consultant, but was rejected by GoE as it didn't meet their expectations, leading to expensive re-work. The CRS strategy was taken forward by a GGGI embedded advisor, but took over two years to finalise. GoE engagement and readiness for TA were critical success factors. The document is now a valued reference document for the ministry.</p>
<p>Case Study 3: Facilitating GoE accreditation for GCF and</p>	<p>DFID contracted CDKN from 2014-2016 to manage the accreditation process. In turn, they employed ASGB consulting, a national private accountancy company. Achieving accreditation for AF and GCF was highly relevant to GoE's ambitions to secure international global finance. AF and GCF accreditation has been received, but the GCF</p>

AF (CDKN, ASGB)

funding target was less than anticipated (only \$50m). ASGB is continuing to support programme management systems.

Success was driven by the commitment of key individuals, notably the Head of the CRGE Facility. The technical details were all managed externally, with limited GoE engagement. There is a risk that this has resulted in limited technical knowledge transfer. Critical success factors in this case study are the quality of the consultancy firms, GoE's commitment to achieve accreditation and the engagement of CDKN.

Case Study 4: Technical support to the CRGE Facility and selected sectors in investment planning and drafting two cross-sectoral, programmatic GCF proposals (CDKN)

DFID contracted CDKN to provide TA in consolidating 6 somewhat disconnected and unaffordable GCF sector proposals into 2 cross sectoral, programmatic proposals: Natural Resources (Agriculture, Water and Forestry) and Sustainable Cities (Urban Development, Housing and Transport). A skilled team of national consultants with relevant and complementary skills and experience was hand-picked by MOFEC staff and worked on both consolidated proposals supported by different international experts who understood GCF and GoE. Each of the proposals took approximately 5 months to identify core content, complete (missing) feasibility studies and meet GCF criteria. The information available on the Natural Resources TA suggests a thorough and well managed execution. The output of the Sustainable Cities continues to be a work in progress.

TA success factors in this case study were: clearly stated TA objectives and purpose; a high calibre team backed by donor commitment facilitating cross functional and sector collaboration; and, careful planning. This contrasted with the MEFC's previous management of the separate sector proposals in which the project and TA parameters were not made clear.

Case Study 5: Funding international training to the CRGE Facility and sectors (WB)

Within a multi-sector capacity building programme and with a fund of \$5m, a WB Senior Natural Resource Management Specialist / Environmental Economist organised and delivered a series of training modules, based on structured e-learning products tailored to meet GoE needs. The impact of the training was severely limited by design flaws, fragmented delivery, poor communication and unrealistic expectations on the part of the Bank and the Facility.

The basis on which training topics were decided and prospective participants agreed were unclear and possibly misunderstood. A clearer contractual arrangement, including both parties' responsibilities pre- and post-training would have helped. The modules were judged by key informants to be too short and have not been evaluated for impact on behaviour or jobs.

Finding 45 Demand-driven TA delivered within an enabling environment is more likely to achieve impacts than externally identified solutions.

Across the literature reviewed⁴¹, there were differences in terms of impacts achieved between interventions and programmes imposed upon recipients in comparison to those designed in

⁴¹ OPM (2003) A Vision for the Future of Technical Assistance in the International Development System

response to the needs identified by recipients themselves. Increasing developing country ownership over the development process is the first priority of the Paris Declaration. It is ineffective for donors and development partners to try to solve capacity gaps through externally identified solutions, as they might not be suitable for the local context.

The literature identifies that successful technical assistance is more likely when requests come from a 'change-ready' part of an institution or are demanded by a key decision-maker⁴². This is also found in the CHIP case studies, where demand for accreditation and fund mobilisation was stronger than for standalone training or for CR Strategies design. Individual drivers and champions for change add energy and motivate others to succeed. For example, the State Minister for Energy and Head of the CRGE Facility were influential in creating demand for TA and in utilising its outputs. Ownership affects traction; when this wasn't present, such as in the training offered in case study 5, there has been less impact.

Finding 46 Problem focused, realistic and iteratively designed TA that is linked to resources can help achieve sustained capacity improvements and limit the production of costly documents which are not linked to functioning systems.

Successful technical assistance delivery that results in capacity changes is challenging, with many systems and governments slow to make progress.⁴³ Sometimes, best practices in laws, policies and organizational practices do not fit into developing country contexts and attempts to impose them by development partners may result in a process described in the literature as '*isomorphic mimicry*'. This means Governments appear to reform by changing what policies or organizations look like, without any change to what they actually do. The major problem with this is that the production of the new documents or institutions takes up limited time and staff capacity leading to a stagnation in 'real' capability. Furthermore, a mismatch between the expectations laid out in documents and the capacity of governments to achieve those targets means that civil servants are overloaded and the system of governance is further weakened. There is no evidence of this occurring in relation to CRGE and many actors cited the existence of the *fast track investment process* as a counter to that risk as it helped GoE staff work out for themselves, in their own contexts, what CRGE looked like rather than relying solely on analysis produced via external technical assistance.

Literature that describes *adaptive management* or *problem-driven iterative adaptation* approaches point towards the need to focus on incremental improvements in the capacity to

⁴² DANIDA (2011) Addressing Capacity Development in Danish Development Cooperation, Guiding Principles and Operational Steps.

⁴³ Andrews, Matt, Lant Pritchett, and Michael Woolcock. (2012). Escaping Capability Traps through Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA). HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP12-036, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

perform. This usually means identifying the problem and designing TA efforts to explore potential solutions to this problem from within the system. This fits well with the concept of “learning by doing” often used by CRGE stakeholders – but it is essential that this generates real learning and change. Therefore approaches rely on locally defined problems, experimentation and experiential learning with tight feedback loops. The literature also suggests that engagement of a broad set of stakeholders is important to ensure that changes are practical, legitimate, and relevant.

While none of the case studies explored explicitly applied an *adaptive management* approach, Case Study 1 presents an example with some of these features. The TA provided was task focused, responsive, supporting day-to-day issues as well as political priorities. By working in both the donor and the GoE communities, he could offer new insights to both and also ensure support was relevant to the objectives of multiple stakeholders.

Finding 47 Capacity to manage, design and coordinate TA is as important as the TA itself.

There must be sufficient political and technical capacity to design and manage TA to ensure results are used effectively. A common weakness in developing countries is the capacity of government to manage TA directly.⁴⁴ This includes the capacity to identify needs, fully articulate roles and scope of assignment, consider and identify the consultants and monitor and quality assure outputs of TA.

This means that the TA provided must match the existing national capacities and be feasible to manage. For example, there needs to be available staff within the CRGE Facility or sector CRGE units to manage procurement and quality assure TA outputs. Case Study 4 showed that in the latest round of TA support to GCF proposals, there is greater capacity to clearly identify and manage the outputs of the TA than in previous experiences. This is both because of greater political prioritisation and also because it is focused on two integrated proposals rather than separate teams working on six sector efforts. The MoANR stakeholder also noted that management reporting lines make a significant difference to Government use of TA. Where TA is managed directly by senior GoE staff and has the capacity to work on priorities important to them, there may be greater benefits.

Ensuring the TA is appropriately designed to meet the right gap is also important. Problem focused TA often identifies structural weaknesses not usually considered in policy change.⁴⁵ The literature suggests that a more holistic approach to capacity development that is based

⁴⁴ OECD (2010) Do No Harm: International support to Statebuilding, OECD-DAC Paris

⁴⁵ Kingdon, J. W. (1995). *Agendas, alternatives, and public policies* (2nd ed.). New York: Longman.

on an understanding of the root causes of performance gaps is critical.⁴⁶ For example, though not covered by the case studies, the CRGE Facility received TA to develop an M&E system to address concerns about the lack of an overall M&E system for the Facility. However, this review identified differing capacities at the sector-level to complete and consolidate results and reports which will make the system less useful and suggests system development needed to be further embedded in the practical realities at sector and sub-national levels.

Even when there is capacity to manage TA within government, there can still be costly fragmentation of TA efforts when donors are not able to effectively coordinate with each other. The review found numerous stakeholders felt that CRGE TA was not well coordinated.

The ease and speed of how TA is procured is also important. TA provided as part of the CHIP programme did respond to demand, but the annual review identified the process for finding and contracting this TA as administratively cumbersome and slow as each item was managed by over-stretched advisors on a case-by-case basis. Ensuring that TA is delivered flexibly and responsively is particularly important in an adaptive approach.

Finding 48 It is important to use a diverse range of tools and expertise to deliver TA.

There are multiple TA tools and approaches that can be used and not all support is suitable for all types of gaps. While it is important that the TA is high quality, the right approach is important. For example, Case Study 1 and 2 benefited from the secondment of international and national technical advisors that built strong working relationships with a wide range of actors and provided direct support to team members, including through on the job training and coaching. Through supporting systems development and facilitating review and reflection this generates learning, but this requires the TA experts to have a broader skills set than just technical expertise. In Case Study 1, the presence of the DFID advisor in the Facility enabled the secondee to address operational challenges as they arose and manage tensions between DFID and GoE priorities, but there are risks related to scope creep and creating dependencies on external support.

Technical advice provided by international and national short term experts can fill gaps. Short term inputs may be cheaper than embedding expertise and can provide external support to solve a particular problem. However, there are risks related to the implementation, ownership and practicality of an externally developed solution (see Finding 46) as well potential conflict of interests if the system requires future consultancy inputs.

⁴⁶ Jackson, C (2010) Context and Position in a Systemic Approach to Capacity Development, IDS Bulletin 41-3.

These can be mitigated with clear ToRs, high quality procurement, engagement between consultant and host government and effective planning and resourcing of TA requirements.

5 Conclusions

These conclusions synthesise the most important findings in relation to each review question.

5.1 How adequate and relevant were DIFD investments in the CRGE Facility to the Government of Ethiopia's ability to deliver its CRGE Vision and Strategies?

Conclusion 1 CHIP supported existing GoE political commitment, helped raise awareness of CRGE and advanced learning on how the CRGE Vision can be achieved. (Finding 1, 2, 23)

DFID's investment usefully bolstered GoE's commitment to CRGE. It supported national systems that promoted wider awareness of CRGE and created an opportunity to learn how to practically operationalise the CRGE Vision and CRGE Strategies. DFID's commitment to the CRGE Facility has been influential in mobilising funds from GoE and other partners. The FTIs played an important role in creating learning on systems improvements and incentives for reform of institutional arrangements in sectors, in MEFCC and in the CRGE Facility.

Conclusion 2 CHIP made an important contribution to the establishment of systems for fund mobilisation, prioritisation, cross-sectoral coordination and project management. Systems for safeguards and leverage of private sector investment still require further development. (Finding 3, 4, 5)

CHIP's contribution as a first mover was critical to the systems development undertaken by GoE. DFID policy engagement supported the development of the CRGE operations manual and Environmental and Social Safeguard Framework, though they did not finance either of these documents. The incentives generated by the DFID investment resulted in the development of proposal templates, appraisal criteria and a nationally-led system for allocating funds between sectors and regions. Learning and capacity is still needed to ensure that systems and processes remain fit for purpose and gaps identified continue to be addressed. While the FTIs tested these systems, there are still areas which need further improvement including pipeline development, results management, emissions measurement and MRV, implementation and monitoring of safeguards and leveraging of private sector investment. Evidence from FTIs indicates that some sectors have not given sufficient thought to how public spending can be complemented with regulatory reform and subsidies to engage the private sector or how public spending might crowd out the private sector.

Conclusion 3 While capacity has increased, there are still gaps in relation to institutional arrangements and capacity at regional and woreda level. In particular, this relates to cross-sectoral and CRGE coordination, project management, the quality of reporting and M&E as well as the need to develop systems for emissions measurement. (Findings 10,11)

Capacity changes in relation to CRGE implementation are most significant at Federal level, and while there are changes at the regional level, significant capacity gaps remain. In particular, MEFCO and its agencies currently have only weak capacity for cross-sectoral and technical coordination at regional levels. Across many bureaus, there are also limitations in woreda and regional capacity for project management, MRV and M&E, but these were most evident in the MEFCO projects in Somali Region, where activities did not draw on learning from existing initiatives resulting in less evidence of impact and sustainability. Whilst MoANR invested resources in climate vulnerability analysis and systems for dissemination of weather forecast information exist, there was no systematic effort to ensure climate information was effectively used at the local level. Systems and capacity for emissions measurement remain untested and capacity for accurate reporting of monitoring data was limited in some areas.

Conclusion 4 CHIP supported the inclusion of CRGE in GTP2. CRGE targets are included to some extent in all sectors GTP2 text but the level of ambition, detail and coherence with standalone CRGE strategies varies. The ability of sectors to report progress against new targets is limited. (Finding 8,9)

CHIP usefully supported GoE to integrate CRGE into GTP2 targets. Whilst the work was done through national systems, technical assistance financed by DFID and ongoing policy engagement by DFID climate advisors was cited by stakeholders as instrumental. However, CRGE targets within GTP 2 relate to emissions but it is not clear that capacity exists to report on these targets.

GTP2 text for most sectors lacks a description of how productivity and growth targets will be protected from climate shocks and what special measures will contribute to climate resilience. Some resilience measures identified in standalone CRGE strategies are not included in the GTPII text or targets. There is a desire to support CRGE integration nationwide and across all sectors. DFIIID and the CRGE Facility have only limited resources for technical support and not all sectors have received the same level of support to date.

Conclusion 5 Ethiopia is attempting something unprecedented, which presents significant opportunities for learning. Data and time for reviewing progress and refining strategy are both important. Currently there are limited resources and incentives for sectors to do this. (Finding 7, 18)

Ethiopia is charting an unprecedented path and GoE is *learning by doing* in its implementation of CRGE. This approach should be supported through opportunities and incentives that capture learning to improve processes. FTIs were short term projects, and only in MoANR, did they include capacity support for M&E and learning. Other sectors also have limited capacity in this area but do not appear to have plans for such arrangements in future.

Conclusion 6 There is no inherent trade-off between mainstreaming and programmatic planning but dedicated CRGE staff have only limited time. If the level of effort is more focused on resource mobilisation and management, then this will affect the speed at which mainstreaming happens and transaction costs associated with CRGE. (Finding 6, 29,30,31)

The capacity to develop programmes for the FTI was sufficient, but it has not resulted in a pipeline of long-term climate programmes, nor an overarching reporting framework for pooled funding received by the CRGE Facility. Each new project generates opportunities to learn, but also has transaction costs related to management. Individual donors who do not pool resources may contribute to burdensome requirements that weaken impact. Work to leverage change in mainstream programmes must respond to a strong demand or political commitment in order to be effective. It may be more effective to deliver standalone CRGE results than supply mainstreaming support to parts of Government where there is no demand for it. The balance for the FTIs between results delivery and wider mainstreaming was appropriate given the timeframe and political investment at the start of the FTI process. However, this balance needs consideration going forward. Currently mainstreaming efforts are not supported by consolidated information on CRGE results from mainstream programmes or knowledge management to document and share lessons and gaps.

Conclusion 7 FTIs were delivered with impressive speed and commitment, generating learning and supporting practical institutional capacity building for CRGE. However, wider impact and sustainability of the related CRGE results could have been strengthened by longer timeframes, improved planning and implementation capacity in some sectors. (Finding 12,13,14,15,17,19)

FTI implementation rolled out activities and delivered outputs within short timeframes, demonstrating what could be achieved with GoE commitment to CRGE implementation. FTIs generated important learning on capacity gaps and changes needed to achieve CRGE GTP II targets. However, the extent to which FTIs contributed climate results and their long-term sustainability have been negatively influenced by the quality of initial design and supplementary implementation guidance, the short implementation time frame and the

varied skills and experiences of frontline staff. The short timeframe also meant sectors focused on generating tangible outputs within the timeframe. In the rural projects of MECC and MoANR, there was a sense that facilitating longer-term and more sustainable change would have been possible with more emphasis on behavioural change and the creation of resilient rural market systems. Assessment of project achievements is that not all are resilient to climate shocks, which requires more attention. High levels of asset transfer in the MoANR project were also reported as potentially causing conflict between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in Harari and Somali, which warrants further investigation, given value for money considerations around the size of the package.

Conclusion 8 The lack of emphasis on reporting against agreed results frameworks made analysis of project performance challenging. Some reports under or over-reported results, did not explain deviations from plans in the proposals and lacked disaggregated data or supporting evidence. (Finding 20,21,32)

Understanding the overall impact of the FTI investment is challenging due to the lack of reporting against an overall results framework. Reports were of mixed quality, with weak aggregation of data between projects and lack of justifications for deviations from project plans. MoANR was the only sector able to convincingly report on outcomes. In some instances, results were reported without any evidence of achievements.

Conclusion 9 Women participated in FTIs and commitment to GoE's gender policy was widespread. However, no specialist gender expertise was used in project design and there were few activities specifically designed to tackle the drivers of gender inequality. (24,25,26,27).

Staff at all levels and in all sectors demonstrated awareness of the GoE's commitments to gender equality and to the participation of women in development activities. However, the Women's Affairs Directorates which exist in all line ministries to coordinate gender mainstreaming were not involved in CRGE. Greater gender expertise might generate new ideas on activities which can tackle the underlying drivers of inequality and promote more sustainable attitudinal change. In some sectors and regions, targeting was conducted at the household level, which may have reduced the impact on females in male headed households, as it usually harder to ensure women control the transferred assets or capitalise on the opportunity for the investment to address existing attitudes towards gender roles.

5.2 Were the outcomes that this investment achieved, worth achieving given the investment? Did the programme represent value for money?

Conclusion 10 FTI development outcomes resulted in positive changes to productivity, incomes and jobs. Achievement and reporting of climate results were limited but longer timeframes and more focused design could have improved this. (Finding 33,34,35)

MoANR was the only sector that captured outcome level changes. Productivity and income level changes were positive and particularly impressive in the context of the ongoing drought. However, the long term sustainability of these gains is unclear, since farmers may not have access to the same level of inputs in the future. Jobs generated by MUDH are likely to create the most sustainable impacts, though potential under-reporting makes estimating the value added challenging. There is less evidence that interventions were designed or prioritised in terms of climate outcomes of mitigation and adaptation. Not all the envisioned emissions reductions projected for FTIs are likely to materialise and none are measured. FTIs did not have time to promote longer term systemic change or to make a significant difference to the behaviour of beneficiaries in response to climate or weather forecast information and skills of staff at local level for this work are also under-developed. Mitigation and adaptation benefits are not yet being measured systematically and capacity for this type of reporting is underdeveloped.

Conclusion 11 FTI projects mostly had low management costs and followed procurement and financial control systems appropriately. However, VfM was not a criteria for project design and was not monitored to inform implementation. Costs per output did not always compare favourably with benchmarks. (Finding 36,37,39,42)

Reliance on GoE staff and systems generated efficiencies, particularly in terms of delivering management costs that were aligned or lower than other delivery modalities in most cases and benefitted from the use of core staff and vehicles. There were some exceptions where supervision and management costs for particular projects appeared higher than expected. It is not possible to be certain that these comparisons are like-with-like, due to a lack of clarity in financial reports and expenditure coding approaches varying across locations.

Procurement was found to have followed GoE procedures, but initial specification did not seem to have considered cost-efficiency as a criterion and the review team noted some approaches were relatively high cost in comparison to benchmarks.

Conclusion 12 The review has found that given its systems level contribution, CHIP has offered VfM, despite not having convincing evidence of the value for money associated with individual FTI results. (Finding 40,41)

MoANR is the only sector which presented impacts on productivity and incomes, and while benefits are likely to outweigh costs in relatively short periods of time, it is an ongoing

challenge to protect these gains from climate shocks and there was not enough evidence that this was core to the FTI. More cost benefit analysis incorporating assumptions around the impact of climate shocks would help identify elements of the package offering the most value. Scaling the package in its current format would be extremely costly. There may be greater value for money in a cheaper approach that reaches more beneficiaries but more research would be needed to identify optimal package size. Impacts from other sectors are likely to vary substantially between interventions and locations – for example in one MECC site in Somali Region, lasting benefits were expected to be minimal.

Despite some doubts about the value of individual FTI results, the review still concludes that overall the programme offered value for money. This is because it is likely that the most significant contributions of DFID's support are the improvements in institutional capacity for mainstreaming and the ability to leverage other sources of finance for CRGE objectives. If half of Ethiopia's ability to access GCF funding can be attributed to DFID's support and the two proposals are successful, then leveraged funds from GCF alone may outweigh DFID's initial investment.

Conclusion 13 CRGE Strategies note the important role of private investment but some FTI designs relied extensively on GoE implementation, which could crowd out private sector in the future. There is also scope to use non-state executing entities to improve the quality of GoE delivery and results management. (Finding 16)

Public-private partnerships are time-consuming to develop and may require different skills to manage. Models for public-private partnership have been considered, but there are opportunities to improve understanding of how GoE could best catalyse private sector engagement in CRGE. In agriculture, forestry and energy FTIs, the GoE was responsible for procuring and distributing all the inputs and there was little evidence that measures to support private suppliers had been considered. Two different models were observed in the waste management sector – one focused on a GoE managed system and the other on a public-private partnership. It is too early to tell which offers the most sustainable and high quality service or is most cost-effective.

MoANR was the only sector to engage non-state actors in CRGE implementation, with Echnoserve and CCF providing additional expertise that bolstered MoANR's FTI project. The partnership with Echnoserve was explicitly designed to provide technical assistance and transfer knowledge and support overall FTI implementation. The two examples of use of executing entities have been frequently cited as useful by GoE staff, and should be promoted to ensure that future CRGE implementation continues to draw on non-state actors, when appropriate.

Conclusion 14 Scaling through sector programmes should aim to reduce transaction costs. Scaling through changes to mainstream programmes will only be meaningful if there is political demand. (Finding 44)

It is likely that future large scale sector programmes will increase transaction costs, as there are greater demands for staff time and vehicles for managing larger projects. There may be some cost-savings associated based on lesson learning or greater application of VfM, but this may not be significant. Scaling CRGE through mainstream programmes offers greater VfM potential, but requires buy in from those in management and leadership to actually deliver VfM results.

5.3 What are the factors that enable technical assistance provided by CHIP (and other partners) to successfully contribute to improvements in the Government of Ethiopia's systems for climate response?

Conclusion 15 Successful TA is a product of a realistic ambition, a demand-driven, problem-focused and iterative approach, and application of tools and methods appropriate to the problem. Capacity to design and manage TA is as important as the TA itself in driving success. (Finding 45,46,47,48)

Technical assistance is most useful when it is demand driven and appropriate to the local context. When TA was not responding to a clear GoE demand or was not delivered in a way customised to the realities of the context, it did not succeed.

The literature suggests that defining the scope of TA is essential to its sustainability. TA which tries to solve too many problems at once may not be as successful as TA that focuses on a more manageable and urgent problem. There is also a need to consider the wider system into which a particular assignment fits. If incentives for continued and routine use of new tools or frameworks developed via TA do not exist or cannot be fostered, then it is unlikely to succeed.

An issue identified through case study analysis was the need for management capacity to design and supervise TA to ensure best results. Current systems were found to be administratively cumbersome and not all TA had been effectively designed or used by its recipients.

6 Recommendations

These recommendations have been developed drawing on the conclusions in the preceding section.

Recommendation 1: MEFCC, MoFEC and Sector Line Ministries should continue to invest in improved capacity for CRGE strategy and design and identify joint priorities for immediate action. (Conclusions 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 13)

The review recognises that GoE is investing in continuous capacity development efforts and that a national capacity development programme has been developed. However, given the timeframe required for capacity development, setting priorities for joint donors and Government action on it is important. Our recommendation is to invest in processes for technical coordination and support at sectoral and regional level. At regional level, support could be designed to support the sub-national MEFCC and MOFEC coordination roles, engage Regional presidents and enable regional bureaus to contextualise CRGE priorities to their situation. Additional capacity now available in both MEFCC and MOFEC at Federal level must be used effectively to move this work forward in a coordinated manner. Ideally, to ensure sufficient demand for this capacity development process, it should be embedded into ongoing action on CRGE delivery. Support should focus on:

- Building knowledge about how CRGE activities can be contextualised at regional level, including how they overlap with existing work and differ from business as usual; and,
- Building learning about the practicalities of private sector engagement and the role of public-private partnerships.

Recommendation 2: Sector Line Ministries should establish systems that create stronger incentives for the use of lessons learned and climate and weather information in decision-making. Whilst capacity to use evidence for adaptive management should be the long-term goal, in the short-term sectors and regions should focus on developing and updating detailed implementation guidance for key CRGE actions. (Conclusions 3, 4, 5, 7)

All sectors, regions and municipalities should consider the potential impact of climate shocks and trends on their GTP2 targets. As part of the SRAP process, GTP2 work-planning or future proposal development, CRGE focal staff should identify how they will encourage the use of climate and weather information into ongoing decision-making. Lessons from MoANR and Somali Regional Bureaus may be relevant to other sectors. All sectors and regions should engage in ongoing learning and create space for reflection and refinement of action plans, at least on a quarterly basis. Sectors should prioritise the development of detailed

implementation guidance that is routinely updated with lessons learned as a core knowledge management tool for CRGE.

Recommendation 3: MOFEC and sectors need to improve project management capacity, including capability for realistic planning and budgeting as well as accurate and comprehensive reporting. The Results Management System for CRGE needs to distinguish the process for ongoing aggregation of GTP2 results from that for standalone climate finance project results. (Conclusions 3, 4, 7, 8)

Given capacity gaps highlighted by the FTIs and the fact that short-term technical assistance to proposal development may not build lasting capacity in those responsible for implementation, all sectors should consider the best way to access sufficient resources to deliver high quality planning, budgeting and reporting in future. This includes support at woreda and regional level as well as support to sector staff involved in aggregation. Lessons from MoANR's experience of joint work with a private sector executing entity may be relevant here.

Creating an ongoing emissions measurement system will require a realistic assessment of the types of data available from woredas and regions and the capacity for aggregating this data and using it for comprehensive emissions measurement at regional and sector level. It seems likely that significant investment in technical assistance and capacity development is needed before any sector can report convincingly against GTP2 emissions targets. This must be driven by high level officials at sector level and with due focus on coordinated and sector-wide approaches.

Recommendation 4: Establishing a stronger evidence base for climate outcomes and a clearer process for assessing the cost-effectiveness of selected delivery approaches are essential to delivering value for money in future CRGE investments. MoFEC should investigate how changes to financial reporting systems can enable ongoing monitoring against all aspects of value for money. (Conclusions 10, 11, 12)

The short-term investments in FTIs were not selected with robust criteria on the likelihood of climate results nor on the cost-effectiveness of their delivery approaches. Ensuring sectors have the capacity to undertake such analysis in future will be important for demonstrating climate additionality and value for money. Value for money should also be investigated in ongoing monitoring but this will require changes to the financial and results reporting systems to ensure that comparison of cost drivers and output costs can be more meaningful.

Recommendation 5: Sectors should invest more time and resources into gender and safeguarding issues (Conclusions 2, 9)

There are opportunities for sectors to integrate transformative work on gender equality into their CRGE activities. Stronger links to specialist gender expertise during project design and monitoring would be valuable.

Awareness and systems for safeguarding have improved. However, there is still a need to strengthen their practical application and generate lessons learned in their application. The issues of water use and of potential conflict between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in the MoANR project were not identified as risks.

Recommendation 6: MoFEC, MEFCC and relevant sectors should ensure pipeline development is long-term and reduces transaction costs. This means achieving an appropriate balance between investment in climate mainstreaming via other sector programmes and the development of standalone climate projects. Decision-making about this should reflect dialogue with potential donors and will vary between sectors. Sectors should ensure pipelines include support to innovation, learning, regulatory change and institutional developments as well as just scaling up CRGE results. (Conclusion 6, 14)

It is recognised that pipeline development is taking place via the SRAP and through proposal development for new sources of climate finance. Understandably, given budget deficits, mobilising new resources has been the top priority. However, in the longer term, a more cost-effective approach would be for investment planning to be less reactive to individual donor demands and to focus instead on building a credible pipeline of programme areas and associated results in which donors could invest via a pooled approach.

Recommendation 7: Donors, including DFID, should consider making longer term investments, improving coordination and investing in pooled funds if possible to reduce transaction costs. (Conclusions 6, 7, 14)

The ability of donors to work together to support pipeline development, capacity building and learning around a joint set of focused priorities will have a significant bearing on the cost-effectiveness of future investments.

Recommendation 8: The CRGE Facility should manage supply and demand for TA through pooled TA that is guided by joint donor- GoE decision-making. (Conclusion 15)

There is appetite for a TA pool from both donors and GoE. From the GoE, a mechanism is needed to quality assure individuals and ensure terms of reference are realistic and support useful identification of appropriate TA. A consortium approach to TA provision will enable GoE to access a wider range of resources and skills and will reduce transaction costs on GoE, though will require a common framework of GoE needs. This should be supported through a structured dialogue between GoE and donors on future TA requirements and problem driven

approaches that generate opportunities for innovation, experiential learning and adaptive approaches to CRGE implementation.

Annex 1: Terms of Reference CHIP

Final Review

January 2016

Background to CHIP

The UK's Climate High-Level Investment Programme (CHIP) is supporting Ethiopia to plan and implement its Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) vision. This means becoming a middle income country by 2025 with zero net increase in carbon emissions. The Government of Ethiopia plans to use climate finance to complement and strengthen its development investment and to build resilience and green growth objectives into all sectors and at all levels.

The UK provides support through policy and technical engagement, and the implementation of two International Climate Fund (ICF) funded programmes. This is coordinated with complementary UK investment from multilateral and regional programmes funded from DFID centrally. CHIP provides up to £30 million over nearly four years from September 2012 to March 2016. It is complemented by DFID's Strategic Climate Investment Programme, SCIP, which is building the skills and systems needed for investments to succeed. UK global and regional programmes provide complementary investment in Ethiopia, in climate resilience and green energy.

Objectives of Final Evaluative Review

CHIP was amongst the first DFID climate investment in Ethiopia and the final review has a dual accountability and learning purpose. It will assess project progress against objectives and comment on the efficiency and effectiveness of CHIP's delivery approaches. The evaluation questions were developed by DFID to respond to priority questions that will inform their future investments. The review objectives are therefore:

- To assess CHIP's contribution to the Ethiopian climate response (learning and accountability); and
- To document lessons in relation to both design and delivery for future phases of the programme (learning).

Evaluation questions

The following evaluation questions are proposed as follows:

1. How adequate and relevant were DIFD investments in the CRGE Facility to the Government of Ethiopia's ability to deliver its CRGE Vision and Strategies?
2. Were the outcomes that this investment achieved, worth achieving given the investment? Did the programme represent value for money?
3. What are the factors that enable technical assistance provided by CHIP (and other partners) to successfully contribute to improvements in the Government of Ethiopia's systems for climate response?

Scope

The review will allocate different weights to each of the four review themes. An indicative guide to this is provided below:

- **Documentation of results across components (10%)**

The review will collect and analyse data to enable reporting against each of the logframe indicators related to the CREGE Facility. It is not possible for this review to assure all data back to its source, but assessments of data quality for logframe indicators will be included.

- **CRGE Facility sufficiency and relevance questions (50%)**

This section of the review will focus on the CHIP support to the CRGE Facility and will explore a number of sub-questions defined by DFID in relation to mainstreaming, the programmatic approach and the quality and sustainability of results.

Exploration of the twin-track nature of the CHIP theory of change and the relationship between CRGE Facility and sectoral investments will not be a major focus of the review.

- **Value for Money (30%)**

This section of the review will primarily focus on developing capacity for VfM analysis within the CRGE Facility and Sectors. Information produced by other components will be presented by them. More time will be spent on cost-benefit analysis due to the greater complexity of this work but of equal importance will be working with implementers to get access to the best quality data for meaningful economy and efficiency analysis.

- **Technical Assistance (10%)**

This will be a light-touch case-study based review that will seek to document principles and lessons-learned from current technical assistance provided in relation to the CRGE in Ethiopia. It will not represent an exhaustive assessment but will provide supplementary

analysis to support DFID in identifying future options for the provision of technical assistance.

Approach and methods

CHIP's M&E approach is theory-based, and relies primarily on qualitative data.

Some tools which should be used in the review include:

- Review of component reports
- Re-application of Mainstreaming and Decision-Making Assessments using the sampling approach set out in the M&E Strategy;
- Site visits to CRGE Facility sites based on purposive sampling
- Analysis of qualitative data from literature review and semi-structured interviews around key evaluation questions and criteria
- Case study analysis
- Portfolio analysis
- Value for money analysis

Communication and dissemination

It is assumed that the primary audience for the review will be DFID and GoE. Some sections may be shared with DFID directly.

Annex 2: List of documents reviewed

Documents review

Addis Ababa City Administration Environmental Protection Authority, 2015, Fast Track Project Proposal for Mount Jemo Wechecha Ecosystem Rehabilitation Project

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CRGE Facility, April 2015, Progress Report for all contributing Partners, Reporting Period (5): January 2015 – March 2015

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CRGE Facility, July 2015, Progress Report for all Contributing Partners, Reporting Period (5): April 2015 – June 2015

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CRGE Facility, May 2015, Operations Manual

CRGE Facility, November 2014, Facility Annual Report, Period: 08 November 2013 – 07 November 2014

CRGE Facility: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) and Ministry of Environment and Forest (MEF), CRGE Facility Quarterly Status Report February 2014 - May 2014,

CRGE Facility, July 2015, Progress Report for all Contributing Partners

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CRGE, February 2015, Progress Report for DFID

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DFID Ethiopia, Climate High-Level Investment Programme (CHIP) Business Case

DFID 2011 Strategic Vision for Women and Girls

DFID, Memorandum of Understanding with the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia for Non Budget support Financial Aid

DFID-CRGE Facility, May 2015, quarterly meeting minutes.

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Urban CRGE FTI Procurement Plan (Excel)

Annex 3: List of stakeholders interviewed

Name	Position and organisation
Abdulfatta Mohammed	CRGE Focal Person, Awubarre
Abdurezak Mahamud Ahmed	Head, Sanitation and Beautification Agency, Jiggiga Municipality
Abdurrahman Abdullahi	Head Accountant, WOFED Jiggiga
Abebaw Zewudu	Office Head, Wadla Woreda Environmental Office
Abebe Denlie	Plan & Program Head, Wadla Woreda Administration Office
Abebe Gashaw	Procurement Office, Ennesiesarmider
Abera Kassa	Coordinator, Early Warning Case Team, National Disaster Risk Management Commission
Aberash G/ Ezgiabeher	Gender mainstreaming and Youth Department Head, Women Affairs Directorate, Ministry of Urban Development and Housing
Abigail Jones	Advisor, USAID
Abyiot Wondie	Agribusiness Development Officer, Food Security Directorate, MoANR
Achenif Fante	Male Beneficiary, Wadla
Adam Ward	Advisor, GGGI
Admaso	Director, MoFEC
A dugna Nemera	Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, CRGE Facility, MoFEC
Agegnehu Habte	Deputy Office Head, Lay Gayint Woreda Agric. Office
Ahmed Habiib Ibraahim	Head, Somali Environmental Protection, Mines, Forest and Energy Development Agency (Bureau)
Ahmed Siraj	animal production & forage expert and FTI project woreda focal person, Sofi woreda Agriculture office
Alebegn Dessie	Veterinary Head, Enbsie Sar Midr Woreda Agricultural Office
Alemayehu Ayalew	FTI Focal Person, Wadla Woreda Administration Office
Alemitu Maaza	Female Beneficiary, Enebisie Sar Mider Woreda
Alemu Billow	Office Head, Dessie City Sanitary & Beautification office
Ali M. Gheddi	Project Officer, PRIME project, Mercy Corps -
Ambachew Misganaw	Extension Head, Wadla Woreda Administration Office
Asrat Bekele	GM ASGB consulting
Asrat Sete	Office Head, Wadla Woreda Administration Office
Atalay Abeje	Livestock Production Expert, Enbsie Sar Midr Woreda Agricultural Office
Awake Yitay	CRGE Green Technology Transfer Expert, Amhara Environmental, Forest and Wildlife Protection Development Authority
Axel Michaelowa	MD Switzerland, Perspectives

Ayalew Kebede	Office Head, Guba Lafto Woreda Agriculture and Natural Resource Office
Beker Abdulahi	Expert, research extension advisory council, Harari Agricultural Bureau
Belaynesh Birru	Director, Environment and Climate Change Directorate, MoWIE
Belete Masresha	Accountant, Enbsie Sar Midr Woreda Finance Office
Berhanu Ararsa	Urban Solid Waste Mgt Expert, Oromia Bureau of Rural Land & Environmental Protection
Berhanu Assefa	CRGE Coordinator, CRGE Unit, MOANR
Berihun Mulat	Accountant, Wadla Woreda Finance Office
Beza Kebedele	Finance manager, Climate Change Forum Ethiopia
Bob Fitch	Independent consultant
Boyalew Dirashot	Deputy Office Head, Wadla Woreda Administration Office
Ciara Silke	Climate Advisor, DFID
Damitew Abiye	Extension Expert, Zone Agricultural Office (Debre Tabor)
Daniel Dsaingo	Director, Planning Directorate, MOWIE
Daniel Fikreyesus	Director, Echnoserve
Daniel Yeo	Advisor, GGGI
Danil Mamo	Finance officer, Somali Regional Bureau of Agriculture
David Potter	Climate Advisor, DFID
Debrework Mekuanint	Female Beneficiary, Dessie Municipality
Degefa Duga	Soil & Water Conservation Monitoring Expert, Oromia Bureau of Rural Land & Environmental Protection
Demoz Asfaw	Consultant in NRM, REDD+
Dires LAKE	Procurement Office, Enbsie
Dr Mulugeta Ayalew	Advisor, PMO
Dr. Alemu Mekonnen	Independent consultant
Dr. Girma Balcha	Director, Climate Change Forum Ethiopia
Dr. Solomon	General manager of TPMO-transport program management office, Project Expert, Addis Ababa Bureau of Transport
Dr. Yirgamachew Seyoum	Director, Forestry Policy, Strategy and Regulation Directorate, MEFC
Eden	Finance Manager, Echnoserve
Eyob Amerga	Project Coordinator, Urban Greening Project, MUDH
Faisal Farah Mamood	Fund Accountant, Somali Bureau of Urban Development, Construction and Industry
Farhan Mahamod	CRGE Focal Person, Somali Regional Bureau of Agriculture
Fentahun Chekol	Chief Administrator, Enbsie Sar Midr Woreda

Fetlework Kelkay	Project Accountant Dessie City Sanitary & Beautification office
Fikresellassie Kebede	Development Agent, Kile Kebele
Firdawek Tesfaye	Livestock expert, Harari Agricultural Bureau
Fisseha	Internal Auditor, Echnoserve
Freyhiwot Nadew	Country Rep, Farm Radio Internat'l
Fufa Ararsa	M&E officer& CRGE focal, Oromia Bureau of Finance & Economic Development
Gebere Sellasie Kidane	Focal Person for CRGE, Tigray Bureau of Finance & Economic Development
Gebeyehu Tegegne	Deputy Administrator, Wadla Woreda Administration Office
Gebre Michel	Director, Environment Climate Change and Industry Zone Development Directorate, Ministry of Industry
Geshaw Melku	Department Head, Wadla Woreda Finance Office
Getachew Engidayehu	Natural Resources Conservation & Development Process Owner, Amhara Regional Agriculture & Natural Resources Bureau
Ghrmawit Haile	Director, Strategic Planning and Resource Mobilisation Directorate, MEFC
Girma Kibret	Carbon Monitoring Specialist (SLMP), Natural Resources Directorate, MoANR
Gizaw Eshetu	Project Expert, Addis Ababa Bureau of Transport
Gizework Hailu	Assistant/Woreda Admin, Lay Gayint
Guasie Endalemaw	Office Head, Enbsie Sar Midr Woreda Cooperative Office
Guled Tayib Ahmed	Urban Planner, CRGE Focal Person, Somali Bureau of Urban Development, Construction and Industry
H.E. Ato Wondimu Tekle	State minister, Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Electricity
H.E. Ato Kare Chawisha Debessa	State Minister, Ministry of Environment and Climate Change
Habtamu Getachew	Office Head, Enbsie Sar Midr Woreda Finance Office
Haile Sellasie Fiseha	Environmental Protection Process Owner
Haileab Girmayi	M&E expert, Tigray Bureau of Environmental Protection, Rural Land Administration & Use
Hamdi Abdulahi	CRGE Focal Person, Somali Environmental Protection, Mines, Forest and Energy Development Agency (Bureau)
Hamdi Sharif	Coop Chair, Kabribeya
Helal Haque	Program Manager CARE Ethiopia
Henok Assote	NRM Process Owner, Guba Lafto Woreda Agriculture and Natural Resource Office
Hiluf Hagos	Environmental Projects Coordinator, Tigray Bureau of Environmental Protection, Rural Land Administration & Use

Jafar Kadir	Development Agent, Kile Kebele
Jemel Nesru	Soil and Water Engineer/FTI project focal person, Harari Agricultural Bureau
Jobir	CRGE Focal point, Green Development Unit, Ministry of Transport
John Mayhew	Consultant, LTS
Kader Hassan	Project Officer, PRIME project, Mercy Corps -
Kassa Getie	Office Head, Enbsie Sar Midr Woreda Environmental Protection Office
Kokebe Bogale	NRM Process Owner, Lay Gayint Woreda Agric. Office
Koster Aytenew	Office Head, Enbsie Sar Midr Woreda Public Relation Office
Lars Ekman	Counsellor Climate Change & Energy Norway
Leul Hailu	TPMO's project management division head, Project Expert, Addis Ababa Bureau of Transport
Libanos Seyoum	Project Cordinator, Solid Waste Project, MUDH
Madie Dejen	Animal Health Expert, Lay Gayint Woreda Agric. Office
Meaza Tadele	Aid Mobilization & Coordination Process Owner, Tigray Bureau of Finance & Economic Development
Medhin Fisseha	Environmental and Social Safeguards Specialist, CRGE Facility, MoFEC
Melkamu Wale	Forestry Expert, Amhara Forest Enterprise
Mengist Melese	Natural Resources Process Owner, Enbsie Sar Midr Woreda Agricultural Office
Mergia Kuma	Senior Environmental Expert Department of Environment + Safeguard Directorate, IPDC
Meron Awaris	Programme Director, Echnoserve
Mesafint Yisemawe	Project Accountant, Lay Gayint
Meseret Tilahun	Office Head, Lay Gayint Woreda Cooperative Office
Mohammed Ahmed	Kabele Chair, CRGE Focal Point, Jogjiga
Mohammed Ibro Yesuf	Male Beneficiary Testimonial, Kile kebele
Mohammed Redwan Ahmed	Deputy Head, Harari Agricultural Bureau Finance Officer, Somali Environmental Protection, Mines, Forest and Energy Development Agency (Bureau)
Mulualem Anteneh	Crop Production Expert, Enbsie Sar Midr Woreda Agricultural Office
Muluye Ereta	Office Head, Wadla Woreda Livestock Development Office
Mustfa Ababu	MRV Senior Expert, CRGE Unit, MOANR
Nesredin Ahmed	Coordinator, Sofi woreda Agriculture office
Nuradih Yusef Ahmed	Manager of DHAMMAYS solid waste collection cooperative, Jigjiga Municipality

Nureidin Umar	Development Agent, Kile Kebele
Olikea Belachew	Programme Officer, Climate Change Forum Ethiopia
Paul Watkiss	Independent consultant
Professor Tadele Ferede	Independent consultant
Rigwadawitt Gebresilassie	Senior Finance Officer, finance directorate, IPDC
Robert Mukiza	Ethiopia country representative , GGGI
Robi Redda	Country head CDKN, CDKN
Rukia Seid	CRGE Focal Person, Directorate of Sanitation and Beautification, Ministry of Urban Development and Housing
Sabir Abdulmalik	Acting head, Gursum
Samirawit Tadesse	CRGE project finance officer, Harari Agricultural Bureau
Saro Aliyi	Female Beneficiary Testimonial , Kile kebele
Selemon Tilahun	CRGE project finance officer, Harari Agricultural Bureau
Shimelis Fekadu	Coordinator / Advisor, CRGE Facility, MoFEC
Sikinesh Beyenne	UNDP
Simret Mekonnen	Junior Expert, Echnoserve
Susan Tambi Matambo	World Bank Environmental specialist climate change, World Bank
Taye Tolera	Advisor and Head, State Minister's Office, Ministry of Health
Tayech Hurki	Women and Youth Director, Women and Youth Affairs Directorate, MEFCC
Tefera Aslechleby	Finance Head, Lay Gayint
Tefera Tadesse	Director, Natural Resources Directorate, MoANR
Temesgen Birhan	Office Head, Lay Gayint Woreda Agric. Office
Temesgen Mulualem	Agriculture & Forestry Sectors CRGE Regional Focal Person, Amhara Regional Agriculture & Natural Resources Bureau
Tena Adamu	Female Beneficiary, Wadla
Tenage Kidane	Gender Expert - Women Affairs Directorate, Women and Youth Affairs Directorate, MoANR
Tenaw Adamu	Male Beneficiary, Enebisie Sar Mider Woreda
Terhas Mebrahtu Hendeza	Director of Forest Fund Mobilization and Carbon Support Directorate, MEFCC
Tesfaye Kebede Yilma	Finance Officer, Green Development Unit, Ministry of Transport
Teshoms Alemu	NRM specialist CRGE focal point, Jogjiga
Tim Brown	Senior Natural Resource Management Specialist / Environmental Economist , World Bank

Tsegaye Tadesse	REDD+ TA, GGGI
Umar Usman	Kebele Chair, Kabribeya NRM
W/RFetle	Finance Head, Dessie City Sanitary & Beautification office
Walelign Abebaw	Office Head, Enbsie Sar Midr Woreda Water & Energy Office
Wandale Abebe	Livestock Section Head, Enbsie Sar Midr Woreda Agricultural Office
Wondifraw Assefa	Sanitary & Beautification Process Owner & FTI FP , Dessie City Sanitary & Beautification office
Woube	Focal Person, Ennesiesarmider
Wubie Yidse	Agriculture & Forestry Sectors CRGE Woreda Focal Person, Zone Agricultural Office (Debre Tabor)
Wuletaw Ayalew	Input Supply, Wadla Woreda Administration Office
Yaregal Chanie	Office Head, Wadla Woreda Cooperative Office
Yeshiber Dagnew	Forest Development & Management Expert, Amhara Forest Enterprise/Echnoserve
Yusuf Ibro	Chairman of Kile Kabele
Zena Habtemariam	Director of Planning, Planning Directorate MOANR
Zerihun Getu	Coordinator, CRGE Facility, MoFEC

Annex 4: Review Matrix

Criteria: Relevance / Effectiveness

1. How adequate and relevant were DIFD investments in the CRGE Facility to the Government of Ethiopia's ability to deliver its CRGE Vision and Strategies?

Sub-questions	Proposed indicators	Proposed data collection methods
1.1. To what extent has donor funding to the CRGE facility contributed to the GoE's ability to deliver the CRGE?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Extent to which the FTIs/TA/DFID engagement contributed to the creation of an institutional set up that has successfully leveraged additional climate resources - Level of understanding/learning achieved about the practicalities of CRGE implementation – do sectors know “what CRGE looks like on the ground?” - Evidence available to support the relevance / quality / impact of the interventions (in relation to both DFID/GoE priorities) prioritised during the FTI process - Level of capacity at national and local level for integrating CRGE considerations (as above) - Extent to which donor investments/engagement have influenced this capacity - Extent to which this capacity is resulting in actual change in delivery - number and type of policy and investment decisions credibly influenced by DFID or other donor funding/engagement 	Review of national capacity assessment documents; MCAM analysis for sectors; stakeholder interviews at kebele to national level.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Views on trade-offs between equity across sectors and CRGE contribution or between different objectives of CRGE. 	
1.2. To what extent are CHIP-funded CRGE results being delivered up to end May 2016?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comparison between FTI proposals and reports - Analysis/quality rating of FTI project portfolio based on the following criteria: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Outreach (% of results targets met – e.g. hectares, # of technologies installed, beneficiaries) - Accuracy of budgeting (# of budget lines with over 10% variance or where changes to budget were not justified) 	<p>Literature Review</p> <p>Field visits & interviews with CRGE implementers</p> <p>Focus group discussions and beneficiary testimonial collection</p>
1.3. What remains to be delivered up to December 2016?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Realistic timeframe (Whether the duration of financial support was realistic for the ambition of the project) - Quality of financial reporting (clarity of reports and time invested by CRGE Facility in financial management support) - Quality of monitoring data (time invested by CRGE Facility in M&E Support; knowledge of M&E process by respondents from kebele, woredas, region and sector level for each sector). - Quality of implementation of at least four projects from different sectors based on case study analysis in two regions 	<p>Technical specialists critical review of results</p>
1.4. To what extent do women and girls benefit from CHIP-funded CRGE results?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Number and % of women and/or female headed households benefitting from FTIs. - Extent to which an analysis of the drivers of gender inequality were taken into consideration in the design of each FTI - Extent to which gender benefits or risks are routinely reported 	<p>Sector FTI proposals and reports.</p> <p>Interviews with FTI implementers at woreda and kebele level.</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Extent to which both men and women in male-headed households and female heads of households were able to participate in FTIs or to benefit from project outcomes. - Extent to which labour or risk burden created by the programme activities was distributed between both women and men in male-headed households or female-headed households. - Extent to which other vulnerable groups (girls, youth, disabled people, low income groups may benefit from different interventions). 	<p>Focus group discussions and interviews with women and men.</p> <p>Review of implementation design, interviews with FTI implementers and focus group discussions.</p>
<p>1.5. Is there a trade-off between programmatic thinking and mainstreaming objectives?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Level of integration between CRGE programmatic plans and other policy/programmes in the sector - Level of integration of institutional structures for delivery of CRGE versus other policy/programmes - Time investment in programmatic planning across sectors - Assessment of different delivery approaches with respect to mainstreaming and programmatic planning objectives - Extent to which results were delivered using FTI resources and co-financing from other programmes or GoE core budget 	<p>Document review of CRGE Programmatic Plans</p> <p>Interviews with Sectors</p> <p>Interviews with non-CRGE Facility run sector programmes</p>

Criteria: Efficiency/Effectiveness

2. Were the outcomes that this investment achieved, worth achieving given the investment? Did the programme represent value for money?

Sub-questions	Proposed indicators	Proposed data collection methods
2.1. How do costs per output compare across CHIP investments?	<p>ETB leveraged from other sources, including GoE budget. (this is important in understanding wider impact but also in correctly calculating costs per output)</p> <p>£ per hectare of urban area 'greened'</p> <p>£ per hectare afforested</p> <p>£ per hectare forest protected</p> <p>£ per solar home system installed</p> <p>£ per biogas system installed</p> <p>£ per solar water pump installed</p> <p>£ per HH reached with a rural agricultural or income generating intervention (set of interventions to be evaluated to be agreed with MoA and MEF)</p>	The feasibility of this depends on our access to high quality monitoring and financial reporting data and on ability to reach agreement on how to apportion total programme costs.
2.2. What are the changes in CRGE Facility outcome indicators? To what extent can these be attributed to FTI investments? What costs have been incurred to achieve these outcomes?	<p>Possible outcome indicators will be assessed based on data availability⁴⁷:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Average net number of months of HH food insecurity (#) – disaggregated by female & male-headed households - Average improvement in yield of key crops 	No data accessed to date. CRGE Facility report they do not feel data is likely to be available. MoARN contacted to explore other possibilities. Another

⁴⁷ To be discussed and agreed with the CRGE Facility.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Average value of household assets (%) – disaggregated by female & male-headed households - Number of households reporting a wider variety of livelihood strategies (disaggregated by male and female-headed) - Number of people accessing low emission or improved efficiency energy technologies, disaggregated by: Rural (W/M); Urban (W/M) - Installed solar capacity (type, GWh) - Cost of projects contributing to these outcomes 	<p>option is the data from Humanitarian Assessments and PSNP monitoring.</p> <p>MOWIE monitoring records.</p> <p>MOWIE monitoring records.</p> <p>Sector financial reports.</p>
<p>2.3. How do cost drivers across CRGE Facility projects compare?</p>	<p>% of CRGE Facility project budgets spent on staff</p> <p>% of CRGE Facility project budget spent on GoE DSA</p> <p>Estimate of hidden costs from non-billable GoE staff inputs (e.g. CRGE Facility / Sector Unit staff not included in projects)</p> <p>Comparison of input costs of items frequently procured to be agreed with CRGE Facility but which may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Poultry - Beehives / bee-keeping equipment - Seeds (map most frequently procured types with MoA/MEF staff) - Tree seedlings (map most frequently procured types with MoA/MEF/MUDHC/MOI staff) - Polythene tubes - Daily wage rates for soil and water conservation (map across MEF and MoA) - Solar home system 	<p>The feasibility of this depends on our access to data from the GoE accounting systems in each sector. To be confirmed.</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Biogas digester - Consultancy time (daily rate) 	
2.4. How could resources be used more effectively to maximise results?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comparison of procurement and design approaches across sectors and components - Stakeholder perceptions of existing cost savings and opportunities for greater efficiency 	<p>Financial data as above.</p> <p>Interviews with stakeholders, including beneficiaries.</p> <p>Benchmarking between woredas or regions or from the literature.</p>
2.5 What impact would scaling projects have on overall costs?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Calculate additional costs which might be incurred for larger investments around management, design, safeguards etc. - Explore possibilities of economies of scale in 2-3 interventions based on detailed analysis through case studies 	<p>Project budgets, expenditure reports, interviews with stakeholders.</p>

Criteria: Effectiveness / Sustainability

3. What are the factors that enable technical assistance provided by CHIP (and other partners) to successfully contribute to improvements in the Government of Ethiopia's systems for climate response?

Sub-questions	Proposed indicators	Proposed data collection methods
3.1. What TA have DFID and other partners provided in relation to CRGE? (sample of visible and varied examples, ideally including both successful and unsuccessful examples)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Description of TA objectives and services provided for 2-3 examples of TA. - No. of days of TA provided and unit costs - Linkage to other sources of TA - Results from TA as perceived by providers and recipients (Both short and long-term) 	<p>Case study approach based on interview and document review.</p> <p>TA "Cases" selected based on criteria proposed in this report.</p>
3.2. To what degree was CHIP TA integrated with other technical assistance to the Ethiopian government? What impact did this have on effectiveness?	This question will be covered in the response above.	
3.3. What are the main factors in Ethiopia that drive whether TA achieves its objectives or not?	<p>Literature review will identify criteria against which TA in Ethiopia can be examined. Criteria identified in previous literature review include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Level of ownership by recipient - Extent to which TA strengthens coordination capacity - Extent to which TA enables system-wide change - Extent to which TA objectives were realistic and focused on a 'change-ready' recipient - Extent to which TA was flexible to changing needs - Extent to which TA was integrated into a pre-defined policy or delivery target 	Analytical work based on case studies

Annex 5: Sample data collection tools

Interview guide for non-FTI bureau staff at regional / woreda level

(e.g. BOFED / Regional Environmental Bureaus / Regional President's offices)

1. Mainstreaming issues

- 1.1. How long have you worked in this area? Do you see / hear about changes in the weather and the environment? What is the GoE doing to tackle these in your sector?
- 1.2. What do you know about the GoE CRGE vision and strategy? What does this mean for your sector in particular? Have you received any new strategies/directives/instructions in line with CRGE?
- 1.3. Have you developed any strategies or plans for CRGE at the regional level? Can you share these? What are the main priorities? How do these add to the national documents? Does the strategy or plan include gender issues?
- 1.4. Has anything changed in terms of your annual planning and budgeting processes in the last two years related to environmental issues/CRGE?
- 1.5. Has anything changed in your day-to-day work? Has anything changed in terms of how you carry out environmental risk assessments or focus on green activities?
- 1.6. What else do you think the GoE should be doing in this area to implement CRGE?
- 1.7. Which of the three areas of CRGE – growth/poverty reduction / adaptation and resilience / mitigation and environmental management are most important in your work? Are there any trade-offs between the three goals?
- 1.8. What, if any, are the arrangements in your region / woreda for coordinating the climate response across sectors?
- 1.9. If any, how do you get communications about CRGE? Where do they come from?
- 1.10. What kind of capacity would you need to be able to do this? Are there specific needs in terms of human or physical capacity that would help?

2. Leverage and influence of the FTI project

- 2.1. Are you aware of the different projects funded under the fast track initiative of the CRGE Facility (MOFEC) in this region?
- 2.2. What role have you played in the management of these projects?

- 2.3. If involved, what went well? What were the challenges?
- 2.4. What do you think has been learned from these projects?
- 2.5. Has any of that learning already changed how you do your work (e.g. annual plans or budgets?) How could it in future?
- 2.6. If the projects were scaled up in future, would be needed to ensure effective management and coordination at the regional level?

3. The Future

- 3.1. What else would you like to see happen in your woreda/ region to respond to CRGE?
- 3.2. What specifically needs to happen to help you do this?

Focus Group Discussion Guide- Forestry projects

Discussion with Project Beneficiaries

Who should be in this group?

Project beneficiaries should be split by gender so you should have all women or all men, not a mix. The following people should be excluded from the FGD and interviewed separately: Kebele or woreda officials, the DA, Lead Farmers involved in training others/collecting monitoring data, any other project implementer. FGDs should contain between 8-12 people as per the *Guide on FGD Participants*. Please call and confirm with organiser in advance to ensure the right number of people are likely to attend and to ensure that timings are convenient to ensure participation of women and men.

According to project documents and reports, the case study projects have the following activities:

Amhara: Nursery establishment, Bee-keeping, fruit seedling propagation and planting, sheep fattening, poultry production and joint forest management site selection and planting in collaboration with the Amhara Forest Enterprise, improved stove production.

Somali; Jijiga Woreda Karamara hills: Established nursery site with solar water pumping system; enclose areas; afforest peri-urban buffer area; implement SWC measures; adopt improved fruit seed production; encourage HHs to adopt improved fodder production, and cut and carry system; establish woodlots.

Somali: Kebrebayeh, Establish 2 x community-based nurseries, produce seedlings to cover 150ha, construct SWC measures on 100ha of closed degraded areas, and form one cooperative.

Before beginning this group, carry out the interview with Woreda Officials and Development Agent so you have a good understanding of the activities reported to have taken place in the area. All these activities are important to our review and you should focus on those which have happened in the kebeles

visited. If all are present and time is a limiting factor – focus particularly on **the afforestation, joint forest management and soil and water conservation activities.**

Note: If you get a chance to make a physical visit to any project activities, please do try and take photographs which can be used in the report and share these with LTS. Consider also taking a few photographs of the review in progress. Think quality rather than quantity! A few high quality shots are better than badly framed pictures of every single focus group or activity. When taking photographs of people, explain how the photo may be used (for LTS reports to MOFEC and DFID) and ensure they have given their consent before taking the photograph.

PART A1: IDENTIFICATION

ENSURE YOUR NOTES ARE LABELLED WITH THIS INFORMATION ABOUT THE GROUP

1. REGION:	
2. WOREDA/MUNICIPALITY:	
3. KEBELE:	
4. PROJECT:	
5. DATE OF INTERVIEW:	

PART A2: INTRODUCTION AND CONSENT

Introduction: We are from a company called LTS International/B&M Consultants. We are here to talk about projects which were funded by the UK Government through the Government of Ethiopia Climate Resilient Green Economy Facility. We are interested in the project that has been promoting the planting of tree seedlings and soil and water conservation in this kebele. *If there are beekeeping/poultry/sheep fattening/activities in the kebele, you may also mention these.*

We would like to get your feedback on that project and on your situation in general. We will use the information you give us to give ideas to the UK Government which provided the funds.

Confidentiality: We are an independent team that is not involved in making decisions about the project. We want to give advice to improve the project activities. We would like you to be very open. We will treat all what you say confidentially and we will not mention who says what in our report or in conversation.

Participant check: We want to divide people into different groups so that we can understand different perspectives. This is a group for people who have been involved in the projects that have set up tree nurseries, done soil and water conservation (or *participated in livelihood activities promoted alongside this such as beekeeping, poultry production or*

sheep fattening). Please can you confirm that you fit in this group or leave the group if you don't fit this description.

We want you to be able to talk freely about your own experiences. Please can those very important people who have been involved in implementing the project or leadership roles in the community leave the group now. This includes anyone who is a Kebele Official, a staff of the Municipality, or anyone with a role in managing the project on behalf of the Government or other organisation. We recognise that these people have lots of useful information to share and we hope that you will be able to come back at x clock so we can do a separate interview with you. *Prompt – you may need to ask several times in different ways and find other light hearted ways of ensuring these individuals leave the group and are far enough away to avoid eavesdropping or other forms of influencing.*

Guidelines: Only one person should talk at a time, no names will be attributed to any of the comments, there are no right or wrong answers to any of these questions, only different points of view and it's important that you speak up whether you agree or disagree, importance of hearing all opinions either positive or negative, importance of respecting each other's opinions.

Timing and consent: Our discussion will last around 2 hours. You do not have to participate in this group if you don't want to. Anyone who doesn't want to participate, should feel free to leave now.

PART B: Composition of the focus group *Ensure you record this information about the participants of the group. The disaggregation by older/younger can be done visually. But you will need to ask those from landless and female-headed households to identify themselves. If this can be done privately prior to the group starting, it is preferable.*

No. of women	
No. of men	
No. of older (45+)	
No. of young (16-25)	
No. of Female Headed Households	
No. of people from landless HH	
No. of people with disabilities	

So you can easily refer to data on social difference, give each member of the group a number and note their characteristics (e.g. older/younger/disabled, FHH). Then you can number comments made by the informants who were speaking. This can help for noting trends in responses across older/younger participants or landless or people with disabilities.

PART C: GOAL-FREE DISCUSSION TO DRAW OUT BENEFICIARY PRIORITIES AND INTERESTS

20 minutes

Start with some small talk and rapport building – ask people how they are doing? Whether they already know each other? How their journey was to the site? Any other small topics that are designed to put people at their ease, make it clear this is different from a formal training and create an atmosphere conducive to informal communication. Ensure that both young and old participate here and are encouraged to participate throughout.

Explain that before we get to the questions that we want to ask about the project we are keen to hear from you about some of your priorities and the most important changes that you have experienced in the last year or so.

1. What are the biggest changes that have happened in your community in the last 2 years? Try to compare the situation before and after 2 years.

Explain: Your response to this can be project or not project related – we appreciate that the project is only a small part of what is going on – this question is to tell us what kind of changes are happening in this area, if they are positive or negative. People should take ‘the community to mean’ the group of people around them and with who they share their lives. Please just talk from your own perspective.

PART D: RESULTS OF THE PROJECT

45 minutes

2. What has the forestry and livelihoods project done in this area? When did it start? What are the main activities that you have been involved in? *Check these against the list provided by the DA before and prompt if any major activities are missing.*

Ask probing questions to understand how these activities have actually gone – e.g. What type of seedlings did you plant? Was the timing of the distribution right? How many seedlings survived after planting? Where inputs were received, probe and check whether these were received as ‘grants’ or ‘loans’, either to individuals or groups, and ask about repayments in the later questions on investment into the activities.

3. Were you asked for your thoughts on the project before it started? How? What happened as a result of this? Were your ideas taken into consideration?
4. How do these activities compare to what the DAs and agriculture bureau were doing before? What is the same? What is different? *Probe to find out if the type of activity or the process by which it is implemented are different.*
5. How were you selected to join these activities? Were there other people who wanted to join certain activities but couldn't? What reasons were used to select some people over others for the different activities? Did they use any selection criteria? Is there any special criteria to select women participants?
6. What efforts have you put into the project? Did you need to invest any money? time? Other? How much time / money have you used so far? Do you still have to make any repayments on a loan, how much?
 - 6.1. Do men and women do different tasks / put in different amounts of labor/time/money? If so, how much?
 - 6.2. Did you face any additional work burden because of the project activity? If yes, how did you handle it?
7. What did you get out of it? What are the most important benefits for you? *Probe to quantify benefits where possible – at least for one or two individuals.*

For each of the most important benefits, ask:

- 7.1. Are there any other projects/factors/ changes that have contributed to you getting these benefits besides the project? If so, what are they?
- 7.2. Do you feel the effort you put in is worth it given the benefits to you?
- 7.3. Do you feel this benefits is different for women and men? If so, how/why?
8. What are the most important benefits to other people (not those directly involved in the project)? The local area/environment?
9. How could the project make a bigger contribution to greater equality between men and women? What specific activities were done in the project to create the equality between men and women?

10. Do you think you will keep on getting these benefits in the future? Why / why not? *Probe to understand the financial model / likely sustainability*

PART E: CHALLENGES AND RISKS

20 minutes

11. How much do these activities respond to your priorities and concerns? Do you face other, more pressing, challenges which are unaddressed? *Probe drawing on answers from the first question if appropriate.*
12. Did you face any challenges because of your gender/ women and men?
13. Are there any aspects of the project which have been challenging for you? Or caused problems for you or others involved in them? If yes, please describe how. *For each problem identified, ask:*
 - 13.1. What did you do about this? Was any action taken as a result? Did you receive any feedback from the project if you raised a concern?
14. Are there any people who may be in a worse situation as a result of this project? Who are they? Why have things got worse for them?
In relation to this question, use your own understanding of the project activities to probe – e.g. if a land enclosure has been set up, ask Who used that land beforehand? How were they compensated?

PART F: RESPONSES TO THE CHANGING CLIMATE IN THE FUTURE

15 minutes

15. In relation to the project we were discussing earlier, what are your priorities for the next few years?
16. Ask older people (women and men)– how would you say the weather has changed since you were young (30 years ago or so)
17. What have you done yourselves in response to these changing conditions? What has this achieved?
18. How has the Government responded to these changing conditions? What has that achieved? Which are the most important things that it has done?
19. What else do you think could be done to help you make a good livelihood whatever happens with the weather?
 - 19.1. What could be done by you as a community?
 - 19.2. What could be done by the Government of Ethiopia?

PART G: FURTHER QUESTIONS ON GENDER

10 minutes

20. Is there any group that you feel is particularly vulnerable and needs to participate more in this project or get more services/support from the Government?
21. How could the Government help this group to participate more or get more benefit from this kind of project in future?
If the answers above do not relate to women/girls or a gendered subgroup, then ask some probing questions – What about women? Do they have specific needs? How could support to meet these needs be offered? How could the DAs contribute to making the situation for men and women more equal?

PART H: THANKS, VALIDATION AND ANY QUESTIONS

5 minutes

Thank you so much for giving your time to talk with us about your experiences. We have taken note of what you have said and will include your ideas in our report. *Summarize the most important key messages from the group at this point and confirm that we have correctly understood.*

Is there anything else you would like to discuss with us about this project?

Are there any questions that you would like to ask us before we leave the group?